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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
UTAH ClOPPER COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff arnd Respondent, 
vs. 
STEPHEN HAYS ESTATE, 
INC., a corporation of Utah, 
.JULIA HAY'S HOGE, STE-
PHEN J. HAYS, LAW-
R,ENCE J. HAYS, MRS. LOU 
GORJ;~Y, MRS. ETHEL V. 
REILLEY and MARY 
LOUISE 0 'DONNELL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 5302 
REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS 
THE ISSUE 
Plaintiff is under the strange obsession that plain-
tiff by a declaration of "plaintiff's purpose" in captur-
ing waters in Tract C has in some way solved the issues 
in this case. It makes not one whit of difference what 
plaintiff may declare its purpose to be. It may be that 
plaintiff has hynotized itself as to the nature of its pur-
pose, but the purpose of law suits and courts is to find 
out what the real effect of claims and conduct is and not 
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what the declared purpose of one of the litigants i:,;. 
Plaintiff's purpose is to capture waters in catchment C. 
AH to this there can !be no dispute. If the waters belong 
to the defendant, plaintiff admits that plaintiff has no 
lawful means hy which plaintiff may be permitted to take 
Hw waters in 'l'raet C. Both plaintiff and defPIHlant 
elairn these same waters. Piaintiff admits that if the 
or·cler of occupancy eutprecl on .June 13, H)'28, and ex-
pressly made "without prejudice~" and only "ppnding 
the action" had not been Pntered plaintiff could not have 
captured these waters in Tract C, not !because plaintiff 
\vould have been a trespasser hut bceansc the waters 
(those that had been in the dump) would have passecl 
from plaintiff's cnvnership when they entered the land 
of the clefendm1t. The order is the only new and dder-
minativc incident in the situation 011 \\'hieh plaintiff rc>-
lies. Did thl:' onler of June l:J, 1~)28, h~· \Vhich plaintiff 
\Yas permitted ''pending the action'' mul ''without pn•-
jnclice" to enter upon the land of the defell(lant and 
c·apture the waters which othenvi:,;e are admittecl to have 
belonged to the defendant, chm1ge the owiwrRhip of the 
waterR baek to the plaintiff? If it clid, the order waR not 
"without prejudice'' but destrueti vc> of defendant's 
ovvnership. Plaintiff contend:,; that plaintiff became the 
(JWner of the waters ("eoutinued to be owner", plaintiff 
phrase:,; it, hut plaintiff cannot eontinue to lw what plain-
tiff never was-OWNER OF W A'rEH IN 'rRACT C) 
hy reason of the order; (lefewlant eontends that such a 
resnlt is not possible nuder the statute, but that if it is 
possible plaintiff must pay defendant for the copper 
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solutions which plaintiff will take. This plaintiff refuses 
to do. 
Plaintiff has an idea that while Tract C had a 
valua'ble water right appurtenant to that tract on .June 
12, 1928, the day before the order was entered, that the 
valuable water right was lost by some legal hokus-pokus 
on .June 13, 1928, by the entry of the order of oc.c•upancy 
"pending the action" and "without prejudice". This 
law suit is to determine whether the order had the effect 
claimed by the plaintiff or was in fact entered, as it ex-
pressly provided, "without prejudice" and only "pend-
ing the action". 
GeHeral Ben Butler is giveu ereclit for having stated 
tltnt the law i:,; "that whieh i:,; confidently stated and 
;-;toutl.v maiutaiued". Apparently counsel for plaintiff 
feel that this is not ouly a good policy 'vith reference to 
the la\Y, reg'm·dle:,;:,; of what the cases may hold, but i;-; 
partieularly applicable to fact:,;. A reading of re-
spoll(lcnt's 'brief i:,; surprising, to say tht> least, with n)-
ferencc to some statements therein contained. ·w c will, 
therefore, at the outset of this reply, eaii attention of 
the court to ·a few statements of counsel before proceed-
illg to eousi<ler the argument. 
WHO OWNS THE FgE OF THE BINGHAM & GARFIELD 
RIGHT OF WAY? 
On page :3, wherein 'Plaintiff seeks to give this court 
a ·statpment of the fads, plaintiff states that almost the 
whole of the :,;urface area .between plaintiff's dumps aud 
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piaintiff's intake is occupied exclusively by the Bingham 
& Garfield Railway Company for railroad purposes 
''for the most part upon lm1d whereof plaintiff' is the 
owner of the fee, the remainder in part under a decree 
of condemnation and in part by conveyance from the 
defendants' predecessor in interest". Thi.s is contrary 
to the evide1we in the case. The Bingham & Garfield 
Raihwt,\' Company owns the land lying between the fee 
land of plaintiff and the Valentine Serip property be-
longing to defendants. Plaintiff mms no land in Dixon 
Gulch adjoining the lands of defendants. The interven-
ing land is owned by the Bingham & Garfield R,ailway 
Company (Ab. 117), and plaiHtijf has no rig·ht on the 
lands of defendants whatsom·er, nor does its property 
even adjoin that of defendants. At one stage in the pro-
ceedings defendants endeavored to have counsel for 
plaintiff concede that the Bingham & Garfield Railway 
Company was i11 souw way related to or owned by the 
plaintiff, but t lw.v Tcfmwd to admit any rela ti onshi p 
whatsoever. ('Jlr. t)l) 
DOES PLAINTIFF OWN DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY? 
Not m!ly iu the statemeut, hut through the cutin' 
brief we find the following phrases used repeatedly: 
'"ro plaintiff's intake ou Tract C"; "plnintijj"s intake 
on 'l'ract C"; "]Jlai1difJ''s intake was constructed upon 
'l'ract C", de. .Just \dwre does plaintiff get the im-
pression that it owns nuy intnkC' upon TraC't C? One 
would think from a reading of the stateme11t and the 
hrief that this iutaln~ npo11 'Pract C belongs to plaintiff 
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awl is upon plaintiff's land. 'l'hi.s intake upon Tract C 
is upon the lands and premises of defendant. Plaintiff 
O\vns no intake upon Tract C any more than it owns the 
waters which are seeping and percolating across and 
arise within Tract D. Plaintiff is in this action seeking 
the right to aequire 'rract C for the purpose of an intake, 
but it certainly owns none at the present time, and any 
''intake of plaintiff on Traot C'' is only a figment of 
counsel's imagina ti ou. 
DOES PLAINTII<'F "EXCLUSIVELY OCCUPY" THE BlNGHAfif & 
GARFIELD RAILWAY RIGHT OF WAY? 
Plaintiff iu its brief says on page 3 that the rail-
road right of way "is oceupied exclusively by the Bing-
ham & Garfiel<l Railway Company for its railroad pur-
poses''; and ou page 110 plaintiff says: ''and the 
Bingham &: Garfield Railway Company is in the ex-
clusive possession of the premises (Tract D) anyway." 
The word "exclusive" is a very positive and compre-
hensive word and has considerable dynamite in it. If 
plaintiff uses this word advisedly, plaiutiff must fol<l 
its tent, like the Arab, and as sileutl;' steal away out 
of this law suit. If the Railway Company oceupies the 
premises exelusively, the defendant has no right of oc-
cupancy therein for any purpose, and the plaintiff can 
comlenm no rights from the defendant iu this action. 
'l1 1JC truth is that the Railway Company oceu:pies the 
premises for raihvay purposes only aml the defendant 
retains the right to use the premises iu all respects uot 
iueousisteut with or interfering with the railwa~, com-
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parry's use for railway purposes-including mining· 
rights-including the right to collect copper solutions 
on and in these prernise·s. If this is not true, why is 
plaintiff attempting to acquire these mining rights, these 
rights to eollect eopper solutions in this action from the 
defendant~ Plaintiff has not cited a single authority in 
its brief in any way qualifying the authorities cited on 
pages 55-67 of appellant '·s !brief upholding~ our bon-
tention that the rail way's occupation is not exclusive, 
and that the defendant retains title for all purposes not 
inconsistent or interfering with the :milway's use of the 
premises for railway purpos0s, including all mining 
rights. Certainly the exclusiveness of the railway in its 
occupancy of Tract D, if not purely fictional, is im-
partial in its •suhstantialne.ss and would apply equally 
against the plaintiff collecting copper solutions through 
condemnation proceedings as against the defendant, the 
owner of the fee. And if, on second thought, the plain-
tiff concludes that plaintiff's claim for the "exclusive 
character'' of the railway's occupancy doe.s not make 
the purpose of plaintiff's action ridiculous, perhaps the 
defendant could collect water out of the toe of the fill on 
its own land even though a mining company may not in 
the interest of its own mining destroy the rig·ht of 
another person to mine in and on its own land. 
Certainly if the railway company occupies the rail-
road right of way "exclusively", the plaintiff could ob-
t.ain nothing from the· defendant in this action. 
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On page 4 of plaintiff's brief plaintiff prodaims its 
intention to confine its use of the railroad fill "to the 
surface in ih; natural condition" .• Just what virtue there 
is in this limitation, if the limitation be true in fact, 
plaintiff docs not enlighten tlw court; but eertainly 
whatever reality there may be in the limitation, it ap-
plies with equal impartialit.v to the defendant's use of 
its own propert~· as to the proposed use by plaintiff of 
defendant's property, and the virtue, if <any and if true 
iu fad, will enure to the owner of the land as muell as 
to tlll' a ttemptiug condemnor. Our own idea about the 
matter is that there is nothing to the limitation. If the 
plaintiff tllay r·ondemn a right to use the railroad right 
of wa~c at all, the fact that t-meh usc requires some modi-
fir·ntiou of tlw "snrface in it.s uatural condition", if such 
modificatiou does not interfere with the usc by the rail-
road of tlw t·igl1t of wa.v for railroad purposes, woul(l 
not in itselt' alone give the railroad or the defendant thP 
right to eomplain. But will the plaintiff use the surface 
ot' the right of wa~· o11l.lf in its natural condition? 
DOE~ PLAINTIFF INTEND ONLY TO USE THE "~URFACE" OJ<' 
THE ltAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY IN ITS "NATURAL CONDITION?" 
Plaintiff's brief says: ''plaintiff, to preserve its 
property in the .solutions mHl the copper they contain, 
was eompelled to institute this suit to condemn that 
ri o·bt'' (the riu:h t to ('OnVe\.' these solutions aeross this ~ ' (_J • 
tract though am 1 undl'r the Tail Toad fill) "sub jed to 
the railroad eompany's easements, limiting its use to thP 
snrfact> iu its natural condition, without any right to 
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enter or penetrate beneath the surface or to disturb tlte 
condition of the surface.'' It is then ~suggested that 
Exhibit 11 (Tr. GO) gives to the plaintiff the "use and 
occupation of this .surface for that purpose." Plaintiff 
may not mean that Exhibit 11 purports to limit plain-
tiff. Certainly Exhibit 11 attempts to authorize plain-
tiff to do anything plaintiff wants to do on "any part 
or the whole of said 'premises ·~ * * and * * ·~ does 
lwreby consent, in ·So far as any rights or easements 
owned or poss,essed by it over, upon, in, beneath, or 
through the said premises are concerned, that Copper 
Company may enter upou and do or cause to be done 
any and all acts and things that will not at any time in-
terfere with the proper use and enjoyment of said prem-
ises by railroad company.'' The statement of plaintiff 
as to the nature of Exhibit 11 is characteristic of pl·ain-
tiff's attitude in a number of matters in this action. On 
the trial the efforts of appellant to compel the plaintiff; 
in view of plaintiff's assertion that all plaintiff wanted 
was a ditch to confine itself to a description of land 
resembling something like what a ditch usually looks 
like, resulted only in plaintiff saying that what plain-
tiff wanted was the entire \Vidth of the gulch and height 
of the railroad fill, and that the entire guleh constituted 
the well-defined eourse of the water from plaintiff's 
dump, and that plaintiff must have it all. Now plain-
tiff says that all it wants is the natural surface of the 
ground over which the Bingham & Garfield Railway 
Company has its fill. If plaintiff were to be taken at its 
own word and the court were to exclude from the plain-
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tiff's rights all waters percolating and seeping or flow-
ing through the railroad fill and above "the surface in 
its natural condition", plaintiff would soon change its 
tune. What plaintiff \Vants is the right to collect the 
copper waters appearing at the toe of Tract D, and 
plaintiff will theoretically indicate what its "purpose" 
is and how it will use only the "surface in its natural 
condition", but would be very much opposed to any 
limitation in the decree in accordance with its verbal 
protestations, particularly if the eourt were to require 
plaintiff to demonstrate that it would make only such 
use of ib proposed right-of-way. As a matter of fact, 
the wifi:wsscs for plaintiff, all of them, indicated that 
the only thing· that is definite and eertain is that the 
water reaches rrract D and can be caught in the catch-
ment, Tract C. 
APPELLANT CONTESTS PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO CONDEMN NOT 
ONLY TRACT D BUT TRACTS A, B, C, AND D. 
On page 5 is this: "But Tracts B and Care required 
for the collection, diversion and conveying away of the 
copper solutions in Dixon Gulch the defendants concede 
to the plarintifl, so on the proof defendants do not contest 
plaintiff's condemna-tion of any of Tracts A, B or C." 
Just where does plaintiff get the impression that there 
are any solutions in defendants' property in Dixon 
Gulch which defendants concede to plaintiff, other than 
those which are brought by the pipe line from Carr Fork 
and other areas~ So also, where is the proof that de-
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fcndanis do not eo11tcst plai11tiff'H comlenma.tioJJ of 
Tract C f We fear that counsel will have considerable 
difficulty in pointing to any statement of defendants in 
the answer or in their briefs where any such concessions 
arc made. On the contrary, defendantH have through-
out the trial a11d throughout their briefs maintaine<l ~md 
contended for ownership of all waters iu Dixon Gulch 
enteriug the lands and premises of defendants other 
than in a pipe line, and ecrtainly have resisted to the 
utmost of their ability the c·ondemnation of Tract C aml 
the capture of the Dixon Guldt waters upou 'l'ract C, 
which iH nothing mon~ or lesH than a reduction to pos-
session of defendants' "·aters upon dd'cnd;.mts' own 
prenuses. Tract C is the pl<H'P where all waters are 
reducl•d to possessio11. ] t iH Hituated upon the land ~md 
premise:-; of dcfen<lant:-; Hll(l belongs to defell<lants. How 
ean plaintiff sa;· that we do not ('ontest the <•mJdemnation 
of Tract C'! ThiH is Hilly iu the extreJIIP. 
Appellant <lisputeH tlw right of the plaintiff to con-
demn 'l'nwts R, C, aml D absolutely and also 'J'rad A 
as far as tlw eonderrmation of this tract in any wa.\· in-
terferes with Uw <'oilectioll by appellant of tlw watm·s 
in 'l'raet ]) in the catchment in Tract C. rl'he court will 
understand tlw Hitnation. 'l'rad C is a catchment in 
which is eolleeted all tile waters from rrracts A and D, 
induding the <lrai11 tunnel, and rrraet B is a pipe which 
('arrics the waters away from rrract C. 'l'here is <·ol-
lccted in rl'ract C through Traet A waterH from Cottou-
wood Gulch. These waterH are emptied into the eateh-
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ment by a p1pe following the courses of Tract A. In 
emptying into the catchment they commingle with waters 
which the plaintiff brings from outside the land belong-
ing to the appellant, water which is mingled with the 
water in Tract D, and the workings also interfere with 
the convenient collection by the appellant of itl:l water 
from Tract D. ~~or this reason objection is made to the 
condenmatiou of Tracts A and B as far as the tracts are 
used to collect the waters into the catchment at C. If 
the pipe over 'l'rart B is continued on down the gulch 
so that it will not empty its water into the catchment 
at C, there will be no objection, hut at the present time 
there is, and there always hal:l been, objeetion to this 
line to the extent that it interferes with appellant's right 
to eolle<"t itt~ own water from Tract D in the catchment, 
rrract c. 
DID DEFENDANT RELINQUISH CLAIM ON COPPER SOLUTIONS 
FROM DRAIN TUNNEL? 
In this connection we desire to refer to the drain 
tunnel and the pipe leading therefrom. There could be 
no objection to the eondenmation of a right to maintain 
this pipe from the drain tunnel, except as its waters are 
now emptied into the catchment in Tract C and interfere 
with the collection of the waters by the appellant in that 
tract. \TV e also desire to refer to the statement in plain-
tiff's brief that the defendants are inconsistent in not 
opposing the collection by the phintiff of the water from 
the drain tunnel. \Ve see no inconsistency. Appellant 
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has made no objection to the collection of these waters 
because the drain tunnel leads directly through the rail-
road fill underneath the plaintiff's dump and conveys the 
water from beneath the dump throug·h the fill, and this 
water ean at all times be collected and controlled by the 
plaintiff on its O\Yll land. It is because of this fad that 
appellant has not deemed it worthwhile to contest the 
drilin tunnel waters. \Vhile they have not actually been 
controlled 011 plaintiff's laud by plaintiff, this can so 
readily he dm1e that no point eould be made in compelling 
plaintiff to do what it actually ean do, and in addition, 
the source of the waters is manifeRt and while they have 
up to the pn~Rent been emptied onto the hmd lwlollp;ing 
to the appellant, it is 11ot nl'ccssar~' that this continue, 
and without doubt plaintiff will, as it easil~· ean, as soon 
as plai11tiff finds it is required !:'>O to do, perfeet its titlP 
to the waters by controlling aud capturing thorn on its 
own land. IH the meantime, as long as plaintiff dumps 
them onto the land of the defendant, they belong to de-
fendant. 
APPELLANT IS OWNER OF ALL WATERS APPEARING IN 
TRACT D FROM WHATEVEH SOURCE THEY COME. 
Again, at the bottom of page 5 and top of page 6, 
plaintiff would lead the eourt to believe that the on]~, 
contention made by defendants was that the waters leav-
ing plaintiff's dump would belong to deft>ndants on]~· in 
the eyent they sank into the earth and passed fro111 t1w 
property of plaintiff and enten~d thC' premises of <1e-
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fendants in the form of a Rpring from depth. The is-
Rues raised by defendants' answer are fully set forth 
at pageR 10, 11 mul 12 of appellants' brief. The subter-
ranean course of the waters was alleged because Ruch a 
source would admittedly, if found, have destroyed plain-
tiff's alleged title in sneh waters, but there won:,; no con-
tention in the answer or in the briefs, or at any other 
time or at all, that defendants had title to these waters 
only in the el'ent these 'l~·aten.; took a subterrm1ean course. 
As a matter of fad, though of course appellant did 
not need plaintiff's consent or admission in order to ex-
ercise its riglttt-:, every defense made by the appellant 
in this case ha.s been admitted by the plaintiff to be, if 
it wert• t~stablished, a perfectly good defense. By its 
answer appellant alleged the waters in question did not 
comt> from the dump. This, if established, is a good 
defense. Plaintiff has admitted such to be the case. 
Defendant also alleged tlta t. if the waters came from the 
dump they sank into the ground ancl appeared in Tract 
D only after distant and circuitous route. This was a 
good defenHe. Plai11tiff has w admitted it. It ought to 
be perfectly apparent \\'ithout plaintiff's admission that 
it was neeessary on plaintiff's theory, without regard to 
whether that theory was good, bad, or indifferent, that 
the waters must come from plaintiff's dump. Any proof 
to the eontrary \Voulcl destroy plaintiff's ease at the 
Htart. Appellant also pleaded that the title to the waters 
ol\ 'rraet D iH in the appellant. 'rhis was a good de-
ft>nse. PIHintiff has admitted it. On the other hand. the 
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theory of appellant has never been that if the plaintiff 
were to establish that the water's came from plaintiff's 
dump, that plaintiff had established title to the waters 
on Tract D, or even that plaintiff had established a con-
summated, final title to the waters while they were in 
plaintiff's clump. AppeUa.nt's position has been, first, 
the water did not come from the dump; second, if it 
came from the dump it came by distant and circuitous 
channel, and title to tl1e water was lost when it left the 
dump; third, it makes no difference from where or how 
the water comes, even though it were to come in its en-
tirety from the dump and even though it were to come 
as a stream in a definite, defined channel, still after it 
leaves the dump and leaves plaintiff',s ground plaintiff 
loses title, and when the water is collected on defend-
ant's ground it belongs to defendant. 
It has always been defendants' position, however, 
that as to any part of the waters finally collected on de-
fendants' ground, that if such waters came from plain-
tiff's dump and did not come by distant and circuitous 
route they reached defendants' Tract D after percolat-
ing and seeping throug·h plaintiff's dump and through 
the gravels and soil beneath the tlump aml through the 
fill, the entire fill, at certain seasons of the year, and 
perhaps throug·h an increasingly smaller area of the 
fill as the summer season advanced, but still through a 
large part of the fill and finally issued in the form of a 
spring at the toe of the railroad fill in the land of the 
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appellant, and ou all fundamental theories or waten; 
rights belong to the appellant. To suggest that the ap-
pellant has exclusively held only one of tlw foregoing 
eontentions or has abandoned any of them i.s ummp-
ported, a gratuitous assumption. 
"DEB'ENDANTS' HEiFUSAL" TO '·RECOGNIZE" (ACCEPT) PLAIN· 
TIFF'S DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF'S PURPOSE 
IN THIS ACTION. 
On page B is this one: ''Defendants refused and 
the.v apparently still refuse to recognize the fact that 
plaintiff does not seek by this action to acrznire wny cop-
per solutions it does Hot OWJI." In view of the decision 
of this court in the Montana-Bingham <'ase and of the 
law set forth in appellants' brief with reference to the 
O\\·nership of waters which have passed into the lands 
and premises of others, and with referenee to seeping 
and pen·olating waters heeoming a part of the land in 
whieh the.v seep and percolate, to which respondent docs 
not even attempt a.n answer, but on the other hand the 
correduess of \Yhi('h is coneede(l, it takes a mighty pecu-
1 iar n1en ta I i ty to be able to figure out tlia t plaintiff is 
not by these proceed.ings seeking to acquire waters whieh 
it doe:,; not O\Yn. These waters are not only within the 
lands and prelllises of defc>ndants hut are captured and 
reduce(l to possession upon defendants' premiset-l. 
Plaintiff's statement in this regard is very much like 
that of au exeeutioner about to behead au indivi(lual, 
who laug-hingly stated, "I am not going to kill you; I 
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am just going to cut your head off.'' By the same argu-
ment any person who once had wild animals, waters, oil, 
gas, or any of the other roving elements of nature which 
are peeuliarly wild and .shifting in contemplation of law, 
and the legal rules regarding which are discussed in ap-
pellant's brief, and the ownership of which is lost with-
out the will of the person from whose lands or premises 
they escape, might very well say, "We will reclaim that 
which is lost. \Ve know we have lost title to this wild 
and roving thing and that the right to possession and 
ownership has passed from us into the hands of another, 
but we will condemn our neighbor's land and then we 
will not only thereby regain ownership of that which 
we have lost, but will in addition take all other wild 
animals, gas, oil, water, etc., upon his premises and not 
pay him a cent for it, because, perchance, it was once 
ours." This is exactly the situation in this ease, and 
in this connection it is interesting to note the evidence 
of Mr. J. D. Schilling, Mining Superintendent of the 
Utah Copper Company. He testified (Tr. 278) as fol-
lo·ws: 
"Q. And it is your theory, as I understand, 
that these waters escape from the dump up 
above'? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you intend to capture them down 
below some hundreds of feet on the V aleJ1tine 
Scrip~ 
A. Yes, sir." 
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DEFENDANTS CONCEDE NOTHING TO PLAINTIFF 
IN THIS ACTION. 
Here is another one on page 8: "Were it to have 
been found that defendants instead of plaintiff owned 
the copper solutions plaintiff sought to convey over the 
easements across A, B, C, and D condemned in this ac-
tion, then this suit would have been dismissed, but de-
fendanls' concessions on the p1·oo{ deprived them of 
that defense." \V e do not know whom plaintiff is seek-
ing to fool by this statement nor to wha,t concessions on 
the proof plaintiff refers. Sinec plaintiff docs not parti-
cularly state ~what couc•essions on the proof are referred 
to, mHl since defendants have always contended that de-
femlants owned these waters regardless of their source 
or e01use after they entered defendants' premises, and 
is noiY appealing from the decision of Judge .McDonough 
for failure, among other things, to give defendants that 
whielt is theirs as a matter of law, we ean only conclude 
that plaintiff makes that statement in the hope that such 
strong talk will fool someolle. This j,s sheer unsupported 
bombast and means nothing. 
DID DEFENDANT STIPULATE TO SETTLE FOR $500.00 AP-
PELLANT'S CLAIM FOR $200,000.00 AND UPWARDS? 
On page 9 plain tiff says this : "Not one page of 
that record is directed to the issue of damages, the ulti-
mate issue in a condemnation suit." After the lower 
court had deprived defendants of the right to present 
evidence as to the value of the waters within the prem-
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t.ses sought to be taken, what was the use of presenting 
evidence upon other matters? Also, where doHs plain-
tiff get the impression that the ultimate issue in a con-
demnation suit is damages t The statute prescribes at 
lea~-;t thn•e is~-;ues to he presented aml determined before 
you even arrive at the question of damages, any one of 
wl1ieh preliminary questions may be ultimate. Counsel 
would have m; believp that a corporation like the Utah 
Copper Company should have the court take judicial 
knrmledge of the fact that it is entitled to take the lands 
anrl premises of its neighbors with impunity, and there-
by, without r:o mpensa.tion, acquire the water~-; thereon, 
and simply waive aside the three preliminary issnes pre-
scri,bed by the statute, and proceed immediately to the 
taking of evidence a·s to ,the amount of damages, elimin-
ating, of <·ourse, for the benefit of the Utah Copper Com-
pauy, all evideJH'l' of the value of tlw wah•rs within the 
lands taken. 
"TITLE", OR, AS WE THINK, MORE ACCURATELY, "USE" UNDELt 
SEC. 7333, COMPILED LAIYS OF UTAH, 1917, IS THE 
MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IN THIS CASE. 
Counsel states this on page~): "This prolonged con-
troversy revolves about only one issue, i. c., i·n lr'hom is 
fliP title to the coptJer solutions?" In view of the total 
lac·k of nn~-;wur on tlw part of appellaJllt to the law as set 
forth in appellant's brief with reference to the owm'r-
ship of \\·ater.s with relation to ownership of the laud we 
shonld think counsel would have been afraid to have had 
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this the only issue. Certainly plaintiff was not contend-
ing for any such proposition, and a reading of defend-
ants' answer and of the evidence taken in the case as 
abstracted by appellants shows that evidence was 
produced with reference to each and all of the issues 
presented by ,the answer. 
HOW MUCH IS THE LJ!;GAL ADVIC:E OF THE AT'fORNEYS FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF TO THE DEFENDANT AS TO THE BEST 
WAY TO PROTECT DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS, WORTH? 
On page 9 is this: "De,fendants eould with greater 
propriety have sought the relief they desired by suit to 
enjoin diversion of eopper solutions of which defend-
ants claim to be the owners.'' This is the first time 
plaintiff has presented this idea. In other ~words, they 
say that while defendants own the ~waters after they en-
ter ~the lands and premises of defendants, the only 
remedy of defendants is to stop the Utah Copper Com-
pany, by an injunction suit, from taking them. In other 
words, we must sit idly by and consent to a eondemna-
tion case, and then, after that is over, go into an equity 
case in the hope that the equity court will reverse that 
whieh the c.ourt hearing the condemnation case might do. 
It would seem tha~t defendants should have entrusted 
their rights to the counsel and advice of plaintiff's at-
torneys, which would have been, as we rea(l their brief, 
to make no defense to the condemnation case excepting 
as to the element of damages, eliminating, of eourse, all 
evidence as to the value of the waters on the premises, 
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take $500.00 as the value of the lan<l without the water, 
and then thereafter file an injunciion case in a court of 
equity. vVe fear this advice is given over the left 
shoulder. Plaintiff is not in a posi,tion to complain about 
the forum or the character of :the case in which the is-
sues in this case are tried. It chose the forum and pre-
scribed the character of the case, and so far defen<lants 
have been content to rely upon the counsel and advice 
of their O\Vll nttorneys as to defcuses thereto all(l pro-
N~dun• to he taken. 
There is eontroversy in this case as to ,,·hether or 
not on plaintiff's ow11 showi11g there is legal Jweessity 
for the plaintiff, if it has the legal right o•tht>r\\·i;-;l' to 
eondemn Tracts C and D, because plaintiff ow1Js tile 
property higher up the gulch and therefore has mt op-
porhmity on its ow11 land at compara,tively little expense 
to eolled the waten; whieh eome from its dump. On the 
other hand, plaintiff dm1ies that there is Hll.'" CPPt:ain op-
portunit.'· to eollect the waters at any point in the p;nleh 
abo1Te Trad C. It is therefore manifest that plaintiff's 
positiou is that rrnwt c i:-; the strategic point and the• 
only point at whieh appdlaut could colleet the <·opper 
waters in Dixon Gulch. How manifestly iusiucere, then•-
fore, is the repeated suggestion made in re;,;pondent's 
brief that the appropriate aml <'OlJRistent aetion for ap-
pellant in thl' <lefense of the <'Ondenmation suit ~woul<l 
have been to eoucede the right iu plaintiff to eondemn 
Tracts C and D and then in anothc'r adi011 to have raise<l 
the question of wlwther or not plaintiff was taking de-
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femlant 's watt•r in r:i1ract C. 'Phis woultl not have been 
closing tlw door to the barn after the horse was gone; it 
would haw~ meant, according to plaintiff's position re-
garding the exclusive charaeter of r:i1 ract D for capturing 
waters in Dixon Gulch, demanding possession of an ani-
mal ferm• uahuae after permitting the t'lll'lllY to neqnire 
the only ham in whi<·h the wild animal could have been 
c:aptnred or <~ontrollcd hy defcndallts. \Ve may have an 
exaltnd opinion of our own \Visdom and karning, hnt it 
does not extend to a belief t,Jmt we know enough to eon-
(luet both sides of a law suit with equal success, and we 
are 11ot prepared to eoneede even to eounsel for plain-
tiff that he is as wist• as he thinks he is. 
liRIED UP Wl\'l'ERS. 
On page 11 plaintiff discusses various little pools of 
<·opper "·ater that had spilled over fr·om the rlrain tun-
nel, awl then said that ''plaintiff piped that part of the 
eopper solutions from the drain tunnel to ds intake on 
'/'met C, when•by to dry up the little pools of copper wa-
ter that had been ere a ted by the spilling of the solutions 
frmn th<-• past<->J·ly portal of the drain tnmwl.'' Plaintiff 
g·in•s no refermwe to any evidence of snell <h·ying np, 
and there is 110 sueh evidence i11 the eas<-'. This Htatemrnt 
i:-; wholly unsupported by the reron1 and WP ask plaiu-
ti if to prod nee an:· e\'idenct' sustaining sueh statement. 
Tlw water oe<·urrences ill lower Dixon Gulch are de-
snibcd in the brief of appellants, aiH1 these water oc-
cunenC<-'s were still then' at the tenuillation of the trial 
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and are still there at the present time. There was some 
dispute as to t!he source of the copper solutions in these 
various plaees deseribed, but no one ever testified that 
they dried up when plaintiff piped the wruters from the 
drain tunnel to the catehment on Tract C. They persisted 
in spite ·O.f such piping. In this connection we call at-
tention to anot:her statement of plaintiff at the bottom 
of the paragraph on page 11, wherein counsel s~ays: 
"When therefore, mention is made of Dixo11 Gulel1 water, 
title to which is claimed by defendants, it is only the 
HO-ealled 'Hays Spring' copper solutions that are re-
ferred to." Search appeUant 's brief and see whether 
this is true. Also .seek through the brief and find some 
place where we waived any title to the drain tunnel 
water. These various water occurrencE's have never been 
segregated in considering this case, waiving as to one 
and claiming as to the ot1her. Defendants have present-
ed their ea.se with reference to all water oceurrcnces up-
on their lands and premises. Drain tunnel waters, of 
course, flow through a well defined ehannel in a tunnel, 
and the portal to the tunnel is just on the eclge of tJhc 
Valentine Scrip, so that it would be an easy matter for 
plaintiff to step inside of the tunnel and capture these 
waters upon the premises of the B. & G. Raitway. There 
is no dispute as to the souree of t1hose waters. Hight of 
ownership to the water occurrenees upon defendants' 
property has never, orally or in writing, been waived by 
defendants. 
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DID PLAI~TLFI<' "ACQUIRE BY ARRAi'iGEMENT" WITH BOUR-
GARD AND ODDIE "WHAT LITTLE WATER THEHE 
WAS IN DIXON GULCH BEFORE THE MAKING 
OF PLAINTIFF'S DUMPS"? 
Another one: At the bottom of page 11 aml the top 
of page 12 counsel .says this: "\Vhat little water there 
was in Dixon Gulch before the making of plaintiff's 
clump there, plaintiff aequired h~- arrangpment with 
.Jerome Bourganl and .J. W. Oddie, the original ap-
propriators.'' In the first plaee the record is replete 
with evidence that this was not a little 1Pctler, hut, on thP 
other hand, was eonsidcrablc; that the waters came from 
two or thn'e springs several huncb·ed feet west from the 
B. & G. fill, at which waH known as the Pieuic Flats. rrhe 
water waH used by Bouq.!,•ard and Oddie and the Bingham 
HoteL Plaintiff di(l not own this water nor clid plain-
tiff base any C'laim upon Hueh alleged ownership, as 
shown h)· om~ look at the complaint, nor did plaintiff at 
any time, ot· at all, acquire any owner-ship, from Botu-
gard and Oddie. The evidcnee with reference to this 
alleged transaction was givPn by Mr. Gooclrieh at page 
1.11 of the ahstrad, awl again at transcript 421. Mr. 
Goo(lrich testified that the negotiations were never eom-
pleted; that Bourgard was the onl.v one of the owners 
who ever signPd Exhibit 2~); that there were others in-
terested. The inHtrument upon which plaintiff now 
seeks to .say that it was the owner of Dixon Gulch waters 
before Ute fill was put jn is as follows: 
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'' EX:HiBIT 29. 
No. 286403 
This Agreement made and entered into this 16th day 
of October, 1911, by and between .Jerome Bourgard, of 
the town of Bingham, Salt L·ake County, Utah, party 
of the first part and Bingham & Garfield Railway Com-
pany, a corporation organized under the laws of Utah, 
party of the second part, witnesseth: 
That, Whereas, the party of the fir.st part is the 
owner and entitled to the use of an undivided one-half 
interest in a certain stream of water having its source 
in Dixon Gulch, Bingham Canyon, Utah, and 
~Whereas, the pa.rty of the second part is desirous 
of obtaining the right and privilege of using any sur-
plus water in ·Said stream for culinary purposes only it 
is agreed by the parties hereto that for the sum of Oue 
Dollar, paid by the party o,f the second part to the party 
of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledgeJ, 
the party of the second part shall have the right to im-
pound the waters of said stream and convey the same hy 
means of suitable pipes or conduits, to a tank constructed 
by the said party of the second part on its own prem-
ises, said tank to be connected by means of pipes of 
proper size with the pipes or conduits now in use by the 
party of the first part, at such point on the main line a3 
said party of the first part shall designate and in sucit 
a way that the rights of the said party of the first part 
to said waters as now enjoyed by him shall not be in-
terfered with or abridged by the party of the second 
part. 
~Witness our hands nnd seals the day and date above 
written. 
.Jerome Bourganl 
Bingham & Garfield Railway Company, 
Signed By J olm M. Hays, Secretary. 
Witnesses: 
Chas. T. S. Parsons 
.J. S. Gard. 
Oct. 16th, 1911." 
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~rhis is a splendid example of the hardihood of 
plaintiff in confidently stating facts which never existed. 
Again at page 13 plaintiff states that the easterly 
boundary line of plaintiff's property is the westerly 
boundary line of defendants' property. "\Ve have here-
tofore discussed this point. The Bing'ham & Garfield 
Railway Company right-of-way lies between the two. 
So much for plaintiff's alleged statement of facts. 
Piaiutiff's Argument A seems to be an attempted 
answt~r to defendants' law points 1 and 2. Plaintiff's 
counsel in this cas,e reminds us somewhat of a. young man 
who was attempting to pass a bar examination. He was 
asked for the doetrine of "ancient lights". Never hav-
ing heard of the subject matter and being unwble to make 
any answer thereto, he said as follows: ''I have never 
heard of the doctrine of 'ancient lights', but to show you 
that I know something about law I will give you the rule 
m Shelley's case.'' 
APPELLANT HAS ABANDONED NONE OF APPELLANT'S 
DEFENSES. 
Finding the la\V all against them upon the proposi-
tion of the ownership o·f these waters, regardless of their 
source, when they enter the lands and premises of Je-
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fendants, they attempt to set up a few straw men, and 
then by giving a detailed abstract of the evidence pres-
entecl hy plaintiff upon the probable source and course 
of the waters orcurring within the defendants' premises 
hope thereby to divert the attention of the court from 
the law presentc'd in the law points. This has to do with 
a statement made b.'· counsel which has heretofore been 
rnfened to, namely, that if the' solutions ha<l sunk into 
the em·th and had passe<l from plaintiff's property and 
been comiugled witl1 the waters within adjacent prop-
erty aml the suht('I'I'Dnean \Yall'rs of the' earth ancl had 
Lwcome lost, that tllen they would ('Case to be the prop-
crt~- of plaintiff and become tlw property of defenrlants. 
Plaintiff feels that if they can set that up as the only 
defense of defendants aml thereby induce rlef0mhmts to 
concede such to he the only defense which defendants 
might interpose in this case, that they coul<l thcreh~- shift 
the issne and briug defenda11ts out of tlw trenehes to de-
fend this straw mm1. \Ve again call the court's attention 
to the fact that this was only o11e of the many defenses 
relied upon and was not at all dctermi11ativc' of the case. 
WHAT IS A SPIUXG? 
Plaintiff in this ease is Yioleutl~· antngouistic to the 
nse of the expression "spring" in refen'lll'C' to the oc-
cmTmwe of the wall'I'S 011 rrrad D. Its o!JjectiorJ to the 
word has never been c·lea rl~· defined. Plaintiff a ppal'l'llt-
I:· has a vague hut unascertained apprclwnsirm that a 
"spring" would hurt plaintiff more than something else 
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and therefore secured the trial court's determination 
that the water occurrence in dispute is not a spring, 
though just what it is if not a spring, the plaintiff has 
not disclosed. 
"The word 'spring' when applied to water, 
means the formation of water that naturally 
gushes out of the earth's surface. A spring is a 
place where water issues f,rom the ground by 
natural forces. lf'umcr v. Seabury, 1:3 N. Y. Supp. 
12, 16, 59 Hun. 272 (citing Magoon v. Harris, 46 
Vt. 264; Bloodgood v. Ayers, 108 N. Y. 405, 15 N. 
~~- 43:3, 2 Am. St. Rep. 443). 
" '!Springs', as used in a deed granting the 
privilege of taking water from springs, means a 
plaee where water by natural forces usually is-
sues from the ground, and docs not include places 
where the grantor reached water by orifices in 
the ground, a11d where the water did not flow to 
the surface. Magoon v. Hal'l'is, 46 Vt. 264, 271. 
"A spring is wah>r issuing by natural forees 
out of the earth at a particular place. 
-'\Vords & Phrases, Vol. 7, p. 6617. 
"\Vater rising to the surfal'e of the earth 
from below, and either flowing away in the form 
of a small stream or standing as a pool or a small 
lake, is the definition of a 't>pring'. De Wolf-
Hkill v. Smith, 8H Pae. 1001, 1003, 5 Cal. App. 175 
(quoting Cent. Diet.) 
-\Vonls & PhraHeH (2d Series), Vol. 4, p. GG:L 
"1Dvidenee held sufficient to suHtain finding 
that waters collected by sunken box 40 feet from 
hox first establi:,;lwd, had the same source, and 
were part of one spring and eonveyed by deed of 
spring; a 'spring' being a marshy area of small 
hut dcfini tc extent, wherein underground waters 
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find their way to the surface. Harrison Y. Cha-
boya, 245 P. 1087, 1088, 198 Cal. 473. 
-Words & Phrases (2d Series), Vol. 7, p. 117." 
Then' <ll"P numerous definitions in Baldwin's Cen-
tury Edition of Bouvier's Law Dietionary, commencing 
on page 1125, of similar character to the foregoing; and 
We'bster 's N e\\' International Dictionary give:,; the fol-
lowing definition:'' Any source of supply, esp. that of a 
stream; a 11 issm• of water from the ea J"th ; a natura 1 
fountain.'' 
In the present case plaintiff's own ('OBtention is that 
waters falling on its dump, percolate aud seep through 
the dump, fiuall.'' finding their "·a;, to tho hotlom of 
Dixon Gulch where after, flowing for a EdJOrt distance, 
they appear at a collecting poiut through the toe of a 
railroad fill. This statemeut, without admitting the coli-
elusions of the deseription as a matter of fact, \\"C re-
spectfully suggest, is a perfectly pennissiblt> desC'ription 
of a spring. The waters of a spring always have their 
origin a.t a higher level tlum the spri11g. :-:lue!J watl•rs 
flow from various som·eus and 11uall.'· re;wh tlw surfncP. 
It does not <lest ro_\' the dwracter of thP spring to say 
that the water must havP its origiu iu a <'Ousiderable 
a rea, and does not des,troy the clunacter of the spring-
to say that prior to the water issuing to the surface it 
flo\\·s in a colleeted volurrw. "'"\ll ~wat<'r has been sm-f<tce 
water at some time. Even 011 plaintiff's theory the wa-
ter O<'CillTClH'e on Tract D is a spring-. 'l'he them·~' of 
appellant would gin• a widm· source to tht> water and 
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would account for the existeJtee• of the water oecnrrenee 
in the toe of the fill prior to the placing· of the dump in 
Dixon Gulch, commencing in 1926. In our opinion, ;md 
the evidence certainly bean; us out, otherwise it is im-
possible to account for the water prior to the dump, the 
water issuing from the Hays Spring at lea:-;t comes from 
the entire drainage area of Dixon Gulch, and in all like-
lihood this area will include hig·her and adjacent lands. 
Plaintiff attempts to make considerable out of the fad 
that the court fouml agaillst the appellant on appellant's 
geologiral theory and also on appdlant 's theory that 
tTeu though the water occmTence on Tract D is not a 
::;~·11clinal manifestation from distant sources, it still 
iucludes water from sources other than plaintiff's dump. 
Plaintiff attempt:-; to twit appellant because the court 
below did uot agn•p with appellaut awl to cover the ap-
pellant with humiliation because of appellant's disaster 
Oil tlw trial. It has always semed to appellant that on au 
appeal it was mueii safer to eheerfully, carefully, aml 
perhaps prayerfully, disclose' to the appellate court the 
grounds 011 whieh the d0risiou below rests than to 
ehuckle in glee all<l stick out om•'s tougue• at the mere 
fact of a preliminary victory. 
It took his Honor who tried this <'asc below mon• 
than two years to reach a dceisiou favorable to the plain-
tiff's contention. It cannot he that the basis of plain-
tiff's elaim is as simple aucl apparent as plaintiff seems 
to suggest; awl the• <lifficnlties of arriving at a condu-
sion favorahlP to the plaintiff are, we think, indicated 
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by the fact that plaintiff has carefully refrained from 
any detailed disclosure of the basis of plaintiff's rights 
and from an attempt to support such rights by an ap-
peal to the authorities. 
The Hays Spring waters issue from the ground ami 
appear through a rock wall. What difference does it 
make whether you call it a :Spring'? There can be no 
doubt of the fact that this water occurrence comes near-
er to being a spring than anything else. It certainly is 
not a river, nor is it a creek, nor is it a. well. Plaintiff 
says that no witness, with the possible exception of the 
defendant Stephen Hays, was produced who testified 
that he ever saw a spring in the bottom of Dixon Gulch 
either b·efore or after the construction of the railro·ad 
fill. 
OLD MINERS VS. MAY-WALKER8-WERE THERE WATERS IN 
DIXON GULCH BEFOftE THE RAILROAD FILL? 
Richard D. Connary, au old miner, testified that he 
prospected and mined the sulphide vein in Dixon Gulch 
at a point now beneath the B. & G. fill. He stated (Ab. 
248) that he sank a hole about five feet deep, close to the 
bottom of the canyon, about twenty-five or thirty feet to 
the north of the bottom of the gulch on the sulphide vein, 
and that he prospected along that vein several years 
afterward for different parties, and there were quite a 
number of old prospect holes beneath the fill on the north 
side along the vein, and that there was water in that 
hole (Ab. 249); that water appeared all along the snl-
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phid(' n~m wherever there were any holus dug·; that he 
didn't reeall how much water there was, but there ~was 
so much that "I eouldn 't do much work there" (AlJ. 
250); that it \\Tas so long ago tltat he di(l not remember 
the quantity, but "I remember there ~was quite a lot of 
water running out of there and these other holes along 
up the vein." He stated further (Ab. 251) that some of 
the water sank i11 the Roil allll then seemed to appear 
again on the soli(l bedroek; that in some years it couhl 
be observed by people passing up awl down the canyon, 
and in some years it eoulrl not; that there were hig 
honlrlers in the bottom of the gulch and there was ron-
siderahle gravel collerted there and might not be seen. 
Ammon B. Stringham mined in Dixon Gulch at the 
lT. & l. Tunnel; that he never went up in the bottom of 
thl' gulch but saw men working in Dixon Gulch below 
?l'hcre the IJ. d'; 0. fill now is, on the tunnel and inclines 
on the side of the hills; thai he always saw water there 
coming out of these holes aiHl running- down the side of 
the hill (Ab. 262-264); that these holes were along the 
::-;ulpl1ide le(lge on the right-hand Hide of the guleh going 
up, about seventy-five or one hundre·(l feet up from the 
bottom of the gnleh. 
Thomas Stringham, brother of the former ~witnes::-;. 
testified that he prosperted Dixon Gnleh where the B. & 
G. fill is, aud that there 'vas water in that portion of the 
gulrh below the Gardelli workings. rrlwre werp two or 
three places where the water eauw out there, ancl that 
the tunnels were on the right siue, and that in ad(lition 
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there was a spring about one hundred feet along the bot-
tom of the gulch which broke out on the side hill; that 
the pl,aco whore the bad water came out was a little west 
below tho B. & G. fll and is underneath the fill at the 
present time. 
Tho evidence of these men, in the face of the evi-
dence given by Messrs. Earl, Goodrich, Bowman, Ingles-
by, Heaston, Straup and Kelly, all of whom testified that 
lower Dixon Gulch was a verit,able Sahara, was sub-
sequently demonstrated to be correct and accurate by 
the discovery of the two incline shafts at a point on the 
sulphide vein beyond the B. & G. fill, but within Tract D. 
These discoveries simply shO\ved that the witnesses for 
plaintiff, testifying according to their best knowledge, 
no doubt, so rar as their observations had disclosed, 
showed that these water occurrences beneath the B. & G. 
fill were discernable only to the prospector and miner 
who worked along the sulphide ledge, because there was 
a thick grov..th of underbrush up to the sulphide ledge, 
and because all of the water would sink into the soil and 
gravel in the guleh and seek the real bottom of tho gulch 
(Ab. 213-220-221-239-251-252). The evidence in this case 
is undisputed that Dixon Gulch was not a place for much 
walking. The 'bottom of the gulch was full of large 
rocks and boulders, very precipitous, and at some times 
of the year woulrl be swept clear of gravel, and at other 
times there would be a lot of gravel on the bottom o·f the 
gulch. (A b. 251) This variation was not only true as to 
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seasons of the year, ibut was also true of the various 
places within the gulch. 
\Veeks were not consumed for the purpose of prov-
ing that these waters within Tract D were or were not 
a spring. Weeks were consumed in producing- evidence 
with reference to all of the defenses prc:-;ented by de-
fendants both on behalf of plaintiff and defendants. 
Plaintiff states on page 16 that the whole purpose of de-
fendants' case was consumed to prove that there was a 
spring. How silly! Defendants presented evidence with 
reference to all of their defenses. 
Counsel states that this geologieal fant.asy of the 
Hays Spring \Vas a ereature of defendants' ingenuity. 
This issuance of water from the ground through this 
rock waH upon defendant;.;' premises certainly was no 
creature of anyone's ingenuity. It was a reality and of 
sufficient reality to become the apple of plaintiff's e.ve, 
so much so that it was willing to endeavor to obtain it 
for itself by devious and questionable attempts at bar-
gaining in the beginning (A b. 207), and then, their pur-
pose having been ascertained, through these proceed-
ings. They did not want to take the chance of losing this 
creature of ingenuity hy tunnelling in to the toe of their 
dump, as was done in the Tiewaukee case, to collect for 
themselves only such water as they ovvned, because they 
knew very well that this creature of ingenuity consti-
tuted waters comingling from various sources, aml was 
in existence as a reality long before their dump \YHS 
placed in Dixon Guleh, which gave positive evidence that 
tbis water oecunence cuuld 1wt be an outlet fnnn their 
so-called reduction u:u1·ks (plaintiff's dumps). 
~Would plaintiff have us believe that the waters 
which were appearing at the I Jays Spring before plain-
tiff's dumps were established in Dixon Gulrh ·were the 
waters from the Bnurga rei ancl Oddie spring at Picnic 
}Plats? 'l1 hey never made any sueh claim when the ease 
was tried in the lower court, beennse such a theory is 
destrndive of their entin' theol'." with reference to these 
waters being an outlet fro1n a so-called re<lnction works. 
They bad to have these waters eome from their dump, 
and all of their Pxpel'is tc'stifiu<l that the;' l<>ft the rlnmp 
at the toe of the' B. & G. fill. 'l1 he~· wanted to be so eer-
tain of this point that 1lw;· l~:Hl tlw trial conri fil1!1 that 
a II of these waters <•.orne from this so-C' a llt'd J'l'd udim1 
works, and had the court henuetieally seal the surfa<'e 
soils underneath the dumps in Dixon Gulch, tog-ether 
with all of the t•racks alHl fissul'l'S in tlw roeks beneath 
the same, and to render that soil substantially im-
permenblP to the waterl'J .flowi11q dmnt thro11.f/h the 
rlmnps, and that "all such wa tc'rs an' confined to the top 
of the surfaC'l' soil undcrnea th the <lumps". vY e are 
wondering ho\\' thl~se Bourgard and Odclie spring waters 
got up into thP tlumps so that they could flow along thP 
top of the surface soils and gl't out of this slwleylike 
snhstmwc'. Of c·ourse plaintiff' had to lwrmetically seal 
the dump or it would not have heen a reservoir. (Rpcak-
ing of ereatures of imagination or ingenuity, we want the 
ronrt to remembt>J' that plaintiff has had to have a. Yer~· 
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vivid imagination to have this great big dump a reser-
voir or sponge; this entire gulch, including the bottom 
and both sides, filled up -with the railroad fill, he a ditch 
or canal; and this dump a reduction works within the 
contemplation of our law relating to eminent domain. 
So much for digression.) 
The ·witness T£ad testified (Alb. 110) that there was 
a spring about forty-five feet above the railroad iill and 
one about 800 or 900 or 1000 feet farther up, and further 
testified (Ab. 112) that the waters which Oddie and 
Bourgard were using in l~J12 were arising on the Valen-
tine Scrip patent: 
"Q. That water that you havce described 
which Oddie and Bourgarcl was using was arising 
on the Valentine Scrip patent 1 
A. It was being collected on the V aleutine 
Scrip patent. Where it was arising I couldn't 
say because it was coming out right undt•r the toe 
of the Bingham and Garfield Railroad fill. 
Q. Coming out on the left~ 
A. It dipped to the left. 
Q. Is that the ~.;ame plaee where it is com-
ing· out now'? 
A. I eouldn 't say, it is all covered with fill 
now and nobody can see it. If I might indieate 
on this exhibit I will shnw you about_:_ 
Q. Yes, I will ask you to do it 'I 
A. It is somewhere in this vicinity right 
here is where the water was coming out where I 
have marked with a cross up there, that is after 
the original construction of the Bingham & Gar-
field Railroad and the fill had been placed in 
there.'' 
He testified further that after the waters from the 
Picnic :B'la 1 s Spring-s ceased to be diverted by the Bing-
ham & Garfield Railway Company in 1915, that such wa-
ters (Ab. J~fi) were not flowing through the drain tun-
nel; 1lmt he did llo1 know what became of it; "that all I 
kno\\· is that it \\~as not lll~ing taken away from there and 
was Hot appearillg· below OJ\ the surfaee in the low season 
of tlw .H~ar. It just was not appenrillg on the sm·face. 
I am speakillg mdy of 1 he d l'.'' sem;oll. I did not see it 
during the we.t season either. I jns1 obse1·vecl the water 
running in the reservoir nbove the H. & G. fill and do 
not know u;Jwf her:a.mr of it.'·' 
'l'hese Bourgard and Odrlie Hpring waters wen• also 
described by A. L. Heaston, Olle of the plaintiff's ·wit-
nesses, who testified (Ab. 189) that af.tcr these ·waters 
left the ::;prings they flowed for a short distmH·e on thP 
surfaee at certain 1 irnes of the .''Cal'. !lis e\'idPllCP is as 
follows: 
"(~. \\' ould :·on sa:' t heu ,jfw t o1 her tlw n in 
the sp rillg of the :·ear wa tPr from t host• sp ri11gs 
flowecl on!:· a slwrt distanee? 
A. It flcl\ved a short distance, ,VL'S sir, a]}(l 
when it got to where there was gran~! awl loos·· 
stuff, i.t \\·onld sink. 
Q. Disappear'? 
A. Disappear, ye:-; sir." 
Mr. Earl further h•stifie<l (Ab. 4G7) that these spring· 
waters, after tltP)' left the re:-;crvoir ahont a thousancl 
feet west of the B. & G. fill seeped through or under the 
fill aw 1 went down below; that in hi:,; opinion it seeped 
down through the fill, ei i her through the fill or under-
neath the fill. "lt may never have appeared on the sur-
faeL~ helo,v, but it certainly came down belo·w." 
If thi:,; evidem·e is corrL•ct-and plaintiff 1s in a poor 
position to dispute it heeause it was produced hy its own 
witnesses-then then• ean Jw no rlouht of the fad that 
tlw reappearauce of thesp waters out of the gravel on 
defendants' premises emtstituted a spring from snb-
ternmean seepings and pereolations, and these waters 
are not from the• dump of plaintiff and never were in this 
so-callc•d reductioiJ works. If th<~se waters sank to depth 
and found a ('Ourse along bedroek, then it would seem 
that Uwre \Vas rather a substantial hole in this sealing 
process-in this so-called reservoir described by Mr. 
Beeson as lwiug a "reservoir within a reservoir", and 
we ('ertainly SPL' no reason for not giving the waters 
which \Yen• appearing at th(_• Hays Spring before plain-
tiff's dumps WL~rc in Dixon Gulch a tmbterranean eourse, 
either beneath thP fill or into the synelinal basin and out 
over the snlphi<le ledgt•, as des<"ribed by Dr. Pack and 
Mr. Crane, and as demonstrated beyowl all question hy 
the waters in the north and south incline shafts. 
THJ<] GEOLOGISTS. 
None of plaintiff's geologists and experts stated, 
however, that the waters appearing at the Hays Spring 
were the Hourgan1 awl Od<lie waters. They all testi-
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fied that the Hays Spring waters were from the dump; 
that they trirkled along the top of the surface soils 
beneath the dump and then seeped and percolated 
through the fill along a wide expanse of wash mat.erial, 
which was described by plaintiff as "semi-pervious", 
but which was described ·by witnesses for defendants as 
bt>ing impervious to the downward pas::mge of the water 
-such as to stop the water at that point from sinking 
into the so-called French drain in the bottom of the 
gulch. At first, plaintiff's witnesses testified that these 
water:,; passed through the :B,rench drain, but a reading 
of the evidenee of Mr. Beeson showed that that was com-
pletely abandoned, and on one occasion counsel for 
plaintiff clesrribed any such theory as "sheer nonsense" 
(Ab. 373-374). 
How can plaintiff and defendant escape the only 
logical conelusion to whleh a reasonably mill<1ed person 
must come after reading the evidence of lay witnesses 
on both sides, and of experts bought and paid for and 
produced by both sides, to-wit, that the waters appear-
ing on Tract D (the Hays Spring and all of the rest of 
them) are from various different :,;ources, to-wit, from 
the sulphide vein from the Picnic :B,lat Springs, reap-
pearing· after their subterranean course (and in this 
connection the court will bear in mind that Mr. Earl 
testified that in his opinion the gravels (Tr. 2275) are 
very deep at the toe of plaintiff's dumps against the B. 
& G. fill, and that it would be necessary to go consider-
able depth to shut off the waters); also that a portion 
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of these waters eo me from pnwipi tation u po11 the B. & 
G. fill, which is a substantial area aml composed largely 
of similar material to that within the dump:-;, anJ whicl1 
fill has been by the trial court decree<l to be a part of tlw 
premi::;es of defendants, and with reference to which 
finding no cross appeal is taken, nor is there any at-
tempted answer on the part of plaiuiiff as to the argu-
ment made in law point 2 as to our owner:-;hip thereof 
so far as these watm·s are c·oucc•nJed. 
Plaintiff's brief, mJdc•r snhlwacling A of argument 
II, eommeueing at pagl' 14 of the brief and ending at 
page• (i4, iR nothing more nor les::; than a one-sided ab-
straet of plaintiff's own c>viclenec•. vYe assume eounsel 
feelR that this eourt intl'mls to read the briefs only and 
pa~c no attention whatsoever to tl1e abstraet of all of 
the e\·idew·c• producNl in this case by both parties. 
In ,-iew of this situation it is a great temptatio11 to 
defendants to meet this sort of tactics by likewise quot-
ing from tlw evidence, and doing so with great partiality 
to rlefendaints' side of the case. 
Defend;mts have no controvers:· with the evidence 
of Dr. lnglc>s'b:·, Dr. Straup, Mr. Heaston, Mr. Hocking 
or Charles Kelly. rl1hey were easual visitors in Dixon 
Gulch, but it was no place for pleasure seekers because 
thl' bottom of the gnleb was precipitous in plaees ancl 
was full of big houlden;. rrhe path to Picnic Flats was 
along the top of the ridg·e to the left (Ah. 257). Dr. 
Straup, however, used to go into the gulch during the 
month of May to <·onrt his sweetheart-the present Mrs. 
4U 
Dr. Straup-and he frankly admitted that when he \Vas 
in the gulch h·e was looking for soft places on which to 
sit a]l(l was not looking for water seeping over sulphide 
ledges. The same with Dr. Inglesby. He was just a May-
walker in the gulch. All of these witnesses testified ab-
solutely that there were no water occurrences on this 
tract in question, and yet within a day or two after they 
gave their evidence we found water coming over the 
sulphide ledge at the two inoline shafts. They simply 
were not looking for water occurrences when they were 
in there, and had no such opportunity for information 
as the old miners who were presented by the defendants, 
and whose evidence has heretofore been quoted. 
Defendants produced Dr. Frederick .J. Pack, of the 
University of Utah, Guy W. Crane, geologist for the 
Chief Consolidated Mining Company of :B~ureka, Leland 
H. Kimball, hydraulic engineer, and Ronald M. Crocker, 
eminent mining engineer, all of whom testifie<l for de-
fendants. Their evidence is a;bstracted and set forth as 
given in the abstract which has been presented in this 
case. They completely destroyed and filled up the so-
called French drain which plaintiff at first relied upon 
for the passage of these waters through the railroad 
fill, and they did it so effectually and so completely that 
counsel for plaintiff finally, in open e{mrt, announced the 
abandonment of such an idea (Ab. iH::l-:374), and it was 
never heard of again. From there on they took the 
view, as oxprosse<l by Mr. Beeson and ~fr. :BJarl, that 
these copper solutions as they arrive at the point of 
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contact with the B. & G. fill, seep and percolate laterally 
out through the fill. 
'' Q. What have you assumed to be the con-
dition of the first flume from your lower wing of 
the upper portal of the drain tunnel, what have 
you assumed to be the condition of that terrain'! 
A. I have assumed that to be-l hadn't 
really given it very much thought because my eon-
ception of the way those solutions, these copper 
waters passed through there is that they eueoun-
ter instead of an impervious seal it is just semi-
pervious, that is it simply prevents the flow from 
being rapid, and that the copper waters will 
eYentuall~· percolate through it. 
Q. Thnt is your seal against the toe of the 
fill? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You think that is semi-pervious"? 
A. Yes,Ithinkitis. 
Q. That the waters percolate uownward 
thrQugh that and into the fill and percolate out 
through the fill until they reach the bottom of the 
gulch and appear down at the Hays spring, is 
that your idea? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Does that extend across the entire up-
ward toe of the fill? 
A. I should think so. 
Q. So that when you said it flowed down 
through the fill, you didn't know of any parti-
cular channel in which they were coursing down 
through the fill, did ~·ou 1 You have seen no evi-
dence of that, have yon? 
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A. No, not of any particular channel except 
when it comes out, when I have observed it, it all 
came out at one place. 
Q. I think you stated those waters are seep-
ing and percolating in the fill, in the soil ahove 
the fill and above bed-rock, is that correct? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. You ohs('rved the ~water percolation be-
tween bed-rock and the collar of the raise in the 
caiehmeut tunnel, did you not, Mr. Beason? 
A. Yes, I think I observed that." 
Of.: 
* * 
"(~. Is that the character, the salllL' gpm•ral 
charader of water ~::eepage and JWreoJation yon 
have <leserilJed iu your evidem•e-is ilH' way tltL' 
water leavc>s the fill and <'OmPs <lowll to tlw point 
where it aceumulates for th(' making of thP Ha~'s 
spring similar to that appearanee that is in the 
shnft there or in tlw raisP? 
A. Yes, I think it is. I believe then• nre 
phwes in the bottom of tltc> stream whc•n• thf~ 
gravel would have a certain amount of mwl iu 
it and .force mon• water to comt> out right in the 
lwd of the strc•am than otht>rs." (Ab. ;)01-flO:n 
Defendants' geologists and pngineers testifie<l that 
this sy11clinal basin was eompose<l of massive quartzite 
as a bast>, on tlw top of which the ;ml,pbi<le lc>dgP, and 
that within the hasin is a great nms:-; of slwttered quart-
zite, incompl'ieni to bold wat<)r, eapped by a thin layer 
of sm,face soil all(l rode debris. 'l'lwy tPstified that iu 
their opinion it wa:-; a physieal impossibilit~· to plaeL> 
npo11 this grouwl a large reservoir or spongl', drippi11g 
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wet and full of water, without having that water pass 
out in every direction, except up, into the surrounding 
areas; that on account of the broken, fractured, and in-
competent character of the quartzite lying above the 
sulphide ledge, that these waters would naturally find 
their way out into the surrounding country, t.hen down-
ward to the sulphide ledge, and then pass over the lip 
of the synclinal basin wherever it could, and thus add t.o 
the waters which had theretofore been appearing at the 
Rays Spring. This basin is not a hollow one, but is full 
of shattered and fractured materials, and the waters 
within the rbasin arc seeping and pereolating in various 
direetions, always seeking the lower levels. They do not 
cominglc and become an admixture in the sense that 
waters do when placed within a hollow basin, but they 
have their areas and particular localities within the 
basin. rrhe north and south inclines are admittedly not 
at the axis of the syncline, and yet we find water coming 
out in these localities varying in quality within a dis-
tance of twenty feet of each other, and o·ther waters were 
fonml along· the sulphide ledge during the course of 
trial farther north and farther up on the limb of the 
syncline. These experts tesrtified that it was only na-
tural that these waters from this so-called reservoir or 
sponge, lying immediately above the sulphide ledge in 
Dixon Gulch, should find their way out on the sulphide 
ledge at a point beneath the B. & G. fill-the lowest point 
ou the wlphide ledge in Dixon Gulch-regardless of 
whether it is the axis of the syncline, as testified by !le-
fendants' experts, or slightly to the right of the axis, 
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as testified by plaintiff's experts, and then appear on 
the surfare at the Hays Spring ann at the other points 
aB testified. 
In this cmmeetion plaintiff was none too proud of 
the evidenee of one of its so-called experts-Mr. 
F'rederick D. Hans.on. The eonrt will notil'e that while 
plaintiff quotes extensively from the evidence of Mr. 
Beeson, it ga\'e but a short paragraph to ~lr. Hanson. 
This expert is the oue who sealed the surface soils he-
neatlJ plaintiff's rlumps and compressed them into a 
shale-like substance. In fact, he was so sure it was shale 
that he went out to a point in the Niagara drain tunnd 
lwnen fh t lw U tall Coppm· ColliJlan~· d Ulllp in Di xm 1 
Gulch. Hr~ stole into tltis tunuel awlmadl' extcusi\'C and 
profoull<l observations aml viewed the premises wit11 
great skill and learning. He foul\(l tltP soil ltard awl 
finn, not easy to pick into and pir·k out a pil'f'l'. 'l'here 
\nls also imlif'ation of eleavage and parting rmra1lel to 
the snrface of the soil, and in geueral the soil hall a coHI-
Jn·essC'd, compaf't a ppl'H ra m·e, somewhat rcse1uhliug the 
formation iu a heddiug of shale (A·b. 50!-:J-510). Upon 
r·ross-exalllination defendants had l1irn definitely locate 
tlw spo·t where he had made these profound awl learncrl 
oh~crYations so that there mig·ht bP no mistake ·with n•-
fcrcm·e to the exact spot. 'l'!Jercaftl'r Mr. Crocker and 
a mining engineer uamed 8hclton went to the place, took 
a sampll~ of the material, and broug-ht it in to court. It 
was introduced in cvidcnf'e, and lo mHl behold it turned 
ont to bl' plain, eYPn'fla~' ma11nrr (Ah. 5GI) aurl should 
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have been handled with a pitch-fork. Mr. Shelton called 
it leaf mold. He and counsel for plaintiff had quite a 
dispute (Ab. 567-568) as to whether it waR manure or 
leaf mold. This is the shale-like substance '\vhich Mr. 
Hanson found, and upon this evidenee eounsel for the 
plaintiff had the court make finding of fact No. XXX[II 
to the effect that the weight of the dump compresses the 
surfa('<' soil and gives it a ('Ompaci appearal\(·(~ . 
. Just at this point it ma~· not lw amiss also-sinee 
plaintiff complains bitterly ahout tlw amount of time 
bkcu by defendantH in presenting their case, and also 
takes eomiderablo delight in calling attention of the 
court to tlw fad that on one or hYo minor details there 
was some slight varianec between the evidence of Dr. 
Pad~ aml Mr. Crane-to <'all attention of the court to 
tlle fact that Mr. Earl, who disclaimed being a mining 
engineer or !JnYing <my knowledge wha.tsoever of water 
or water courses, etc'., (All. lOG, Tr. 103-104) and yet 
presum(_•d to niticise the opinion of his ehief, Mr. Good-
rich, and o.f .Mr. Crocker with reference to the possibility 
of <'olloeting th!:'SL' solutions at th(_• toe of plaintiff's 
<lump, but who nevertheless was a halHl.'· witness and 
sern~d the fullctions of utility mmt on the Utah Copper 
Company team of witnesses, and who evidently on some 
oc<·asionH might be able to make a survey with a transit, 
eommmed RL'Vcral <lays of th!:' c·onrt's time trying to 
pro\·e a surn~y of tho area now eovered by the <lump~ 
in Dixon Guleb which was made in 1924. After Mr. Earl 
had testified at great length awl at great expense to both 
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parties, and had taken personal credit and responsibility 
for the survey ('Tr. 2220), and one witness had been 
brought from Los Angeles to identify notes, etc., and 
others had been produced to show how carefully these 
notes were safeguarded, indexed and filed, it was found 
that this great surveyor, this man who disputed with Mr. 
H. C. Goodrich, chief engineer of the Utah Copper Com-
pany-the head of his department-on such an impor-
tant proposition as the possibility of capturing the Utah 
Copper Company solutions at the toe of their dump, in 
order to make one observation called for in that survey 
would have, been required to see through a hill, and tha,t 
in order to see the top of the rod, being held as high as 
the tallest rodman could hold, and with the transit at 
the very highest point, he would have been compelled to 
see seven f>eet underground ( Tr. 2485), and the whole 
thing was thrown out as inaccurate and worthless (Tr. 
2480-2481-3141). Several days were lost, and this gTeat 
engineer, Mr. Earl, took his place on the bench along 
side of Mr. Hanson, the great geologist, who disoovered 
the shale-like substance hereinbefore referred to. This 
evidence of Mr. Earl's was so utterly worthless and 
valueless, and so unreliable that it was eliminated from 
the abstract by mutual understanding. 
So much for the experts produced by plaintiff. 
\Ve are not going to weary this court with a further 
detail of the evidence presented to the trial court by 
defendants and its witnesses, upon the proposition of 
geology and water courses. vV e are going to assume 
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that this court will be able to reau that evidenee and ap-
preciate and understand it. Suffice it to say that there 
was a su1bstantia1 eonflict. It was no such one-sided 
proposition as that attempted to be s,tated by plaintiff 
in its brief. Jn faet, it was so substantial that .fudge 
MeDonough took about two mul one-half years to decide 
the ease, and ,then when referring to the court's decision 
upon this matter the court said as follo·ws: ''This phase 
of the law suit is the• one that has caused the court the 
greatest difficulty insofar as t be labor of reacl1ing a eon-
elusion tlwn·on is eoneenwc1, as it necessitated, after the 
filing of counsel'::; brief, a re-examination of a great 
portion of the evidenee with refereuce thereto and to the 
notes of the eourt with reference to actual observations." 
WHO PUT THE COPPER IN THE WATE!t? 
Under poiut liT, commeneing at page 59 of the brief, 
plaintiff attempts to explain how the Hays Spring wa-
ters came to han• a copper content years before the Utah 
Copper Compan~· dumps i11 Dixon Gulch were placed 
then•. He states that W<' relied very largely upon the 
evideuce of George B. Robbe•, a wihwss called for plain-
tiff. It is tnw that we believed the evidence of the wit-
ness Hobbe, but in addition there is the evidence of 
Samuel Baird wlw visited at the .Jensen home, 11car the 
nwuth of Dixo11 Gul(·h, bc•tweeu the mi<ldle of August 
until 0<1tobe1·, i11 l~J:25, who made te::;is of thi;; water with 
some• uails and found that there was sufficient eopper iu 
the water to produce enough copper on the nails after 
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a'bont u week's time that it could be scratched off; like-
wise 0. S .. T Pnsen, who lived at the mouth of Dixon Gulch, 
testified that for four years, commencing in 1924, he had 
oibserved these waters and that there was a greenish 
stain ou the flume, that the icicles on the cribbing had a 
green tinge, and that his children put iron and nails and 
an old clevis in the water about two years ago (1926) and 
that it showed a coating of copper colored matter all 
over the iron ; likewise, :Mrs. .T ensen testified that the 
children had put numerous articles in the water, and 
that a substance was coated on the outside of them, and 
that the children brought them to her and showed them. 
Counsel states that this copper content comes from 
the B. & G. fill. Assuming that to be true, where does 
this argument help plaintiff? The trial court found the 
fill to belong to defendants so far as the right to capture 
water thereon is concerned (Alb. 626). 
This evidence given by both parties not only showed 
a sTrbstantial but also a continuous copper content in the 
Hays Spring waters for years before the dumps were 
placed in Dixon Gulch. Do we understand that the court 
is going to determine which part of the copper content of 
these waters comes from the dump and which part from 
the fill~ 
We doubt, however, if plaintiff can explain this sit-
uation by saying that this copper content comes from the 
fill. The fill was placed in Dixon Gulch in 1910. Plain-
tiff claims that the Hays Spring- waters were potable and 
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good to drink until 1919 and 1920 and that there was a 
pool of water where the boys swam back of some vegeta-
tion and reeds and rushes. The copper seems to have 
appeared in 1919 or 1920, because Mr. Connary testified 
that there was acid and copper in the water in 1919 to 
surh an extent that they could not use it for their car-
bide lamps, and Mr. Robbe testified that it contained cop-
per in 1920. Plaintiff now says that these dumps and 
fills start giving off copper immediately, and that it 
takes four or five years before they start giving off com-
mercial solnt ions. If that is true then this fill should 
have been giviug off copper immediately following 1910. 
Again we must conelucle with Dr. Pack and Mr. 
Crane that undoubtedly the copper content in the Hays 
Spring water::.; is from variou::.; sources; from the fill, 
from the springs in Picnie "B'lats, from plaintiff's dump 
in Dixon Gulch, anu from all the ores and rocks upon 
and within the Dixon Gulch surfaee and sub-surface 
drainage area::.; (kb. 403-404). 
THE EXPERIMENTS. 
Counsel has quoted at great length and gusto with 
reference to three experiments which were made by the 
pouring of wa,ter at various place::.;. "\Ye are surprised 
that plaintiff refers to them, because they certainly turn-
ed out disastrously for plaintiff. 
Experiment No. 1: The water was placed on the top 
of the B. & G. fill (not the Utah Copper dumps) in great 
quantities from a two-iueh pipe. It was turnerl on at 
bU 
1 :25 P. M. and the H:ays Spring showed an mcrease at 
8:00P.M. (Ab. 329). 
As to the second experiment eounl:·;el for plaintiff 
seems to have gotten all mixed up. 'l'he Hays 8pring fig-
urPs are quoted for the drain tunnel, and the drain tunnel 
figures are qnot!~d for the Hays Spring. In otliL'r wonls, 
it was the B. & G. drain tmmel which was flowing 6000 
gallons per twenty-four hours when the water was turned 
on, and whicl1 WaR flowing (il ,~l20 gallons per twt~uty­
fonr hours OHP hour later, and renclwd a maxinnun flow 
of 108,000 gallouR h)· 3:05 P.M. The lla.vs Spring showed 
a slight increase as a result of this flooding, but it was 
s]l0\\'11 (Ah. :32:1 alHl ;j27) that this in!•reasl' \\·as surplus 
and overflow from the drain tunnel. The water was 
coming through the drain tunnel and dO\\'ll tllP rnouutain 
iuto Dixon Gul!'IJ in such quautit ies that tht• flun1t> could 
not contain it, and it was splashing o\·er i11to tht> Hays 
Spring. The increase of water coming through the drain 
tunnel a('comded for all of the water that was poured in 
thiR experiment (Ab. :324). 
It will therefon• be seen that ('Ollllsel for plaintiff 
was arguing against himself in eitiug this t>xrwrimeut, 
and all of the good things which eounsel intenlled to in-
fpr from this experiment, aR demonstrate!l on page 4:~ 
of their brief, ~were for the Hays Spring, and tht• bad 
thingl"\ intendecl to he shown have to do with tlJC draiu 
tunneL 
'l'he third experiment was on November 1, 1928. The 
water was ponrell on the dump immedin,Jel~· ahoye tlw 
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old placer gravel beds, which are plainly to be seen in 
the cut for B. & G. Railway. These gravels pass beneath 
the B. & G. fill. The water was turned on at twelve o'-
clock noon, and the first increase in the Hays Spring was 
at 10:04 P. M., and the maximum was reached at eleven 
A.M. on November 22nd. 
The first experiment showed nothing excepting that 
if you poured water on the top of the B. & G. fill it would 
sink. No one ever doubted that. rrhe second experi-
ment established beyond all question of a doubt that 
water goiug down through the dump flooded the area 
back nf the B. & G. fill and passed into the drain tunnel. 
CJ'he third experiment showed that after many hours 
waters which are placed upon the dump above the old 
placer gravels will eventually seep and pereolate down 
to the Hays Spring, or that the flood area bark of the 
fill can be flooded to such an extent that it will pa;,;s out 
lateraiTy through the fill. Of conrse, if you pour enougll 
water upon anything you will floo(l it. 
These demonstrations did not prove the source of 
the Hays Spring waters at all. Dr. Pack discussed these 
experiments and the reliability of them, and stated that 
no pouring such as this could be regarded as a duplicate 
of nature's slow proeess, and that the information ob-
tained in that manner proved nothing of value in this 
case (Ab. 399-400). 
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THE REAL QUESTION IS NOT WHERE DID THE COPPER COME 
FROM BUT, WHO DOES IT GO TO? 
Defendants gladl~· aecept tlw <·halleng-e of plaintiff 
to <lisntss and lwYe this aPJwllate eonri paRs upon all 
the eYidence prese1decl b)· both sides v,·ith ref'pJ·enel' to 
the geological ease, ami with reference to all othPr issm•s 
raised by defendants' answer. 'rho evi<lence is jmpartial-
ly and fairly ahst raeted and will not bt> difficult to fol-
lo\L \Ve weleomr plaintiff's clwlleng-n to a n~considera­
tion of those issues of fad. 
Iu presenti11g this easr to the appella.ie eourt, how-
t'ver, we di<lnot feel that it was necessary to plaee upon 
the appellate rourt Hw burden of reviewing these facts, 
and lwnre based our appeal upm1 the \llHlispntcd facts 
and the law relating to them, and took the position that 
regardless of the eom·s<• m· source nt' the,.;e watl•rs withi11 
Tmd D that tl1e~· ·belong to defeJI(lants, and that befon• 
an.\"OJle can take the ground tl1e~· nmst JHl~· the Yalne 
thereof, incln<ling thl• Ya1ne of the water. 
Instead, howL•n•r, of ans\n~ring or pnm aitPillflting 
to answer defendants upon the propositions of law 
presented by the appeal, plainiiff, like the fpllow wl10 
answered with referenee to the rnle i11 iShelle~·'s ease, 
thought it was a good idea to discuss somdhi11g entirely 
different from that which 1s presented by tile appeal ann 
to lure this appellatP eourt a wa~· from the questions on 
appeal by unfairly, wiih great partialit:· a11d inadequate-
!:·, presentiHg· somp of t lw evidelH'l' eonsiclere(l b~· t hl• 
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trial court, and only such evidence as plaintiff deemed 
to be favorable to its side. Apparently eounsel for 
plaintiff cannot meet the arguments l'ontainP<l Jll bw 
points I awl II as presented by defendants. 
\V e shall therefore simply conclude that these wa-
ten; occurring at the Hays Spring, north incline shaft, 
sonth incline ;;haft, Hays upper cnt, Hay;; lower cut, and 
in the catehment upon Trad C eome from variou;; sources 
an(1 derivl' their copper co11lmtt al;;o from various 
sonrees. They do uot have the same ehemieal composi-
tion as the Utah Copper Compan.v dump water::; as col-
lected in the dn1in tunnel, aml contai11 a very high per-
centage of ::;ilica, which could not have been picked up in 
the course of a trip through the B. & G. fill eonsisting· of 
only a few hours. Glass is made from silica ancl is prae-
tieally indissolnble in the presence of water, and yet 
the 11ays Spring wnh•1·s contain a great deal more sili•ca 
tha11 the waters in tlte drain tunnel, showing that these 
water;; have been in eontnf't with quartzite for a long 
period of time, so as to accumulate sucl1 a burden of 
Rilica. The same is true of other elemeHt.s in the water. 
(See Cram•, A'b. :3S/-:l60, as corroborated h~· Harms, Ab. 
447-448). 
\V e eould go on indefinitel~T' a:,; di(l plaintiff, awl 
re-abstract an(l re-tell all of the evidence presentt>d h~· 
defendants, which macll' it .,o difficult for the lower 
court to llecide tlw ease. \V l~ wil1 not do so aud simply 
ask this appellate eourt to disreg-ard thPse arguments 
54 
upon disputed facts with reference to the geology, and 
decide the questions of law presented by the appeal. 
·what answer, therefore, has plaintiff made to the 
law argument made in law points I and II by defend-
ants·? The amnver comes back, ''none''. 
\Vhat differPnce docs it make >vhcre the copper 
comes from 1 
We aRsullw, of course, with argument that this court 
IS going to reg-ard coppc1· wa tor as water the samo as 
sulphur water, salt water, and any other water containing 
mineral. The sonree of the mineral has nothing what-
soever to do with the title to the water and has no bear-
ing ou the case whatsoever, excepting as trying to deter-
mine the source-and since this water had copper for 
years before the dumps were placed in Dixon Gulch and 
had a substantial content in 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1927 
we do not see how this court, or any other court, can sa)' 
what part of the copper content eame from one source 
and What part from another. 
The expert witnesses for plaintiff testified that the 
porphyry dyke whieh passes through the Smith (Hays) 
tnnnel workings on the right hand side of Dixon Gulch, 
and which shows at the Hays Lower Cut, is eonnccltcd 
with the porphyry showing near the south incline, and 
that iu their opinion this is a dyke whid1 extends up 
acrosR lower Dixon Gulch so as to cut off the downward 
course of the subterranean waters in Dixon Gulch. This 
was fine theorizing and is an excellent example of what 
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counsel for plaintiff says with referenec to theorizing 
venm::; actual facts. The Smith (Hays) tunnel enters 
the mountain at the rear of some hou.sc.s 011 the right 
hand sic1e of Dixon Gulch. It follows this porpl1yry oc-
currc·nec for some distam·e, awl it makes n sharp turn 
to the left, passing through the porphyry and out into 
the quartzite. The <'onrt will ob:,;erve, therefore, that 
this quartzite that they pa:,;sed into would be below the 
porphyry and this so-eallPd porphyry dyke ·would lie 
between thi:,; area and the upper portion of Dixon Guleh. 
The point where the Smith tmmel went out through tl1e 
porphyry alHl into the quartzite was just on the right 
hawl side of Dixon Gulch near the Hays lower cut (Ab. 
:20~)). ~ir. Bowman, the old miner who testified for 
plaintiff mHl who worked in this tunnel, testified (Ab. 
183) tlmt just a:,; :,;oon a:,; they got out of the porph,ny 
awl into the quartzite they got a good stream of water. 
Mr. S .. J. Hays testified (Ab. 241) that lower Dixon 
Gulch i:,; a veritable ocean and yon can develop water 
anywhere. This was also the statement of .Judge Ken-
ncr (Ab. :Wl). 
Plaintiff states that tl1is copper solution is an arti-
ficial product rn·o<lnc<)d b~· plaintiff's indm:try. 'rhis 
dump material iR wa:,;te matter whic·h they were glad to 
get rid of. The only iwlustry that plaintiff pnt in on 
the matter was to haul it away beeause they eould make 
no other use of it, and clump it in the guleh. 
It is nature's eoppor and the meteoric waters which 
dcseend upon the dump arc a free gift of nature. 
fl(i 
ALL WE (BOTH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT) WANT 
IS THE COPPER. 
On page 17 and again on page 91 of plaintiff's brief 
a point is attempted to he made by the assertion that all 
the appellant wants is the copper in the copper 
solutions in 'rract D. We admit it, both for our-
selves and for the pla•intiff, if there is anyone in this 
ease who wants simply the water and not the copper in 
the water solutions, he, she, or it is a strange person-
ality, but to say that the appellant wants appellant's cop-
per solution:,; is to bring no railing accusation against 
the appellant, and this law suit is being tried not to de-
termine a moral but a legal question. The moral ques-
tion will arise after the adion is terminated and we will 
then disf'over whether or not either party to the action 
wants copper solutions belonging to the other party, and 
whether or not, the matter having been determined, the 
party against whom the determination falls ·will prompt-
ly desist from its effort to acquire the copper solutions 
belonging to the other party and also promptly account 
for those already taken. 
THE CHARGE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS MISLED THE 
PLAINTIFF AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF ONLY NOW 
DISCOVERS THAT THE APPELLANT HAS AT ALL 
TIMES CLAIMED THE' WATERS IN TRACT D. 
On pp. 75 and 76 of respondent's brief the sug-
gestion, whether humorously or not, is made that be-
cause in the stipulation a bond of only ten thousand dol-
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lars was exacted, defendant 1s either limited m 
its demand to that sum or thereby gave plaintiff the 
right to suppose that defendant regarded ten thousand 
dollars as the limit of defendants' damages for occupa-
tion and collecting of waters in Tract D in case the plain-
tiff fails in this action. \V e say that we find it difficult to 
determine whether or not this argument is seriously ad-
vanced or only humorously suggestive, alHl our difficulty 
is increased by reason of the fact that eontact with our 
brothers on the other side does not warrant us in regard-
ing the sonl-sa ving gra.ee of humor as one of their 
fortunate possessions; otherwise we would conclude that 
the suggestion that plaintiff has been misled as one ad-
vanced either with the tongue in the cheek or the twinkle 
iu the eye. ~'rom the start defeutlaut has claimed that 
the plaiutiff in taking the copper solutions in Tract D 
was taking the defendant's property. A bond of ten 
thousand dollars was regarded as a suHicient bond, not 
because it was felt that the possibilities of recovery in 
this case were iu any \Vay limited to a bond. On the 
contrary, defendant has always reganled the plaintiff 
as amply able without a bond to respond to any judg-
ment that might be recovered against it. But by de-
defendant's pleading plaintiff was warned that it was 
taking defendant's property while it occupied "pending 
the action" and "without prejudice" the property of 
the defendant. 
There is another inciclent of this action which may 
well be considered in this connection and that is the fact 
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tha.t none of the parties hereto ever dreamed that it 
would take four years to determine as serious an ac-
tion as this is in its effect upon the rights of the parties. 
The court \\"ill discover in the transeript (p. 4027, Janu-
a r~- 17, 19:-n ) that one year and a half after the case had 
been tried a motion vvas made in the lower court that the 
plaintiff he required to ae.eount for the copper waters it 
had taken aml to impound the proeeeds from the sale of 
such copper waters. At the time ! his motion was brought 
to the attention of the court tlw trial court annoUI1Ced 
that within a Rhor! time a deciRion would be remlered. It 
is only because of the death of thP late Monis L. Ritchie 
and the neecssit;· of a rehearing of the cast> by his 
Honor who finally disposed of it on the trial, and the 
great IPngtll of tim(' l"P(juirc<l in reachiug tlw dceision by 
thP lower eourt, that the amount of the bond in this ease 
is so insig11ifieant iiJ eomparison witl1 !lw ndnal values 
involved. It 'vill be noted that thr deeision in this case 
"'as rcudercd by the trial eourt 011 ~lareh :lnl of this 
year, and that the appellant has brought tlw case into 
the amwllatc eourt with record speP<L :-Jo <lela~· 111 
bringing this action to a prompt conelnsi(lll ean be 
charged upon thP appellall1. 
In this conned ion, ou pag-e 7ti of respondent's brief 
we arc ehargcd with having ehar!ged the authors of re-
spondent's brief \Yith being "eute". Rcfcrenee to our 
brief will disclose that there was nothing personal in 
our eharacterizatiou. 'l1 lw argulllcnt thai thP occupa-
tion of the dcfenda11 t 'R premi Res and tlw collediou of 
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copper solutions therein by the plaintiff authorized by 
the order of occupancy "pending the action" and "with-
out prejudice'' ehanged the ovvnership of the solntionB 
from the plaintiff to the appellant is charaderized '' aB 
'cute', m; 'tricky', a piece of legal legerdemain, as the 
annals of the law disclose.'' It was the ar,gument and 
not the arguer who waR referred to as ''cute''; and after 
reading the argument of appellant in its brief in which 
the original argument is hut repeated, we still think our 
eharacterizati-on accurate. 
WHAT WAS THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE STIPULATION AND 
THE ORDEH OF THE COURT PERMITTING PLAINTIFF 
TO OCCUPY TRACTS A, B, C, AND D IN JUNE, 1928 
"WITHOUT PREJUDICE" AND ''PENDING THE ACTION?" 
Plaintiff does not get down to discussion of the legal 
effect of the stipulation and the order of court permit-
ting plaintiff to occupy Tracts A, B, C, and D in June, 
1928, hut confines itself to repetitions pronouncements. 
Listen to the following pontifications taken from pp. 79 
and 80 of plaintiff's brief: 
"'l1 i tlc to such water while .in plaintiff's dump 
before proeesses of nature have converted it into 
the valuable copper solution that defendants so 
much desire, is in plaintiff, and afteT these na-
tural processes have converted ihe water, the 
property of plaintiff, into a thing of value in the 
form of a <:opper solution, by lea(•hing out all<l 
carrying in such solution the valuable copper 
in plaintiff's dump, also the property of plain-
tiff, the solution continues to be and is plaintiff's 
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property. This copper solution is an artificial 
product composed of ingredients all of which are 
the property of plaintiff. That solution is a de-
fiuite, defiuaible and identified substance from a 
kuowu source, the property of plaintiff, and as 
it falls npou the surface beneath the dump, 
triekles, seeps and fiows on and above bedrock in 
the bottom of the g·ulch over the channel plaintiff 
has condemned across defendant's property, it is 
still such definable, identified substance, traceablP 
and traced from snell known 8oun·e whprein it 
was tlw propert_,~ of plaintiff, wherein the cop-
per was the property of plaintiff, a-dmitted to be 
such by defendants, the product of plaintiff's 
industry, mined by plaintiff, trausported and dP-
posited upon that dump by plaintiff aml now as 
plaintiff's property colleded by plaintiff i11 its 
intakr~ and r·onve~'C'd awa)~ to plaintiff's pn•cipit-
atiug plant, ~where thP copper tlwrein contained, 
plaintiff's propNty, derived from plaintiff's 
dnmps, is l>C'illg pn•sc1Tl'd for plaintiff, it;-; 0\\'11-
er. '' 
'l'hr• foregoing declaration is introduced 011 pp. 78 
aud /!J by the statement that '"l'hese copper solution8 
while in plaintiff's dump arc the personal property of 
the plaintiff, the v<'n' corpus of whi(•ll plaintiff owns" 
(p. 78); awl "Their c•harad<'r is tmchangcd'' (on Trnd 
D), "the personal property of the plaintiff alwa.vs idcuti-
fiecl, never abawlonP<l awl lJCVP1' han• the)~ bec•om(• true 
percolati11g watns." (p. 78). Befon• tlw statl~ml•nt that 
copper solntioils an• personal rn·opert~·, tht> plaintiff 
quotes 011 pp. 78-~l of its 'brief a hrief part of a seutenee 
from Utal1 Copper Compau~~ v. Mo11taua-Bingham Con-
solidated Mining Co., (i!J Utah, at pp. 4:30-4:31, i11 whieh 
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the court :says that in that ea:se the waters carrying cop-
per ''so long as they are in the dump and considered 
part of it, ' o) are like the dump itself, the property 
of the plaintiff; that it is as lawful for the plaintiff, so 
long as tlw waters are in the dump, to collect and re-
move them as it is to remoYc the Jump itself; ' 'x' *" 
It should be retnt•m'bered, however, that in the <~ase re-
ferred to hy agTel•ment beh,·eell trw parties the dump 
never became a part of the fee, an<l the whole theory of 
th<' Mo11tana-Bingham rase is that by agreement between 
the parties the owner of the dump reserved the right to 
t'l•mon~ the dump awl therefore the water itself part of 
till' dump as against the owner of the fee. It is familiar 
law that parties may by agreement prevent what would 
ot l!enrise bccotnc attaehml to the real property and 
t hPreh_,. bceonw n~al property and so rontinue its cha rac-
ter of personal propert_,.. It may, therefore, be true that 
in the l\loniatta-Biugham ease neither the immense dump 
nor the eoppcr solntiotls <'ontained therein became real 
property, though thP conrt doe;.; not so expressly hold, 
aml cotmsd has cited no other authority for its sug-
gestion that the copper solutions in the dump in this 
case are pen;onal property. Ou the other hand, as dis-
tinguished au anthor as \\'iel in his highly regarde<l work 
011 "~Wakr Rights", (:3d !~d.) at p. :m, sa~·s that until 
water is taken into a rec•pptacle awl there adually eon-
fined, it is not severed from the laud itself and nuder 
the old holdi11gs which support the "cujus est solum 
cloctrillc" iu its entiret~· is regarded as a part of the 
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land and as real property. Plaintiff has not enlightened 
us and has eited no authority at all derogating from the 
authorities cited by us in our original brief that prop-
erty in water is of peculiar character, and ownership 
consists in the possibility of capture while in or on the 
land of the ownet· with the right to exclude a trespasser. 
See \Viel, Sec. i34 and 35. 
Wiel, in Sec. i35, states the doctrine as follows: 
"'The analogy to animals ferae naturae is 
finally shown by the authorities esta;blishing that 
water reduced to possession is personal prop-
erty. Just as wild animals, by capture becoming 
private property, are personalty, so likewise run-
ning- water, severed from its natural wandering, 
and confined under private control in a reservoir, 
or other works of man tha,t reduce it to posses-
sion, is also personal property. 
''The individual particles of water so im-
pressed by diversion into an artificial strneture 
or waterworks that confine it, and become priva.te 
property, possess none of the characteristics of 
immovability that go with ideas of real estate; 
they are still always moving though privately 
possessed, having, as particles, the characteristica 
of personal] property.'' 
The author cites, among other cases, Bear Lake & 
River Waterworks & Irr. Co. v. Ogden City, 3i3 Pac. 1:35, 
where the court says at p. 136: 
"Water flowing in a natural stream or in a 
ditch is not subject to ownership, so far as the 
eorpus of the water is concerned. The right to 
use it is a hereditament appurtenant to land. This 
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is the right that is exempt from taxation in cases 
where the land to which it is appurtenant is sub-
ject to taxation. But water in the pipes of a dis-
tributing system is personal property. The 
ownership is in the water itself. It was, at com-
moll law, the subject of larceny, and it is not ap-
purtenant to any land.'' 
\Vhile the foregoing statement 1s made with refer-
ence to watL•r l'lowiug i11 a stn~am, we know of no dis-
tinction between flowing and pereolating watm· as far 
as a ehange from real to personal propert~· is concerned. 
"l'~LESS PLAil\?l'lFF IS PERMI'l'TED TO RECOVER ITS 
PROPERTY AS PLAINTIFF PROPOSES, PLAINTIFF'S 
COPPEit SOLUTIONS WILL'' BE LOST. 
On p. 91 of plaintiff's hrief plaintiff sa:vs: "Unless 
plaintiff lw pennittt>tl to RE(~OVER its property as 
plaintiff proposes, plaintiff's eopper solutions will flow 
thence Oil down into Bingham Creek and to waste, or 
into the possession of others who, like the defendants in 
this cas<•, neither own them nor haye any right, title or 
interest in them.'' 
\\" P think plaintiff has nu<·omwiousl~· indi<'ated the 
weakness of plaintiff's case by plaintiff's pleadings and 
cNtain parts of plaintiff's brief, notieeahly hy the fore-
goiug quotation. In plaintiff's <·omplaint (para. 1:~, Ab. 
12) plaintiff alleges: "ln order, also, to collect such 
waters containing Raid eopper in solution as aforesaid, 
and to cna,ble the same to be <·ondueted through said pipe 
lines to such preeipitating vats or tanks, it is neeessary 
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and essential to excavate and construct tunnels and short 
branches therefrom beneath the surface of a portion of 
the properties and premises of said defendants above 
named; and to utilize as a conduit for the purpose of con-
ducting the said waters holding copper in solution and 
percolating through the said dump or deposit of ores 
so as aforesaid deposited and pla:ced upon the surface 
of the property anll mining elaims of this plaintiff in 
Dixon Gulch, that portion of the said Dixon Gulch, ex-
tending across a portion of the Haid property of said 
defendants'' etc. In other words, after the solutions in 
plaintiff's dump leave the dump and leave plaintiff's 
property, plaintiff cannot get them unless it gets them 
on defendant's ground. But it is a misnomer in law to 
say that the solutions are owned by the plaintiff when 
they reach defendant's premises. There they are owned 
by the defendants, and this is an action the purpose of 
which is to acquire title to copper solutions which the 
plaintiff does not own and has absolutely no right to 
capture or control in defendant's premises. 
Plaintiff realizes the force of the art,'llment that 
m order for it to aequire title it must eapture, control, 
and confine water. For this reason plaintiff attempted 
in its first proposed findings of fact to induee the court 
to find as a matter .of faet that the dump was a reservoir 
or a reeeptacle. This the court declined to do. Plaintiff 
then attempted to get the court to bring the railroad 
dump within the Montana-Bingham case by holding that 
the railroad company had a right to remove the railroad 
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fill and that :,;ince the railroad company had given to the 
plaintiff the right to use the railroad fill for all purposes, 
the plaintiff could remove the copper :,;olutions from the 
railroad fill at the toe of the fill. But the court held that 
the rights of the railroad company in its right of way 
over the land owned by the plaintiff was a right of way 
for l"trietly railroad purposes,, and that the railroad 
could not mine on the right of' way, (rrr. :3714, :3747, 3764; 
:HSD) and now plaintiff abandons its original contention 
as to what it could take from the railroad eompany ad-
versely to the defendant, and contends that it has by con-
denmation m·quired the right to colleet and remove wa-
ten>, in other words, that condemnation is a substitute 
for contract. A eontraet operated in the Montana-Bing-
ham east~, now a eondc~nmation should operate. 
'J1Jw books in discussing the nature of water use the 
uld desc-riptive words "ferae naturae", wild by nature-
and all say that water is not finally owned and title not 
finally ae<]nired until the water is captured or reduced to 
pm;session or eontrol on the analogy of the wild animal 
\\'hiclt was not owned until re:,;traint was imposed. Using 
this same analogy, suppose that a herd of wild animals 
were eonfined within an inclosure the larger part of which 
was owned by A and a small converging neck \vas owned 
by B, but that the natme of the animal compelled it in-
evitably to pass from the large tract into the neck owned 
hy B. \Vould the law listen a minute to the suggestion 
that A should he permitted to acquire the land of B 1 And 
if A were to say, "The animal belongs to me anfl not to 
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H, therefore l should be permitted to eondemn B 's land", 
the purpose of A would be perfectly apparent and equally 
nnpermittahle. 'l'he eourt if appealed to would say to 
A, "You are mistaken about your ownership of these 
animals. 'l'hey arc wild by nature and belong to the one 
who first <~aptnres them. If yon do not <·hool'e to capture 
tlwm 011 your own ground, you eannot be permitted to 
deny to B tlw right to capture them \\·hen they leave 
your ground and reaeh the ground of B. 'l'hese animals 
hPlong finally a]](] ultimatdy to th<~ Olll' \Yho captures 
thPm, and heforr eapture they belong· only in a potential 
Hense to the one on whosE~ land tlwy arp at a gin~n timr. 
Jf .'·on want the animals, eaptun' them on .vour ground or 
\my from B tlw right to capture thl'lll on hi:-; grOlllJ(l." 
And suppo:-;e, nndPr sn<"h circnll11-'tall<'l'H mHlcr thl' pro-
visiom; of law whieh permit oeeupation "rwnding the 
nction" "withont prejndiee ", A ean oecupy B ':-; gTound 
under the claim of A that he owned thl~ animals a1Hl that 
B <lid not own the111, and that the law permitted A to ac-
quire the land of H, the <·onrt wen~ to onll'r B to let A 
o<~cup~· B 's land, a]](l after the:-;(' animals eamc from .;\ ':-; 
land o11to B ':-; laud A wun' io capture them on B 's land, 
hut that latur, after revic\Ying the facts and <'Ol!siderillg 
the Ia \\', the <·ourt were to :-;ay, ''A, you a rl' wrong; you 
neither 0\\'11 thP animaiH 11or have a right io coudenm 
B ':-;land." Docs anyone think for a minute that A would 
lw pcnnitted to reply, "I may 11ot havl' had a right to 
<·ondenm B 'H laud and may not have tlw a!lima]s which 
\H'rl' on B's land at the ll10ilJent of <'0!1denmatio11, hut 
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having come into possession 'pending the action' 'without 
prejudice' to B 's rights of B 's land, I then captured such 
animals as <'ame onto B 's land, and because I was in 
possession under the order of the court for my purpose 
to capture the animals, they belong to me.'' We think 
that the argument of A would make little impression 
on the court. 
'Phe same illustration might be used with reference 
to fish in a stream, part of the stream being owned by 
B and part heing owned by A, and tlte fish, because of 
their nature, or for other reasons, inevitably coming 
from that part of the stream owned by A into that part 
ownetl by B. \Vould the court be impressed with the 
argument of A that he should be permitted to condemn 
that part of the .stream owned by B so as to capture 
A's fi~h whic•h were A's only if captured on A's part of 
the stream and B 's if captured on B 's part of the stream~ 
We think not. 
'l'he same thing would be true about gas. Suppose 
A and B owned a gas dome, B the greater part of the 
dome antl A only a small part. VI/ ould A be permitted 
to condemn B 's part? \\T e think not. 
Eaeh particle of water as to suC'h particles of water 
at'> came from the dump, and we deny that all of it conws 
from the dump, but as to each particle of water as it 
seeped and percolated through the dump, the plaintiff 
had the rig·ht not of consummated, final title, but the 
right to capture and thereby acquire a final title to such 
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particle of water; but as eaeh particle of water passed 
toward the east such particle finally reached the eastern 
boundary of the plaintiffs' land, ami in passing that 
boundary, in law it said "goodbye" to the plaintiff and 
"how-do-~·ou-do" to tlte owner of the laud into which 
it passed. :B'inally as to each particle reaching the western 
boundar~· of the appellant's land, it there greeted the 
appellant uot with a frown of alieu hostility, but with 
a fair and open and impartial <'onutenance stamped with 
the approval of the law, am! said to tltL~ appellant, "l 
am yours if you take me." The only event that has 
OC('!llTed in the history of tlw eoustantly recmTiug prog-
l'm;s of water from the dmnp (that is, as to such watee 
as eomes from the dump) that plaintiff suggests as <-hang-
ing the si tna tion is an order entered on the l:it h of .June, 
1 ~J2H, as the appellant always thought, in good faith and 
full~· proteeting the right of all the partieH until the 
eontJ·on'rsy was fiually deienniiw<l. 'rhe order was Cll· 
terL'd ''without prejudice'' based 011 a stipulation ''with-
out projndiee", sigued hy tlw parties by their honorable 
rupresentatin:s, pennitting· the plaintiff "pending· the 
acti(Jll" to m·<·np_,. laml ow11ed hy the appellaut "without 
prejudice>", and there to eolluct waters \Yhi<'h had pn~sed 
fnnn the plailltiff's <lump (that is, snell \\·atPr:- as nc-
tunll~· ha<l been iu the dump) and from tlw plaiutiff's 
land into the land own<>d b~· the defendant, all<l in so 
passing· lind passed from the qualified ownership of thP 
plaintiff to tlte qualified owuprship of tlw defendant uud 
\\'hieh watt•r was finally cnptured by the plnintiff "with-
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out preju<liet•" on and in the land owrwcl1Jy the appellant 
but whieh the plaintiff occupied "pending the action", 
''without prejudice". If out of that order it is J)()Rsihk 
for the plaintiff to <·reate not a change in title, but, ac-
<·ording to plaintiff, a 1ncre c<mtinuation of title, not-
withstanding there had been no eonsummation of title 
by captu1·e of the wah•r in the dump, and notwithstanding 
the passage across the boundary separating plaintiff's 
ground from itR neighbor, but simply by reason of Uw or-
dc>r of the <'ourt permitting occupaney of plaintiff's land 
until tlw issues of this controvers~· arc determined, aR 
the plaintiff <·ontends, \H' <·amwt read the law. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A TR~~'SPASSl<JR IN OCCUPYING 
DEFENDANT'S PRIDMISE8 BUT 
IS A TRUSTEE. 
Plaintiff says that tlw onll'r of tht> <·.ourt removed 
th<' han of trespasr,wr a.~ainst plaintiff iu occupying 
'Tra<'is C and D. \\' e agree: hut it did not rhang-c title 
to Tracts C alJ(l D, uor to the waters fiowing into Trarts 
(' all(l D. Plaintiff <·cased to he a trespasser and it bc-
ealll<' a trust<'<' in duty hound to ac<·onnt Oll final deter-
llliwdiou agaiust its contention to the appellant for its 
a<'ts \\·hilc in posRession "pewling the adion", "without 
prejndict>". Plai11tiff will admit that it <'ould not lwve 
<'rossed tlw \\'CRtE~ru houll<lar.'· of dcfell<lant's land before 
the onler of <'ourt permitting temporary possession and 
hnH' captured the waten; ftowing in app<>llant 's lall<l with-
out being n trespassur, and we think it is just as clear 
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that plaintiff \\'ould not only have been a trespasser, but 
after it had taken the water flowing from Tract D, it 
would have been a thief. Plaintiff claims that the result 
was in some way modified by the order of the court, but 
plaintiff dare not come down out of nebulous gener-
alities and arg-ue thil:' matter out as a matter of common 
sense and authority. It is a very easy thing to say ''we 
are the owners'' in this situation, but it is a very difficult 
thing for plaintiff to put its feet squarely on the ground 
of authority an(l the law. 
Weil, Section 37, has this to say about the matter: 
"E:SCAPED OR ABANDONED W ATERI-
The water taken into an artificial structure and 
reduced to possession is private property during 
the period of possession. vVhen possession of the 
actual water or corpus has been relinquished or 
lost, by overflow or discharge after use, property 
in it ceases; the water becomes again no body's 
property and re-enters the negative eommunity, 
or 'belongs to the public,' just as it was before 
being taken into the ditch. It has no earmarks 
to enable its former possessor to follow it and 
say it is his. The specific water so discharged 
or escaped is abandoned; not an abandonment 
of a water-right, hut an abandonment of specific 
portions of water, y}z., the very particles that are 
diseharged or have escaped from control." 
~F'or fear it :-;hould he suggested that while the fore-
going is true as to running water it would not be true as 
to an undergrouud stream or as to percolating water, 
hut which suggestion would not he true under the mooern 
doctrine, See Weil, Seetiou 1100, under the title "NO 
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l_;O?\GER PRIVATF~ PROPgR'l'Y IN ITS NArrUR1AL 
srrATg_,, 
In tlw eourt below plaintiff argued that by reason 
of an arrangement it had with the railroad company 
plaintiff could. "convey" water through the railroad fill 
withont losing title, and since the railroad company could 
remove the railroad fill at its own will, it could give to 
1lw plaintiff the right to remove the water in the till, an 
attempt being mad<~, apparent!~·, to g·et \Yithin the do('-
trine of the Montana-Bingham Y. LTtnh Copper case. This 
th<•o!·~· l!a~ disappeared in the progress of this case from 
tht> trial r·onrt to the appellate court, and it emerges in 
<lll attPnual<>rl and undefinud assertion without an~· ref-
l'I'l'IJr·p to tilt> record wlwtever, that the railroad eompany 
o<·cnpies "t>xclnf<iYely" tlw land OYer which it has an 
('<I Sl~llll'nt 1>~· eondenllln ti on or eon trar·t. 'rh iH assertion 
that tl1C' railroad's right of way is one of "pxelusive" 
f'hnrad<•r is n•pL•ated at several places in plaintiff's 
brief. "\gai11 plaintiff f'ites no anthority m support of 
its dt>f'laration that the use h~· the railroarl of the right 
of wa~· is t~x<·lnsi\'e. '!'here is 110 such anthorit~·. On the 
r·ontn\I'Y, tlw auth01·it)· is that a 1·ight of \VIl)' is not 
exdusin• as agninst th(• own<•r i11 fe<• as to any use whieh 
dol'S 11ot interf<·n~ with the railroad':,; usp for railroad 
purpmws, all(f particularly that a right of way gives to 
thP railroad 110 mi11ing rights. The railroad <'annot ('On-
fer upo11 tlw plaintiff '''hat it does not possess aml cannot 
rleprin• the appellant of what the appellant retains, that 
is, all mining rights in th0 right of way including the 
72 
right of way as modified or changed in confirmation by 
the railroad fill. 
Plaintiff has not ventured to discuss any of the 
decisive considerations surrounding the securing of pos-
session of the defendant's land by the plaintiff by virtue 
of the stipulation and order of the court in the condem--
nation proceeding. No discussion or citation of authority 
it attempted with regard to the nature and limitations 
of the plaintiff's rights in the copper solutions while they 
were in the dump and the points made by appellant i11 
its brief that the title to the water is a mere limited title, 
the right to capture and exclude others from capturing 
\\"hile in the dump; that this limited title is lost when 
the water passes from the plaintiff's premises and a 
similar qualified title vests in the appellant; that while 
the appellant lllay not compel the plaintiff to continue 
to permit its waters to escape into the land of the ap-
pellant, the plaintiff may not follow sueh waters; and 
that when such waters are captured in the land of the 
appellant there is a final, consummated title in the ap-
pellant. 
The only suggestion of an explanation of the basis 
of plaintiff'8 contention that the waters captured by 
plaintiff iu catchment C since plaintiff went in to pos-
se:,;sion "pending the action" and "without prejudice" 
on .T nne 1:1, 1928, is that plaintiff by the order permitting 
octnpation was not a trespasser in such occupation. It 
is true that plaintiff ·was not a trespasser after the order 
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of .Jm1e 1iHil, 1928, but plaintiff beemne a tt·ustee for 
the appellant in ease it was found at the end of the path 
we are pursuing that the plaintiff could not condemn 
Trads A, B, C, and D. 
\Y e will be aided in reaching a conclusion as to the 
character and rights incident to plaintiff's occupation 
of appellant's ground by considering what would have 
been the effect had their been no order of occupancy. 
\V e suppose there ('all he no doubt that if there had been 
no onler of occupHIH'Y the appellant could have collected 
the coppe1· solutions iu Trad C aml in so doing would 
han~ omwd them absolutely. It would have helped con-
>"iderahly if plaintiff had diseussed this point and have 
<·mweded it on the appeal as plaintiff ditl on the trial, 
so that ,,.e are able to say without an order of occupa-
tion, "pending the action'' and "without prejudice", 
plaintiff \Yas the owner of the copper solutions seeping 
and !io\Ying i11 'rnwt D and captured iu the catchment 
011 Tract C. Plaintiff has not attewpted to meet our 
citations on pp. 91, 92 aud 9~~ that the words "-,vithout 
prejudice" mean that the thing done" without prejudice" 
is as tlwngh it had uever been dcme. Iu the present case 
ueither the faet of the entry of the stipulation, the order 
of oecupaw·y "pending the actiou" and ''without preju-
dice", nor the actual oceupancy of the plaintiff, has any 
place whatever in the determination of whether or not the 
appellant is the o\\"ner of the eopper solutions seeping nn<l 
flo\\'ing ill Tract D. If the entry of the order "without 
prejudiee" nnd "pending the action" is given any ef-
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feet whatever in changing title and ownership to the 
('opper solutions, in tlw degree that it is g-iven cffed, 
there is a departure from the Rtipulation and order that 
it should he "without prejudic(' ". If tlw onlL•r is with-
ont prejndi(•e then the oecnpatio11 is without prejudi{·e, 
and if the occupation is without prejudice, it necessarily 
follows that whoever was tlw owner p1·ior to thl' order 
[LlHl the O('CUJHmcy i8 now tlH· owner; thert• has only heen 
a chanp;c• i11 thP person c·ollc~ding· the solutions, not in the 
O\\·nership of tltetll: thP ehange being one "without pre-
judiec" and only "pending· tlw action"; and whether 
or not tlw plaintiiT lllllst pa:· for thL• ('OJ>JH'l" solutionR 
it has been colle(·ting· fro111 Tra(·t D will depend upon 
whether or not the appellant waR thL• owner heforp the 
0rder of oecupaney and the1·efore coutiuued to be there-
after; and if for <lit~· J"t•ason the eollrt penuits thL• (·on-
delllnation of 'l'raets .A, B, C, and D i11 twnnitting (~OJI­
demuation the (•ourt will require that the appl'llant lw 
paid for en•ry elutlle!lt of nlJm• ill t!Jl'SC' tracts iu(·luding 
Hll.'' wntL•rs tH•n·olating or flowi11g in th<· trads. 
Plaintiff, as it seems to appellant, fails to appreeiate 
the fad that if ~'ou take land in whieh th(•re is pl•n·olating-
water :·on 11mst P'ay for the preeolating water. As wc> 
han• stntecl nmn~· times i11 this case, it iR our eontentiou 
1 hat the appellant's prmnisl'S cauuot he condl'llllJC(l be-
(•;mse snch ('Ondemnn ti on would mean that the right of 
the defendants to llline on their O\Yll pn~tnises would he 
transferre<l to thL• plaint iff, alJ(l the statutes of e111inent 
domain eon1emplate no sueh reslllt. On the other hand, 
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we are clearly of the opinion that .if the plaintiff may 
eondemn the defendant's premises, in doing so it must 
pay for the valualble per·colating, seeping and flowing 
eopper solutions therein. 
Plaintiff has cited the case of Los Angeles v. Pom-
eroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pae. 585, in which it was held that 
the underground waters of an entire valley were a reser-
voir and that since the waters moved in a certain direc-
tion, they constituted a subterranean stream throughout 
the entire valley. \Ve will refer to this ease again, hut 
at the present time let us rely on the case for onr propo-
sition that in condemning land you must pay for all of 
the water seeping, percolating aml flowing .in it. The 
eourt in this case approve<l the following instruetiou: 
"You are instrueted that, in addition to these 
rights aud benefits arising from the flow of the 
river through this land, the defendants are the 
absolute owners of all sueh water as may he pres-
ent in the :-:oil of this land, and which does not 
con:stitute a part of the water of the river. This 
is usually called 'pereolating water.' There is, 
however, no magic in the word 'percolating'; and 
the faet that any witness may apply that word, or 
refuse to apply it, to any particular class of wa-
ters of which he may speak, is not <~onelnsive of 
the question whether or not such water does or 
does not form part of the river. That question 
is to be determined bv von from a consideratim1 
of the fach; proven. ·· The right and ownership 
of the defendants in this elass of water:-: is dis-
tinct from, and much greater than, their right to 
the waters of the stream. As to the \\"atcrs of 
the stream, they have a right only to the use of 
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it on this land, and they do not own its corpus, 
or its body, or the very water itself; and they have 
no right to take it away from the land and use it 
on other lands, or to sell or dispose of it for use 
on other lands or at other places. But as to this 
other \\·atcr, if any thc>re is in this land, not a 
ymrt of the stream, they are the absolute owners 
of it, to the same extent and as full)· as they 
own the soil or the roeks or timber on the land. 
Therefore, if hy any means they can separate this 
water from the laml, the)· have an absolute right 
to the water thus separated, and may conduct it 
a\Yay and sell or disposc> of it anywhere as they 
see fit, suhjeet only to the limitation that the~· may 
not excavah• or do anything on the lan<l for the 
mere purpose of intercepting sneh water, ami pre-
venting same from flowing into the Rtream or wa-
ter course on the land of another, a}](l without 
inteudinp; to make an~· ht>IWfi<·ial use of it them-
:o;elves. 'Vhatc>ver additional 111arkd valnP this 
land may have had by reasou of tlw presence 
t,herein of watt~r of this c·lass, or h.'· rPason of 
the feasibility of separating it frotH tlw lan<l, or 
of using it on the land, or of eonducting it to somP 
other plaep for use or sHIP, or of the gTl'at market 
val up of snc h wn tl•r for t-mch purpm;cs, or h~· rea-
ROll of all thm.:p thing-s eomhiued, or hy ren-
SOIJ of any other lawful benefit or a<lvantag·e whi(·h 
this water g·ives, this additional market value in-
uref' to the benefit of the rlefen<lants, and is a 
part of the compensation to whieh the~· are en-
titled in this eaRe, as the vahw of the land to he 
<-ondemned. 
"You are instrnde<l that, if the jnr~v heliC'Yl' 
front the evidenee that the subterranean waters 
in the land sought to he eondeumed are percolating· 
withont any <lefinit<' ehannel, and that the same 
are not a suhtenanean water conrsc> or stream; 
aml if thc>~· believe that sn('lt watc•rs eome onto 
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said lauds from the lands of others above, or pass 
from tlw lands sought to be condemned down to 
the lands of others lying below, and that snch lrp-
per proprietors could, by the construction of tun-
nels or other works, cut off or divert said watei's, 
or some part thereof, from the lands sought to 
he condemned, or that such lower proprietors 
could construet tunnels or other works on the 
lands lying helm\' the lands sought to be condemn-
ed, which would have the effect of draining or (le-
rniving the lands songht to be condemned of their 
subterranean waters, to the extent that the owners 
of the land sought to he condemned eoultl not 
make a praetieal usp thereof, or of some part of 
said waters-then the jnry are instrueted that 
such upper and lower proprietors would have the 
same rights so to appropriate saicl waters ou 
their lands as the rlefendants would have ou the 
lands sought to be condemned; and the jury must 
take those faets into consideration so far as thev 
diminish or destroy the value of the rights of th.c 
defendants to said waters, or such portion thereof 
as f'ould be so cliYerted or drained so as to Cle-
prive clefPntlants of the practical use thereof." 
lt will be noticed that in eomlemniug a piece of land 
and taking watt>I'S sec•ping-, percolatiug and flowing there-
in the f'ourt iu the Lns Angdes-Pomero~- ease requires 
that the eo11deumor shall pay for the r·apal'it~- of the 
land to produce tNifer, aud it will further be noted that 
this capacity is not limiterl to thP watl'r in the laud at 
tlw inRtaiWl' of condenmatiou, hut the eondenmor was 
requirerl to pay for the \rat(•r whieh would come into the 
land in the fnbn·e, Rnbjeet to the possibility which limited 
tlw value of the water right in tlw owner of the land and 
thP amount which the condemnor was therefore required 
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to pay for that water right by the fact that the owner 
of the dominant estate was free to cut off the flow of 
tl1e water (if percolating) at any time and deprive the 
servient estate, which was condemned, of the continued 
flow. lt will be noted, therefore, in the present case that 
if plaintiff is permitted to condemn Tract D and the wa-
ters seeping, pereola ting and flowing therein, the plain-
tiff \Yill condemn the water producing capacity of this 
ground whieh included the right in the appellant to all 
waters \\~hich should f1ow, seep and percolate from the 
lands of the plaintiff into the lands of the appellant. Of 
course the plaintiff could cut this water off by capturing 
it on its own premises and by preventing its escape, but 
the ownership of all water flowing from the land of the 
plaintiff and into the land of the defendant ceased, in 
crossing the boundary between the land of the plaintiff 
and the land of the appellant to belong to the plaintiff 
and beeome the water of the appellant, and must be paid 
for. As a matter of fact, this, as plaintiff says, "inter-
e,sting case" of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy clearly states 
the doctrine that in condemning a piece of land one must 
not only pay for the water in the land at the instance 
of condemnatiou hut must pay for the likely or possible 
particle of water-it may he hundreds of miles away, 
or it may be at that time in the douds, or it may he at 
that time in the gulf stream-which in the eourse of time 
will reach the laud in question and, in reaehing such 
land, he suhjeet to capture. So in the instant case, the 
plaintiff in condemning tract D must pay the appellant 
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for the copper solutions seeping, pet'colating and flowing 
in plaintiff's dump which, unless captured and controlled 
011 plaintiif's land, will etwape into the land of appella11l 
and Le owned by appelhwt. It would have been "inter-
esting" for the City of Lo;:; Angeles to have informed 
Pomeroy and his assoeiates that in eondelllning its land 
all Los Angeles would have to pa~' was for the laud a11d 
no watet·, that tlw water which would comP iHlo the lund 
in the future would belong to the City of Lo;,; Angeles 
bt><·ausc Los Angeles would not be a trespasser npon the 
land it had a<~quired front Pomeroy. 
\\" e are dealing with old and fundamental principles 
iu this cas<'. 'l'he law rPlating to water is not the c·n~ature 
of' our day lJut of many generations, and its principles 
haYe hee11 tested and applied under varying eirenm-
stances and found to work out i11 the long nm, C'very-
thing considered, the fnin,st and most equitable re<'Of,>ni-
tiou of rights, and such s_•;stmu cannot he <list urhed or 
sPt asi ck lw('a us<• of the whims or supposed interests 
of a larg-e 1nining ('OHC<'nl as against a fc\V individuals. 
\\"hat we gl't out of the case of Los Angeles ,._ Pomeroy 
is that you l'annot takl' tlw watl'r sel~ping, pl'r<·olating 
or Jlo\\'ing i11 tlw land of mwther b_,. comll~lllllation pro-
<'l•edings wtiless ;I} Oil pay for them, and that is all that we 
<·au ask hPI"l' if the <'ourt rea<'ltes the ('Ollclusiou that thi·s 
la]}(l may he <'ondPimwd. 
'l'!Jp logic of the plaintiff 111 this ease would work 
out in a rather discou<'ert.ing wa~' if it wen' applied to 
a valley i11 which there was sitnaterl six different mining 
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concerns ownmg mmmg dumps producing copper solu-
tions at different elevations, the highest being owned 
by A and the lowest being owned by F. E would institute 
proeeedings to condemn the land of F so as to collect its 
copper solutions on the land of 1<--.. Having succeeded 
and thereby educated its neighbor D, situate at a higher 
level, D would bring an action to condemn the lands of 
E, which would include those of !<~. Having succeeded, 
C would institute a similar action acquiring the lands of 
D, E, and F. B would follo\\·, and finally A, having the 
land al the highest elevation, would become the owner of 
the lands of C, D, E, and F; and in so doing they would 
c~ach in turn make the same argument as plaintiff makes 
in this case, that all they were acquiring wa,s a ditch, 
ancl that having acquired possession by the preliminary 
order '' wi tlwut preju< lice'', ''pen <ling the action'', the 
copper solutioni:i which eame into the servient tenement 
thereafter were ''conducted'', '' eonveyed' ', ''carried'' 
by them onto such servient tenement, ancl having pos-
session of the servient tenement, they were not tres-
passers, and not being trespassers, would have entire 
right, not by agreement with the owner of the servient 
tcmement, hut by eonclemnatiou, as plaintiff in this case 
says in order to hring plaintiff's rights within its in-
terpretation of the ~fontana-Bingham case, to collect the 
1n1ters in question. 
On pp. 102 and 1 o:) of our brief we discuss the use 
of the words "convey", "carry", and "take" used by 
the plaintiff in <lescrihing the movement of sueh part 
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of the water as comes from plaintiff's dump to the in-
take at catchment C and suggested that plaintiff was 
arrogating to itself too much in the use of these words 
since they imply some control of the waters on the part 
of the plaintiff, while the facts demonstrate that the 
only agency at all concerned is the law of g-ravitation 
which plaintiff unconsciously is attempting to condemn 
in this action. The water in question falls like the gentle 
dew from heaven upon the earth beneath, \Vhich happens 
in this ca'se to be the dump of the plaintiff, but the fall-
ing is no different than if the property were otherwise, 
and then seeps, percolates, and, perhaps, flows through 
t lle tlump into the soils beneath the dump, and seeps, 
percolates, and, perhaps, flows through and out of the 
ftll. Some of it perhaps reaches the bottom of the gulch 
and all of it rises in the toe of the dump on Tract D. How 
in the name of heaven can this progress be called a "con-
veying" or "carrying" or "taking" of the water by 
the plaintiff from the dump to the eatehment, rrract D"? 
The only reason why these words are used is that they 
imply some control of the water by the plaintiff, and 
plaintiff realizes that to perfect its title it must have 
captured, reduced to possession, and controlled this wa-
ter on its own premises. It is for this reason that plain-
tiff toys with words which imply the capacity of the 
plaintiff to "earry'', "convey", and "take" such part 
of the water as comes from the dump to the catchment 
from the plainti 1I 's land to the land of the defendant. 
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Again plaintiff's use of these words is poetical and has 
no existence in reality. 
UTAH COPPER CO. V. MONTANA-BINGHAM CONSOLIDATED 
MINING CO .• 69 UTAH 423, 255 PAC. 678. 
Plaintiff argues that the basis of the holding in the 
~\I on tan a- Bingham case b.v the State Court is that the 
lltah Copper Company waH not a trespa,;ser on the dump 
<nHi therefore ha<l the right to take the water in the 
dump. 'I' his is not the baH is of the eourt 's deeision. The 
basi,; of the <·ourt ',; deci,;io11 is that hy agreement the 
Utah CoppPr Comrmu)· wa,; the owner of thP dump ~with 
the express ri.qht to remoYe till' dUJilp and could thNc-
forc remove eYerything in the• dump. 'Vhile plaintiff 
\Hli:' not a trespasser it was something mon• than "not 
a trespasser". Plaintiff had the express right to re~ 
move the dnmp, in other words, it was the owner of the 
clnmp, and the solntiom; being a part of the dump, was 
the owner of the solutions. 
MONTANA CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. V. UTAH COPPER 
CO., DECREID OJ<' JUDGE .JOHNSOl\. 
ln a se<~ond Montana-Bingh:uu-l)tah Copper cas<' 
:filed iu the Federal Comt, w:hi<'h is discussc•d b~· plain-
tiff ou pp. GH aml 70, the Federal Court at tempterl a de-
<'ree interpn•tivl' of tlw decision by the fitate Court. 'rhe 
J1'e<1eral Conrt has not explained the hasi:-; of its decision 
aud ma~- well have held that sin<'e the rig-ht to remove 
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the dump existed, this included the right to remove the 
copper solutions on and in the easement. \V e do not 
know why the court held that the Copper Company could 
follow the solutions into the soils and onto betlrock nuder 
the dump, but we surmise that it was because the court 
felt that the right to remove the dump <'arried with it 
the right of doing everything necessary to make that 
removal effectual and beneiieial. In any event, the 
rights \\·ere based on agreement between the owner of 
the dump with the right of removal and the owner of the 
servient estate burdened with the duty of permitting 
the remon1l. But all of the comfort which plaintiff may 
he able to get ont of the Federal ease stops :,;hort of 
any aid in the ea;se now before the court, for the decree 
in the Federal C'ase expressly ends all elaim, ownership, 
or right in the plaintiff to tl1e coppl~r solutions when "the 
same shall have flowed out and seeped and percolated iu 
and through the soil on the plaintiff's mining elaims, 
laterally bt~yond the periphery of sai<l dump or deposit 
and off of and from the surface right, interest and estate 
heretofore conveyed to defendant"; and in another plal.'e 
in the decree "the right eontinue:,; until" (awl then ench;) 
''when the copper solutions shall have flowed out and 
seepecl or percolated iu aml through the soil of the plain-
tiff's mining claims (Montana-Bingham Company) later-
ally beyond the periphery of said dump or deposit and 
off of and from said surface right, interest and estate of 
the defemlant" (Utah Copper Company). On page 71, 
after quoting from the Federal Montana-Bingham ea.:Se 
84 
and then from the opinion in the State case, and having 
Ptated that the only difference as far as plaintiff can 
Hee is that "in the case at bar the two estates are laterally 
cont iguom; ", while in the Tiewaukee case the dump was 
superimposed upon the claims of the ltliniug company, 
plaintiff asks, \Yhat is the differenee t ~We are more 
interested, however, in the fnc·t that plaintiff has cited 
the Fedl~ral case as in some way sustaining its position 
here, uotwithstanding tlw fac·t, which plaiutiff has not 
n•fc•ned to nor attempted to explain iu any degree, that 
tlw eonl'i in the ]<'edernl c·asl• in n denee prepared and 
Sll'hmitted to the court hy the plaintiff aetua1l,\·, expl'C'ssly, 
h\·iC'e, fonnd that thl•re was a di ff'en•Iwe, all<l that as soon 
as thl• solutions seeped "latentll.'· he.nmd the pe1·iphery 
oft-mid dmnp or deposit," tlw title• of the plaiutiff ec•ased 
and its right to capture the solutiom; cea:-:ed. ln:-:tead of 
aski11g appellaut to explain the diffen•w·e it :,.;L•ems to 
us that it it-> itH'lllllbent npm1 the plainti f'f in <'i tiug this 
('ase to attl'lllpt t->OIIll~ n~couciliatiou hetwel'Jl till' expn•ss 
lilllitation of the denee in tlll' rJ'iewaukec• <'HSl' as to 
water sN•ping or flowing'' latl~rally he.'·mHl tlw periplH•r.'· 
of t->aid dmnp or d<'posit ". 'L'hl• diff'l•n•JWl' hl'twee•n the• 
right to collec·t thl• \rater beueath the· dulllp and tlw denial 
of tlw right whl'll the water flowed laterally hC>.\'Olld the 
dnmp is, at-> it :,.;eetns to us, perfect!.'· oln·ious. The <·otut 
hl'ld thai by agreellll'nt the plaintiff in thl• 'l'iPwtmkee 
<'HSl~ i11 the Fe~deral Court had snrn~ndered the right 
otlwnvise possessed to colle•ct the coppe•r solutions ill 
its OWJl ground beneath tlw dump, hnt that that agree-
rnent did not extend to the solutions seepmg or per-
colating iu the property of the plaintiff beyond the peri-
}Jlwry of the dump. It was purely a rnatte1· of agt·eement 
and rests upon the sonnd basis that you may agree to 
part with what you OWll. rrhe question in this ('HSC is 
not what may be done by the owner with what he owns, 
whieh was the question in the Tiewankee case, but 
whether or not the plaintiff iu this case adually owns 
wlwt tlw .Montana-Bingham Compauy was expressly de-
en~ed to own iu the Tiewnnk<~t· case, tltat is, all copper 
solutiom; pl·n·olating, seeping or flowing in its property 
to ,,·hich it has not volm1taril~· and hy ag-reement sur-
Ieudered its rights. Ou page 71, after refening to the 
11ontana-Biugham ease, aud noting that the copper so-
lutious whi<·h the ( 'opper Company was permitted to 
follow all(! cnptun• were those iu and bt>neath the dump, 
hut in this case are lat<>rally by hundreds of feet from 
th<• dump, plai11tiff says: "But what do theRe <lefend-
mits think this wit is for! Not being able to acquire 
h)· <'OIItrad the right to convt•y these solutions over and 
upon the prelllist•s of tht> defendant, plaintiff found it 
lle<·e:-;sa ry to institute this suit b.'· whi<·h to condemn that 
right, alHl, pursuant to the order of eourt entered into 
po:-;scssiou of that part of tlw defendants' premises re-
quired for that purpost>, all(! Pxereising the rig-ht so eon-
ft>nt>d lliJOll J!laintiff iu and ll)JOU those premises, plain-
tiff pro<"eedl'd to aud has at all times since umh~r that 
rigbt, comTeyed its <·opper solutions from its dumps down 
to its intake." The foregoing statement is a mass of 
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twisted perversiOns. In the first place, we deny that 
the plaintiff ever attempted ''to acquire by contract 
the right to convey these solutions over and upon the 
premises of the defendant". The plaintiff never sought 
to convey the solutions over the premises of the defend-
ants. If phiintiff had attempted to seeure a eontraet to 
convey its solutions over the promises of the defendants, 
there is no doubt but that it could have seeured such :=t. 
contmct. But, be it remembered, conveying implies con-
trol, and powerful as the plaintiff thinks it is, it does 
not convey by simply permitting the law of gravitation 
to exert its influence. Conveying implies control and 
posisession, and the only way in which the plaintiff could 
have conveyed solutions over the land and premises 
would have been to have eaptured on its own land solu-
tions in its clump and by some means whieh woul(l have 
confined such solutions and not permitted them to esc·ape, 
such as by means of a pipe line have taken them acro•ss 
appe11ant's premises. Appellant would never have ob-
jected to this; but plaintiff has never attempted to secure 
such a right. It is, we think, for the same reason, a 
perversion for plaintiff to suggest that because of the 
refusal of defendant, plaintiff ''found it necessary to in-
stitute this suit by whieh to condemn that right" (right 
to convey water a·cross defendant's premises); and it is 
also who11y inaceurato to state that plaintiff "pursuant 
to the order of tho court entered into possession of that 
part of defendants' premi,sos required for that purpose". 
What the plaintiff is doing is capturing on defendant's 
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l<md defendant's copper solutions. They have never 
ht>en redu(~ed to possession by the plaintiff at any other 
phwc than 011 the land of the defendant where they are 
ownt>d by defendant; and these waters have been per-
mitted to escape from plaintiff's dump just as truly since 
the order of the court as prior thereto. 'rlw last state-
ment that since the oi,der of the court plaintiff has "pro-
ceeded to ami has at all times since under that right, 
('OnYeyed its copper solutions from its dumps down to 
its intalw ", ignores the conditional, tentative, preliruin-
my (•ha rader of the O('(~upalH~Y of defenda11t 's premises 
h:· tlw plaintiff "pt>nding the adion" and "without 
prejudiCL' ''. 
If tilL' plaintiff (lesires to secme the right to capture 
copper solutions in the servient estate in this case as it 
was pt>nnitted to do in the 'riewauket> ('ase, it must do 
as it did in the 'l'iewaukee case, secure that right by 
agTeement and pa.'· for it, or, it must do as the plaintiff 
clid in thL' "intt>resting <·ase" of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy 
-purdmsP that right. WL' join with plaintiff in recom·· 
1nending the ('ase of Los Angele8 v. Pomero.\· as "inter-
esting" and add that it is instrn('tin•. As we think illu-
1llinating this Pntin~ qnesti(m, may \H' ask what would 
ha n• been tlw result in the 'l'iewaukee ease had the Utah 
Copper Compnu.'· in its agreement secured only a right 
to dump its wastu material on the land of the Montana-
Bingham Compan~' '! ~Would not the court have held 
nndt>r SU('h cin·mustances that it had ahandont>(l any COll-
per solutions thereafter flowing out of tlw dump, and in 
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the present case, having acquired no right by agreement 
with the defendants to remove from the lands of the 
defendants any ·waters which may have escaped from the 
plaintiff's dump at a higher level, will the defendant 
be permitted, without paying for them, to take copper 
~oiutions from the lands of the defendant vvhen there 
can he no doubt that the plaintiff would have had no 
rig·ht in the 'riewaukee case to have taken copper solu-
tions from the dump, or, as the Federal Court held, be-
neath the dump (but not laterally) had the defendant 
not by agTeement reserved the right to remove the entire 
<lump and all in it 1 
It is absolutely certain that unless the copper solu-
tions in plaintiff's dump are actually captured ~md con-
trolled in the dump they will percolate, seep and flow 
into Tract D. This certainty is a property right in the 
owner of rrract D. This right in the owner of Tract D 
is not an absolute right and may be cut off and destroyed 
by the plaintiff capturing and controlling the solutions 
before they leave the dump, but the plaintiff's right to 
the solutions in the dump is confined to the dump, and 
the plaintiff has no more right to anticipate the right 
of the defendants to the solutions if they are permitted 
to escape and flow into Tract D by condenming Tract 
D and thus acquiring ownership to the waters even 
though they are permitted to escape and flow into Tract 
D than the owner of Tract D has to anticipate its owner-
ship by extending a tunnel into plaintiff's dump and 
capturing the waters in the dump before they are per-
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mitted to escape. The plaintiff owns the waters in the 
dump; the defendant owns the waters in defendant's 
ground. The plaintiff has the right to prevent the es-
cape. 'rhe defendant has the right to capture after the 
escape. Neither can interfere with the other; and what 
the plaintiff is attempting· to do in this l'ase is to de;;troy 
the defendant's rights to capture the waters after they 
escape, when the only way plaintiff ean preserve its title 
is to prevent the cseape. lt is because tlwre is no escape 
from the conl'lnsion that if plaintiff is permitted to con-
deum 'l'ract D or eateh the waters in Tract 0, it will be 
mining- the defendant's ground, <·apturiug defendant's 
('Opper solutions and depriviug the lldendant of its own 
right to miue, that we say thl~ court eannot permit the 
condemnation of the trad sought by the plaintiff. While 
the foregoing is absolutely true in fact and souml in 
law, as we see the law and the fact, the defendant never-
theless says that if the ('Ourt for any reason ean hold that 
tlte plaintiff is entitled to condemn the land of the de-
femlant, it umst pa~· for the eertaiut~· that valuable waters 
permitted to escape will reach defendant's lands and 
belong to the llcfeudant, and that the plaintiff cannot 
eondemn Tract D without paying- for this potential right. 
It is the taking of our property without payment for all 
of its values, of values fixed and inhering in the land, 
those existing in enjoyment now and those which will 
accrue in the fntnrc-this valuable possibility that waters 
in tho <lump will coutinue to escape from the dump, this 
certainty that if it is permitted to escape from the dump 
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it will come to 'rraet D, a value just as true and existent 
as any other value-it is the failure of plaintiff to pay 
for all of these values that vitiates and destroys the 
sonndne:-;H of the decision by the trial court. 
It sceHls to appellant that the essence of this con-
trm·ers:· is not ditheult of a:-;<•ertainment. ]j'or many 
years water has heen flowing down Dixon Gulch and ap-
JWaring approximat'ely where it now does in the Hays 
~]Wing. 'Phis water has had a <·opper eontent for a eon-
l'iderahh• time. ~incc the dnmp of the plaintiff waH de-
poHite<l in the upper elevation in Dixon Onleh the coppN 
<'mttent has increased and he<·oute commercial. These 
<·opper Holutions have flowed and will continue to How 
into the lands of the appellant. Whatever part of these 
:,;olutions c·omes diredly or iudiredly from plaintiff's 
dnrnp plaintiff desin's to eollPci all(] precipitat(•. 'l'hiH 
plaintiff may legally do b,\· <·apturing tlwse solutions on 
its own property. ff they are captured on plaintiff's 
pmpnty they may hP <·om·eycd by ·some meanH not JlPr-
mitting their PS<'HJH', a pipe, for (•xomple, or a c·onc·rcte 
lined ditch, ami we have no doubt that if intereepted, 
eolleded and <'Ontrolled on plaintiff's prullliscH, plaintiff 
<·<mid, if it did Hot interfere with the rights of the de-
femlant to c·olle<'t copper waters on defuudant 'H ground, 
actually c·onve~· these solutions acrm;s the land owned 
by the appellant, or, if possible, thesp solutiollH C'onld be 
cliYertect into land not now reeeiving copper solutions 
from plaintif'f'H <1ulllp, or otherwise, h~· the plaintiff con-
denming snC'lt barren and non-prodnctive lands as far as 
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<~opper solutions are eoncerned. But we think it just 
as rertaiu, as a matter of law, that plaintiff may not 
eondenm the land:,; into which these copper solutions have 
been flowing and will continue to flow unless they are 
eontrolled, captured, and Teduced to possession in plain-
tiff's ground a:,; any other principle of the law relating 
to water. What plaintiff is attempting to Jo is to aban-
don <·ertain waters from its Jump, permit title to arise 
in the appellant, allll uotwitbstandiug this chauge in 
title, take the title away from the appellant without pay-
ing for it. '!'his plaintiff cannot do. \Ye ~;ay "abaudon" 
awl "permit to eseape ". The:,;e exprcs::;ions, in our judg-
ment, are uot at•c•m·atP. 'I'Ite~- imply iu some way volition 
ou the part of the plaintiff. Ownership and ehange of 
ownership of water is in large part involuntary, partien-
larly as to subterranL>an uumifestatious. 'l'he layv ereates 
the qualified ownership as to water in laud and also erHls 
the owuership wheu the water passes from the laud. The 
\Yill of the O\Yuer of the lalHl has nothing to do with either 
the creation or the cessation of ownership. Such owner-
ship is an incident of forces OYer which the owner of the 
land has no control. He doe:'\ not permit water to eseape; 
the water simply fto,,-s from the land through the oper-
ation of natural forces and flows into the land by the 
operation of natural forces, and the mvnership ari;,;es 
and ceases by the operation of the same forces. \Y e think 
plaintiff fails to appreciate or to give due for·ce to the 
uatnre and limitations of ownership of water. 'rhis own-
cn;lJip exists in the owner of the land o11ly while water 
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IH m the land, and is a qualified ownership until the 
water is reduced absolutely to possession. If the water 
leaves the land of the owner, his ownership ceases. And 
it should not he overlooked that it is of the very essence 
of tlw natnre of water that it iR in constant motion and 
ehnnge:;; from plaee to place. It is this incident that 
gwes to it its essenee and distinctive characteristics 
whic·h an~ reeogui:r,ed and have determinative conse-
quen<·es in tiH' lnw relating to the accession and the 
1 prmiua tion of ownership of water. 
IS APPELLANT APPJ<JALING ONLY FROM THE WRITTEN 
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT'? 
Plaintiff <'Olltplaius that \YP have spent a great dt•al 
ef time in argning against the writtc•n tnemormHlum 
opinim1 of thf> eourt and 11ot against th(• jndgn1ent of the 
court (Brief page 74 ). If then• exists any differenc·e 
between the judgment and the written memorandum 
opinion of the eourt, if tho judgment does not enthod.Y 
thP written mmnorandum opinion, it wonld he ver)· ea:;;:· 
for plaintiff to point ont this fad. Plaintiff has sug-
gested 110 differe11ce and "·e think then• is 110 nwterial 
difference. 'l'lte judglllent embodies the opi11iou. \Ye, 
of counw, do not eontend that tlwre iR an:· reversible 
error in the opi11ion, hut the opinion is embodied in the 
jndgmeut and then• is rcYersible error in the jndg1nent, 
and the judgmeJJt is Pxplailled h~, the opinio11 and the 
foree and effed of the judgmPnt is illuRtrated hy the 
opinio11, and it is quite like!~· that it is lJpeauRe the opin-
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wn discloses the nature and effect of the judgment 
that plaintiff objects to our referring to the opinion. 
WHAT IS A DITCH? 
It will not escape the attention of the court that 
plaintiff haR been compelled to Reek every ec·centric and 
queer ease ill the bookR to attr•mpt ;, snpport of its de-
finition of a ditch. 'Plw railroa<l fill iu !his ease was 
plaeP<l squarely a<·ross the g-ulch at rig-ht angles to the 
channel. It ohstruets in great degree the flow of water 
dowll the guleh. 'J1he plaintiff contended that there was 
IHon• or less opm1 drain in the progrf'ss of the gulch due 
to th<• JH'l'S<'llC<~ of larg<• boulders in the making- of the 
fill. The <lefcudant contended that through the aetiou 
of flood \\·a(ers the fill was in large part sealed, but in 
an.Y t>vent as fo all watt>rs not reaching the absolute bot-
tom of th<> gulch, Uw rail!·oad fill itself served as <l 
mPdium !!trough whieh \Ya(<•r:-; front the <lump seeped aml 
JH~reolated. lt \Yas for !his rC>ason that the till itself and 
e\·et·ythiug ahov<> lwdnwk on 'l'rad ]) is i11cluded within 
the area sough! lo IH· l'OIHlenmed. It is n•ry diffienlt, if 
not impossi•ble, to com·L•ivL• a gulch across whi<'lt has been 
plnf'cd a railroacl fill with thousaml:,; of ton:-; of material 
being a "diteh" and the guleh being <·onclemned from 
hedroek up through surface soils and through thP fill as 
a "dit<-h". As a matter of fact, plaintiff has coutem1Pd 
throughout this <'ase for the most fantastieal proposi-
tion:-; in the way of <lit<·ltes, reRervoiT':-; and receptadeR. 
In the original fimlings of faet as snbmitled by tlw 
94 
plaintiff, plaintiff asked the court to find as a matter of 
faet that the dump is a "reservoir" or "receptacle". 
This was objected to as being "poetical", and the court 
struck it out err. 3802-7). Plaintiff''S proposition amounts 
in the eud to a holding that everything through, over, or 
along whieh water is conducted by the law of gravitation 
is a ditch. The definitions we have quoted in our brief 
require that a ditch shall have Home definite boundaries 
confining water, such as a reservoir and a receptacle 
must have. The only boundaries of the "reservoir" 
plaintiff contended for were the blue sky albove and thC> 
brown earth beneath, and the 'same unsubstantial chara<·-
ter attaches to plaintiff's ('Ontention in this cafw J·pgard-
ing a ditch. 
The character of the "ditch" contended for by 
plaintiff is well illustrated by the testimony of plaintiff's 
expert, Joseph J. Beeson (A b. 500-:-n. Mr. Beeson was 
being cross-examined with regard to the plty1sieal con-
ditions undemeath the plaintiff's dump at the toe of the 
dump and up against the railroad fill and tlw conrsp of 
the solutions from that point of capture on defendant's 
land in catchment C. 
'' Q. "\Vhat have you assumed to Le the con-
dition of the first flume from vonr lower wing 
of the upper portal of the drain tunnel, ·what havt~ 
you assumed to be the eonditimt of that terrain1 
A. I have assumed that to Le-I hadn't 
really given it very much thought 1wmmse my eon-
ception of the way those solutions, these copper 
waters passed through there is that they eneoun-
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ter instead of au impervious seal it is ju:,;t semi-
pervious, that is it simply prevents the flow from 
being rapid,. and that the copper water~:-~ will 
eventually percolate throug-h it. 
Q. 'fhat ts your seal against the toe of the 
fill 't 
A. Yes sll'. 
(~. You think that is semi-pervious~ 
A. Yes, 1 think it is. 
Q. 'rhat the waters percolate downward 
throu~h that and into the• fill and pereolate out 
through the fill until they reaeh the bottom of the 
gulch and appc~m down at the 1-la~·s spring, is that 
your idea~ 
A. That is right. 
(~. Does that extend across the entire up-
ward toe of the fill1 
A. I should think ~:-~o. 
(~ .. So that whe11 you Raid it flowed dow11 
through the fill, you didn't know of any parti-
cular channel in \Yhieh they were coursing down 
through the fill, did you~ You have seen no evi-
drlH'e of that, lwve you? 
A. No, not of any partienlar channel except 
when it ('OillPH out, wheu l hav<~ ohservl'd it, it 
all camP out at onl' place. 
(J_ l think you stated those wa terH are seep-
ing and pPrcolating in the fill, in the soil abo,·e the 
fill mHl abo\'(' he<l-rock, is that eorre<'t? 
A. YeR, that iR right. 
(~. You obsNved the water per<'olation hc•-
tween hed-roek and the eollar of the raiRe iu the 
catehment tunnrl, did you uot, Mr. BeaHon? 
nfi 
A. Yes, I think I observed that." 
'' Q. Is that the character, the :-;ame general 
character of water seepage and percolation you 
have described in your evidence~is the way the 
water leaves the fill and comes down to the point 
where it accumulates for the making of the Hays 
spring similar to that appearanc·e that is in the 
shaft there or in the raise? 
A. Yes, I think it is. I believe there are 
places in the bottom of the stream where the 
gravel would have a certain amount of mud in 
it and force more water to come ont right in the 
bed of the stream than others.'' 
The foregoing! testimony indicates the kind of 
"ditch" plain tiff is attempting to condemn. The experi-
ments plaintiff performed in which it took hours for 
water to go from the top of the railroad fi]} and from the 
dump illustrates the conveying charaeteristics of sucl1 a 
"ditch". These experiments are refe.ned to in re-
spondent's brief at pp. 42-4 and are also discm;sc><l in this 
brief at pp. 49-51. And see what Mr. PJarl says 
,about the course of the waters c·omiug from the plain-
tiff's dump in his testimony abstracted at pp. ] Hi-Hi of 
respondent's brief. The course Mr. Earl defines 
is from anywhere to anywhere, just ,so the waters reach 
appellant's land and can be collected in the catchment 
on Tract C. 
NECESSITY. 
Plaintiff Is entitled to very little consideration in 
this case on the question of necessity. Mr. Goodrieh 
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testified that when the dumps were placed in Dixon 
Gulch they were thoroughly familiar with its charac-
teristies and o.f the tendency of these dumps to give off 
copper solutions. 'l'hey knew at that time that the Hays 
1Spring waters were upon defendants' premises and that 
if the dump gave off solutions that they would probably 
go down through the gravels and soils beneath the dump, 
or seep and percolate throug·h the fill and eomiugle with 
these waters. Mr. Goodrich testified fully with refer-
ence to this suhjeci mntter (Ab. 1;>1-15:3). He testified 
as follows: 
'' (~. At the time you commenced dumping iu 
192G you or your company had a thorough knowl-
Pdge and understanding of these dumps and their 
eharacter and characteristics with reference to 
being reservoirs and sponges for water, all of 
them, di<ln 't ~:ou? 
A. Yes sir. 
(~. Had all of that information'? 
A. Yes sir. 
(l. Didn't you 1 
A. Yes sir. 
(l. And at that time, Mr. Goodrich, it would 
have been a very easy matter, would it not, to 
have provided for a catchment at the bottom of 
that dump to obtain these waters without con-
troversy or without any question, the waters from 
your dump, wouldn't it? 
A. No sir, it would not. 
Q. It would not'? 
A. No sir, it would cost considerable money 
to have provided a catch basin. 
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tJ. W onldn 't it have been a very simple 
matter in the railroad fill in Dickson Gulch b) 
have provided a eatchment? 
A. No sir. 
(~. ~Why not? 
A. Cost too much money. 
Q. What would it have eo:,;U 
A. Eight or ten thousand dollars. 
Q. J<~ight or ten 1 housand dollar:,; would not 
have been much to catch millions of tons or mil-
lions of pounds of <·opper, would it? 
A. I don't think that is the way to figure 
values. 'l'hat may be the way yon fi.gun• hut that 
is not the way 1 figure Yahw." 
* 
''Q. lf placed in the B. & 0. fi.ll it woulcln 't 
have heen a vcr_,. difficult t-;ituation, ~would it, ;-;o 
it would be immnue from the shrinking and <'X-
panding operation of these dumps, that ~wouldn't 
have been a w~ry diffi<·ult cngim•pring job, would 
itT 
A. Su<·h n <'Onstru<·tion could llaVl' been put 
un<lemeath the Bingham & Garfi<•ld Hailwa~· fill. 
Q. What is that! 
A. 8uch a construction <·ould havp hl'ell 1mt 
underneath the Bingham & Garfield Haihn1~· iill. 
(J. And could have ht><'ll plaeec! ven· near 
the dump'? 
A. Yl•s, quite <·lose to the dntup. 
(~. vVould have bem1 ver~· l'asy rna Iter, then, 
to have takc•n this water down :\larkham Gulch 
and collected and rctaim•d all the water that eould 
possibly eomc <lo·wn Dickson Gulch from your 
dnrnpf 
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A. lt would cost money to do it. The most 
direct way to seeure the eopper solutions from 
the Utah Copper dump is to take them down 
Dieksou Gulch as it is now and catch them at the 
eat(·h basin at the toe of the dump, take them on 
through the pipe line, just as we have plnmwd." 
It will therefore be seen that there was uo reas·on 
l!l the world why plaintiff should not at that time have 
taken the proper preeaution to eateh its solutions at the 
toe of its own dump. Sm·<'ly an ex.peuditure of eight or ten 
thousand dollars to catc11 hundreds of millions of pounds 
of eopper was a slight consideration. Mr. Goodrich 
testifies again at pages 15~J-Hi0 of the abstract that for 
eight or ten thousand dollars this eatchmeut ean still be 
put in. Mr. Crocker, eminent mining engineer, testified 
to the same effect a])(l pn's<mted a complete plan for th<> 
eatchmeut. 
The only a11swer whieh eounsel attempts to make to 
this proposition is that Mr. Earl had some doubts upon 
the subject matter. Who is Mr. Earl''? He is a m<i·Jte 
engineer (not a mining eng·ineer). Mr. Earl was asked 
a,bout himself to determine his qualifications to speak 
with reference to certain subject matters. He was a 
graduate of the L. D. R. High Sehool (rrr. 65) and took 
two years of eivil engineering at the University of Utah. 
He never took any courses in geology and never made a 
substantial study of it. He quit the University of Utah 
in 1904. He has done a little reading on leaching and 
precipitating· plants, and crl'r. GG) }ws never made any 
substantial study of water and water {'OUrses beneath 
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the surface, or of rock strata and their composition, 
worked as helper on a survey party when he got out of 
the University, and finally worked himself up to transit 
man (Tr. G7); went to work foT the Utah Copper Com-
pany in 1907, making surveys for railroad c·onstruetion. 
His work \\·a:,; entirely along· th<> line of tmrveying and 
about the only time he seems to have got out of it was 
when the leaehing· plant was built he seems to have been 
pTitced iu charge of that operation, and also eonstructed 
two tracks of the railroad through the Bingham yards 
('rr. 71 ). Again at 'l'r. 10:-l-104, liP was askPd this ques-
tion: 
"(~. l take it, Mr. J1Ja rl, s1 nel' ~·ou do not 
c~laim to lw a geologist, as .You havu statPd, and 
have made 110 studY of wnt<>r alHl \Yatt>r <'nurses, 
you woul(1 not fpe(;·oun·«~ll' qualifipd to giH• m1~· 
opinion as to tlw length of time that it would lak<· 
wa,ter to percolate from thP Ftah Coprwr dump 
down to this eat<'l1-all1 
A. No r;ir. 
(~. ~\ssurni11g that it would and eonw out 
and pPrcolah•<l-
·MR. PARS(>NS: What do yon mean hy 
catC'h-all t 
MH. HLCII: \\"h~- this tumwl \Yith its wing 
over there. 
A. No sir, I have not (•ven thought of that, 
I ha(1not, 1 haclnot thought about it and 1 haven't 
any opinion. 1 C'OUldll 't form an~· opinion on it. 
Q. You wouldn't feel ~-o\\TS<'1f qualified to 
form an opinion? 
A. Nosir." 
101 
This is the famous gentle!llan ah;o who was person-
ally in charge of and partieipated in the famous snrve~­
which was thrown out by the court for inaccuracy he-
eausc tlw transit man took a shot which would have re-
quired seeing ReV<'ll feet under groumL 
Connsel for plaintiff would now :state that the opiil-
1011 of Mr_ Goodrich, ehief engineer of plaintiff, and of 
Mr. Crocker, eminent mining engineer, shonld lw di.sre-
garded beeause, perchance, l\1 r. Earl thought there might 
be some questiou with refereuee to iL 
The only qnestiou ·which was l'ver raised with re-
ferellel' to t lw po:ssibil i ty o I' ilw Utah Copper Company 
eatching iL-; water upou its owu premises was tlw qm~s­
tion of cost_ Mr_ Gooclrich thought it would cost eight or 
ten t1ionsaud dol1ars and Mr. Cro<~ker thought it would 
he 1ware1· fivt• thonsmHl dollars. UndouJbtcdly ·with this 
Llepn•ssion on it conld be done for about a's much as the 
bri<'fs ill this <'ase ha,-e l'Ost ou appeal. 
We respedfully snlnnit to this court that it never 
·was a questioll of cost. rrhey realizell that the Hays 
~pring \Yaters we1·c· alread~· flowing upon defendant's' 
premises and aln~ad:- had a substantial copper eonteut. 
rl'IH~.'- wanted to obtain those waters, awl till'Y realized 
ihat the:- eould not <lo sob:- eatching the dump water at 
the toe of the dump hecanse the Hays Spring \Vaters 
were there hufore the dnmp \Vas installed and ha<l a sub-
stantial t•oppl•r conte11t before the dump was installed. 
Therefore, thu ouly wn~- to obtain the Hays ~priug with 
its coppl'l" eoutc•Jlt was to obtain defendants' property. 
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On page 116 of plaintiff's brief complaint seems to 
be made thn t because M1·. Goodrich testified "at the 
early stages of the ease" and admitted that jt would be 
possible rww at comparatively 'small cost to collect the 
eopper solutions from plaintiff's dump at the toe of that 
dump and on the plaintiff's land, and because, as stated 
on p. 117 of plaintiff's brief "the defendants' proposal 
had not been maL1e at that time", some allowance ought 
to be made for the testimony of Mr. Goodrich. This 
soundt'l almost aR though the plaintiff were attempting to 
impeaeh its O\Yn witness; but the fact nevertheless re-
mains that Mr. Goodri-ch testified (Ab. 160, Tr. 384-5) 
that a tunnel which "would divert all of the waters from 
the Utah Copper dump" could be constructed for "eight 
or tEm thousand dollars''. And there can be no dispute 
that Mr. Goodrich, whose eminence and authority as an 
engineer needs no testimonial, answered the following 
question with the following words (Alb. 160, Tr. 385): 
"Q. But for eight or ten thousand dollart'\ 
you ean produee such a catchment and receive tlw 
waters for the Utah Copper Company 1 
A. I should say so. '' 
COSTS 
'Phe eourt elTe(1 in awarding costs to plaintiff. Plain--
tiff contends that the court did not err in awar(1ing costs 
to plaiutiff heeause defendant perverted a true condem-
uatiou action iu to an action to try title. In bring-ing 
this action plaintiff must be held to have brought before 
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the court all the iswes whi~!J tlw la\\' provides must be 
determined before the plaintiff is entitled to succeed. 
Sub-paragraph 1 of Section 7333, Compiled Laws of Utah 
1917, provides : 
"OONDlTIONS PRECEDJ!~N'l' TO CON-
DEMNNTION. Before property can be taken it 
must ,appear: 
"1. T!Jat the use to which it ts applied ts a 
use authori?.(Kl h~· law;'' 
'l'hat tlw nst> to which the tn1ds soug·ht to be• conde1nned 
in tl1is adion was sneh a use was neeessarily in the ease, 
and the lmrden on this issue \\·as on the plaintiff. It 
hurd!~· lies in the mouth of the plaintiff to complain 
reg·ar<ling this matter. 
~\n action in <·ondemuation ts a. dnurti<' one. [t lll-
nules compulsoril.\· the rights of tlw citi?.Cll in the m-
tt>rc>st of the larger \\'l'lfan•. 'rhe existPuce of a sitna-
timl wananting the applieatiou of rig·hts of e111inent do-
main should he cstablishPd he.YO!Hl all question or thl' 
right hceomes a \\TOllg', and its exercise au arbitrury and 
mwonstitutional abuse. '!'here is no hardship in requir-
ing that the plaintiff i11 an adiou in <·onclemnation be 
required to pa,v that small portion of tlw eosts permitted 
to lw taxed in litig:ation of great expense and of vital 
jmportanee. Certainly the wclfarP of the (•omnmnit~~ 
m](l the interest of the pnblie at large will he best served 
by making: the condemnor pay the taxahiP c-ourt (~osts 
of every c.ondernnation snit the defense of which is 
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conduetl•d in good faith. The plaintiff gets the benefit 
of a drastic remedy. He certainly should comply with 
the constitutional provision that private property may 
not he taken without full compensation. 
It developed \'er:r early in the adion that the defend-
ant eontenderl that the plaintiff was not eondemning land 
hut was acquiring the title to the defendants' eopper 
solutions. 'rhis was an entirely legitimate, proper and 
ueeessary eontention. Of course, the plaintiff would have 
preferred that the defendnnt lie down on the only real 
issue in the ease and snlnnit, as it has repeatedly sug-
gested in its brief, to the plaintiff's unobstructed prog-
ress; hut the defendant dirlnot care, and the law did not 
require it, to do this; and it does not lie in the mouth of 
the plaintiff to eomplai11 that this wa:,; not done. The 
TJlaintiff cannot say, "It is trne, we hrought an action 
in eondenmntion hut ~'ou claimed. it was in fad an aetion 
to acquire title and therefore we do not have to pay the 
costs of a eondemnation adion." Plaintiff's mouth is 
closed as far as this defr~liSl' i::; COlH'Cnwrl. 
On page 12:3 plaintiff says: ''The costs taxed were 
not incurred in ascurtainiug- tlw amount of the compen-
sation to which the owner was entitled by reason of the 
taking;" etr-. True. The main question in this case is 
whether or not the plaintiff is by this action taking the 
r~efundauts' copper solutious. 'l'he land itself without the 
solutions is of comparatively little value. But the ques-
tiou of whether the plaintiff was taking the defendants' 
solutions bei11g the important question in the r·nsc, and 
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it being ueem;~ary for the plaintiff to succeed on this 
issue, ami thi~ being an appropriate issue in eoudemna-
tion action, tlte plaintiff ~hould, however the action may 
result, pay the costs of this action. Plaintiff has an 
idea that if plni11tiff is successful in a eondenmatiou ~uit 
that the fad of success relieves plaintiff from paying 
eosts. Of <~ourse suc·h is not the ease. 
'l'hat the question of title~ is entirely appropriate m 
('Ondemnation suits is <lec·hued by our ow11 eourt in the 
ease of K'etchum Coal Co. v. District Court, 159 Pae. 7iJ7, 
in which the old fi.rm of Dickson, Ellis, Ellis & Schulder 
represented certain of the partie:,; and contended un-
suc·c·e~sfully that the issue of title ought to 'be settled out-
side of <·ondemuation suits. After referring to a New 
York ease, where, under the statute "eoudemna tion pro-
ceedings are special and the proceeding comes before 
courts of geueral jurisdiction only in case when there 
is an appeal from the damages awarded to the land 
owner", the court says: 
"Under such circumstances every lawyer 
readily understall'ds aud appreeiates why con-
denmation proceedings are not deemed proper 
to try questions of title, and therefore such ques-
tions must he tried iu a court of general jurisdic-
tion, and in case the dispute respecting the title 
arises between the condemnor and the eondenmee 
the question of title must be determined in a pro-
per court before the damages can be adjusted as 
between them.'' 
The court, after referring to the fact that m eertain 
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juritldictions it has been deeided that ditlputes as to title 
between c;ondemnor and ('tmdemuee may he settled in con-
dmnnation proceedings, and in other states the issue 
as to title between cmzdemttees may not he 80 tried, since 
,-;uch iH.sue relate:-; only to a distrilmtiou of damages and 
not to th(• right to eomlemn, the court says: 
''Anwug othm· easm.; in whi(~h it is held that 
disputes regarding the title to the condemned 
proport~· may 1b(~ determined in the eondemnation 
proceedings vvo refer to the following: Chicago 
& M. J1Jl. Hy. Co. v. Diver, 21:~ Ill. 26, 72 N. E. 758; 
Illinois Cent. H. Co. v. Roskemmer, 2fi4 Ill. 103, 
105 N. K 695; Chic:ag-o & N. \Y. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 
251 Ill. 58, 95 N. E. 1027; Wilcox v. ~t. P. & N. P. 
Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 4i19, 29 N. vY. 148; Gerrard v. 
Omaha, N. & B. H. R. Co., 14 Neh. 270, 1!5 N. \Y. 
2:n; Dietrichs , .. LiTH·oln & N. W. H. Co., 14 Neib. 
:l35, 15 N. \\'. 728; City of Los Angelos Y. Pomeroy, 
124 Cal. 097, ;)7 Pae. 5Rf\. '' 
Tlw eonrt tlwn discus:w.'-' tliP case• of Chit'ago & 11. 
T•~l. H~·. Co. , .. Diver, and then :-;trangPl~· I'Cfl'rs to the 
"interPsti11g" ca:w of Los AngelPs "- l'mn(•ro~·, <IS fol-
lows: 
"In City of Los Angeles \'. Pollleroy, supra, 
~lr. Chief .Justice Beatty, unde1· a statute like 
ours, in his nsual clear and vigorom; style, points 
out that all questions relating to til(• title of the 
property that is eondemned or is affected by the 
c~ondemnation proceeding that llla)' arise should be 
tried ami determi11ed in the eondemnation action. 
Aml why may that not he done'? It seems t']ear 
that our statute, whieh is likP the one in Cali-
fornia, contemplates that it should be done. Comp. 
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Laws 1907, see. :~596, so far as material here, 
provides: 
" 'The court or judge thereof shall 
have power: * * * To hear and determine 
all adverse or conflicting claims to the 
property sought to be condemned, and to 
the damages therefor,' and 'to determine 
the respective rights of different parties 
seeking condemnation of tl1e same prop-
erty.' 
"Again, under our statute an action to con-
demn lands is conlnleiH·ed, eolHlneted, and tried 
in the same eourts and in the same manner as all 
other adions affecting real property are tried. 
In view of the provisions of our statute it is not 
easy to understand why all issues arising in eon-
deumation aetiont:; are not to he tried and deter-
mined in that action the same as is done in all 
other actions affeeting real property.'' 
It is interesting to note that costs of the proceed-
ings in the Ketchum ease were assessed against the 
party contending that tlw issue of title was foreig·n to 
a condemnation action, so the matter ought to be settled 
in this jurisdidion. 
The question of whether or not the attempted use of 
the statutes of emineut domain is in fact a legal use, or, 
as our statute puts it "that the use to whic·h it is to he 
applied is a use authorized by law", is always a proper 
1ssue. Our statute is the same as that of California. 
In 10 Cal. .Jur., p. iW:l, Sec. 19, title "F~mineut Domain", 
the text is as follows: 
"Unquestionably the ow11er of the laud song·ht 
to be condemned may show that the use and its 
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purpose are private and not public. And it is 
competent for the state, upon discovering the mis-
use of its authority whereby private property is 
being wrongfully taken for private use, to inter-
po:c:P by its aitomey general to con·eet the abuse. 
The reasoning underlying this rule is, of course, 
that inasnnwh as the plaintiff in proceedings to 
appropriate private property for puhlie use pur-
ports to act as ,agent for the state, it necessarily 
follmvs that if tlw use is a mere private one the 
proceeding·s amount to an imposition upon the 
court before which they are had." 
A m1mlwr of (•ase:-; arc <'itl•d in support of the text, but, 
as it seellls to ns, tlH• proposition is too tnanifest to re-
q ni re extensive (•i ta tion. 
011 page 12;) plaintiff ('it<•s tlH• Colot·ado caf'e of 
Haver, .. Slatonock, 7G Colo. :301, 223 Pa('. ~m-1-. As \\'l' read 
I he ('aSl' it dom; not support plaintiff's eontention in any 
n~sped. In Colorado, as in U!ali, !liN(' an• ('l'l"tnin pn~­
liminm·~- quc;;.;tions \Yhi('h lllllst he de(•ided hy the court 
or by a ('Ollltllissioner heforp the question of damages 
},., submitted to a jnr.Y. 'l'hP court holds, as \\"(' uncler-
::-;tand the Colorado decision, that if a part;' fails to 
raise tlw pn~limitiar~· questiow.; lwforp tlw court, he 
waives these qnes!ionH, and if lw later improperly injech; 
them in the pro('eedings heforc the jlu~· be is not fmtitled 
to his ('OHts in prese1Jting the issues after having by 
his ('Ollduet waived them. 
A good explanation of tlH• Hituation as far as the 
Colorado ca:-eH are ('Oncenwd will lw fonnd iu the ease 
of l 'nion Pn('. Hy. Co. \'. Colornclo Postal, ()!) Pac. 564. 
]O!J 
\Yc <tuotc from pages 5()5 and ::J()~: 
'' Uonuscl for respoudeut contend that these 
seYeral matters present prejudicial error, for the 
reason that petitioner had failed to prove that the 
property sought to be c·ondemue<l was to he taken 
for a public use, or that there was any uecessity 
for taking iL It is also urged that, in view of the 
issues ma(le by the pleadings, the respondent had 
the right to introduce at the hearing before the 
commissioners the testimony refused, for the rea-
son that such testimony tended to establish a state 
of faets from whieh it woulcl appear the taking of 
the land in question was for a private, and not a 
public·, use, and that there \Vas no necessity for 
sueh taking. These matters might well be dis-
vosed of upmt the ground that the law does not 
c·outemplate that commissioners in condemnation 
proecediugs shall ('Onsider or determine sueh 
questions. On the contrary, they are to he de-
termined hy the• ('Onrt or judge, bnt, unless so pre-
sented for detenninatiou before the appointment 
of commissioners, or the right to do so is in some 
\Ya~, reserved, t Itt'~' an• waived. Recti on 1720, 1 
Mills' Ann. St., provides that the court or judge 
rna~, appoint a hoard of ('Ommissioners to aseer-
tain the ncc·essity for taking lauds sought to he 
condemned. \Yhat propoRitions may he raisecl 
upon the question of IW<'essit? will vary aecord-
ing to the ein·tmtsblll('Cs of ea('h particular ease. 
In this instance, however, so far as disclosed by 
the pleadings, or any matter discussed in the 
brief, we are of thP opinion that the authority of 
the cmumi~simwrs on that question would be ·lim-
ited to a determination of the one of quantity of 
land, or, more a<'curatel.\· speaking, tlw width of 
the proposed right of way suffieient to serve thP 
rcasonahle physical needs of petitioner in erecting 
and maintaining its telegraph line. Or,dinarily, 
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the authority of eommissionerH on the subject 
is r,;o limited. In effect, this court has so decided 
in the reeeut ease of Gibson v. Cann ( Oolo. Sup.) 
66 Pac. 879. It was certainly never intended that 
rommissioners should be required to determine 
questions the solution of which depends upon the 
application of intrieate questionr,; of law such as 
would he presented by the trial of isr,;ues tendered 
by the Hllswer of respondent. This <'OUrt has fre-
quently decided, in cases where the question of 
damages in eollllemna tion proceedings was sub-
mitted to a jury, that the only matter proper fm· 
the jury to consider was the one of damages, and 
that all other questions must he settled in limine. 
Irrigation Co. V. navis, 17 Colo. 326, 29 Pac. 742; 
Thompson v. Reservoir Co., 25 Colo. 243, 53 Pac. 
507; Sicdler v. Seely, 8 Colo. App. 499, 46 Pae. 
848; Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Four Mile R. 
Co., 29 Colo. ____ , 66 Pae. 902. On principle tho 
same rule is applicable to the ease at bar. The 
commissioners wore appointed without objection 
on the part of respondent. There was no attempt 
U'Pon its part to suhmit to the eourt the determin-
ation of any of the questions of fact upon which 
it relied to (lcfeat the procediug until after the 
report was filed. RJespomlent did not serk to 
prove that petitioner did not require the quantity 
of land sought to he condemned, nor by its plead-
ing·s was any such defense suggested. None of 
the matters a hove mentioned whieh respondent 
sought to snhmit to the emnmissioners were of a 
eharacter \dtieh it was the province of that body 
to determine; ami by the eonrse pursued the right 
to have them determined hy tho c-ourt was waived. 
The reason for this coneh1~ion is obvious. If, for 
any reason, tho petitioner in eoudemnation pro-
eocdings i1-l not outitle(l to exorcise the right of 
eminent domain, or take a particnla r tract, these 
questions should be determined hy the court in 
limine. If adverse to tho petitioner, that is the 
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end of the pro<:eeding. irrigation Co. v. Davis, 
supra. In thiR eonnection wu eall attention to 
the case last cited. ln that ease the petitioner 
sought to have a right of way condemned through 
an already-existing diteh. It was held that, if the 
responde11t desired to have the question of the 
feasibility and praeticwbility of takiug a right of 
way through such ditch detPrmined, the question 
should have bet•H refuJT<>d to a hoard of eommis-
simwn..; appoiuted by tht' court, as the lnw directs. 
This holding, howen~r, was based upon the pro-
visions of sedions 22G1, 22G2, 1 Mills' Ann. St., 
whieh provide that lands improved or o<•cupied 
shall not, without the written consent of the own-
er, be suhjel'ted to the 'burden of more thau one 
irrigating ditch coustmeted for the purpose of 
conveying ·water through such property to lands 
adjoiuing or beyond, when the object ean be feas-
ibl~· alHl practicably attained by unitiug and cml-
veying all the water neeessary through such prop-
erty in one diteh; and that, wlwre it is necessary 
to c-onvey water for the purposes of irrigation 
through th<' improved or o<'<'upied lands of an-
other, t lw shortm.;t and mmd. direct route prae-
ticabl<' npon wlliel! sucl1 diteh cm1 he constructed 
shall he Releded. rrhese provisions, however, have 
no application to the ease at 1bar. Neither were 
the.v invoked in Gihson v. Cann, supra. Both 
parties, lioweYer, appear to have treated the ques-
tion of neeess,it_,. as raised by the pleadings and 
teRtimony offered as heing proper to submit to 
the commissioners, aud for that reason we shall 
treat it as property presented for r<'YiC\Y." 
\Yo also <'all nttentiou to tht• following additional 
Colorado <·a:,;es: 
Sand Creek Latt~ral Irrigation Co., .. DaviR, 
29 Pae. 742; 
Lavelle v. Town of .Julesburg, 112 Pae. 774. 
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In the ('ase of Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. 
Denver & H. G. R Co., G9 Pac. 568, our question is dis-
cussed at pages 571-2. 
Without quoting at length, the court holds that a 
dispute betn·ee,n the condemnees as to title is not a proper 
defense because it in no way qualifies or affects the 
right of the condemnor to take the property but only 
e011eerns between whom the amount which the plaintiff 
must pay shall be divi(1e(l. This limitation of the doc-
trine that a suit in eondemna tion may not he turned j nto 
n suit to quiet title as between the eondemnces is per-
fectly intelligi,ble, and it is also understandable that an 
ordinary suit to quiet title may not be pursued under 
the guise of proceedings in eminent <1omain because such 
proceedings imply an admission on the part of the con-
demnor that the condemnee is OWller of an interest which 
the condemnor seeks to obtain by procec~dings in eminent 
domain, otherwise the proceedings have no basis, but the 
question of the extent on character of the title or owner-
ship of the condemnee is always material and pertinent. 
But, we respectfully suggest, the (pJCstion of 1\·hetlwr 
or not the condemnor is not attempting under the guise 
of eondenmaiiou to promote a private and not n publie 
purpose, or the question of whether or not "the nse to 
which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law", as 
our statute phrases it, is always in the case. The 
Colorado ease, to our min<l, is direc·tly in point on this 
phase of our eontrovcrsy. The eourt .in the Colorado 
ease says that as between two persons, both of whom 
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desire to accomplish the public purpose, the courts will 
not permit one to eondemn the land of another, other-
wise there would be no end to eondenmation proceedings. 
The court says : 
"So far as the authority to t'xerciHe the right 
of eminent domain for public uses is c·oncemed, 
it is based npon the theory that the propert~­
granted the subject is upou the eondition th:1t it 
may he retaken to s·erve the neeessities of tlw 
SO"\;ereign power (Mills, Em. Dom. Sec·. 1; n. S. 
v. J Oll(~H, 1 O:J U. S. 51:3, :~ Sup. Ct. :346, 27 L. Ed. 
1015), and to this end agc•ucies neated h~v the 
state, the purpose of which is to serve the public, 
nw~- exercise this rigllt. vVberc, however, land 
is already <levoted to a public use, it would he 
wholly unreasonable to permit it to ho takeu for 
another public· use whieh would nullify and det'oaL 
the oue to which it is already devoted, exPept in 
cnses w!Jere the overwhelming neeessities of the 
public were sueh that, in order to serve their 
nee<ls, or ~upply their neeessities, the taking of 
:mch property became nec~essary. Unles,; so 
limited, no rule governing the rights of tho:'le 
engaged in conducting a business for the benefit 
of the public could be formulated which woul<l af-
ford them protection against others desiring to 
also engage in the transnc·tion of a puhlie busi-
ness. \Vhile eorporations engaged in business of 
a nature which requires them to serve the pulJli<~ 
are said to be public eorporations, they are, in 
fad, hut r)l'ivate enterprises, inaugurated ror tlie 
henefit of their stoekholders; and if one sueh c·or-
poration may take the property of another so a-; 
to deprive the latter of the use to "\Yhic,ll it ic; 
tlcvotccl, except public necessity demawls ~mcl1 
taking, t1wre wonl<l be llO re:u:mwhle limit to the 
eonditlollf; mHler wl1ich the power of omiHent 
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domain might be exereised. vVithout tbe limita-
tion sugg;ested, the most absurd results ('onld fol-
low. 'l'he second might take from the first, others 
take from the latter, and the first tum about and 
retake, and thus the process go on ad infinitum. 
Lalw ~~riP & W. R. Co. v. Hoard of Connnis-
sioners, supra. The taking of property already 
devoted to a pulblie USt' to an t'xteut which wholl~· 
defeats snrh usc, for another public use, eannot 
he justified when it would merely rt>snl! in a 
ehangc of ownership, without iu an? mam!Pr tend-
ing !o meet or sf'ITP !lH• <>xigc•ueic~s of }lnhli<l 
needs, o1· where tlw clu-mge of ownership \Yonld 
lwconw a mer<> nwtt<'r of pri,·at<' couceru. Chicago 
& N. W. H~·. Co. "· Chieago & ~~- R Co., 11:2 Ill. 
5H9. in tlH' eir<'umstmH'<'S of this ca,.;c' lll'ithet· 
<'Olllpnratin' <·onv<'lli<'nee. beneflts, nor <·os1 to th<> 
n~spc<·tin' parties can h<> taken into eol!sidern-
tioll." 
In quoting from the ease' of Ilaver Y. "Iaioll(wk, at 
pagt> 1:2;) of plaillti f'f's brief plaii!liff has olnitte<l what, 
to ns, is 1h<> important pal'! of the decisio11 unde1· the 
Colorado pmeeedings. \\' l' quotP from th<' <·ase eom-
meneing· at the ,.;(:'('OJJd eolunm, p. ~·l:\4: 
"\\r e <·an no! hold that the question of neres-
sity im·olvcs the question whetlwr then' is any 
water in existen(•c whi(•h petitioners can usP. To 
so hold would he to allow ·,the l'OIIIIlliHsioncrs, 
whose :;;o]c function is to determine the necessitv 
for the taking to dctenniuc questions of priority 
of appropriations of water, and, in this ease, to 
determiue the extent to which t lw :,;everal parties 
eoncerned iu this proceeding may use \\'aters from 
the ~1atonock spring· or an~· waters fonn<l in the 
'Zorn arroyo', if such arroyo exists. It was not 
the <lnty of th<' eommissioners, appoint<>d i11 t hi-; 
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case, to pass upon such questions. Their duty, 
under the order and the instruetions of the court, 
was solely to determine the necessity of the plain-
tiffs' proposed ditch and pipe line for the intended 
use; not whether the plaintiffs had any right to 
the use intended, nor whether the intended use 
could ever be consummated. The question of ne-
cessity does not involve the right to condemn, nor 
whether plaintiffs could ever make use of the prop-
erty sought to be oondemned if they obtained 
it. The question of necessity simply involves the 
necessity of having the property song!Jt to be 
taken for the purpose intended.'' 
It ·will thm; he notieed that the conrt does not 
hoh1 that if the proposed eondenmor had no water which 
eonh1 lle used through the pipe line proposed to be laid 
across the land of the eondemnee, sueh questiou would 
not he proper in eondemnation proceeding·s, but that 
sudt qne::;tion is not properly before the eommissioners 
appointed by the court to determine the question of 
"necessity"; "necessity simply involves the neeessity 
of having the property sought to be taken for the purpose 
intew1ed'' all(1 not the question of "'hether or not the 
condemnor could use the right of way ::;ought to be coH-
<lemned. Certainly this question has no application in 
our case. Here the question raised was whether or not 
the "use" was one authori;,ed by law, ·whether under 
the guise of c•ondeuming }and the plaintiff did not in faet 
propose to engage in mining and take from the laud of 
the plaintiff without paying for it the mineral valn<>s 
therein contained. 
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The ease of Oibson v. Cann, 66 Pac. 879, is referred 
to in the Haver ease. In that case the court held that 
111 proceedings ''for the purpose of condemning a right 
of way for a ditch and res·ervoir sites aeross and on the 
land of appelleo" the court would noi inquire "whether 
the enterprise is pradicablc or can be made a success 
:fimmeially that these questions are not properly a matter 
of legal neeessity; nor is it pQrtineut to inquire what 
pet itimwr may he able to aceomplish in the way of ob-
taining \Yatl•r whieh ean be utilized through his proposed 
d it ell and reservoir :-;ystem." We Heed spend no time 
on the distinction betwee11 the situation in thiR Colorado 
ease and the ease now before the court. 'l'he question 
raised by till• appell~mt in the• trial eourt wa,.; \Yiwthn or 
not tilt> plaintiff" \\·as not asking tlw eonrt in pnmitting 
1\w ust> of plai11tiff's lalJ(l un<ler the guise of a <'OlHlem-
nntion pro<'e<>ding to aequire the plaintiff's <'oppe>r solu-
tions without pa~'ing for them. 
The !laver ease> also n~fers to the <·asl~ of Schneider 
, .. N<"hneidel·, HG Pac. :l47. The plaintiff sougltt to <·on-
<1l•mll a right of way for a dit<"h "extending from the 
lower end of a <'l~rtain irrigation diteh upou defendant's 
premises to plaintiff's premises." 1t was ohjectl'<l that 
"the appropriatiou, wlwteve1· he the YolUine or origin 
of the water, must attaeh directly or indircdly to some 
natural COlHRl' or <"hannel." 'l'!Je court says, "He (the 
<·ondenmee) <"mmot raise a question that does not con-
ecru him or whieh rests solely hetweeu pctitiouers and 
ot hur appropriators." 'l'he <"Ourt also sa~·s: ''As to 
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whether or not there is suffieie11t water for plaintiff's use, 
ot· a~ to whether or not the plan is a pradieal or feasible 
Ulll' i~ a matter which ('aunot be detennined in a pro-
<·eediug of this character." 'I' he eourt abo holds that 
then~ is no merit to the C'outention "that no easement can 
lw acquired for a diteh until the right to the use of the 
water shall han• beeome vested." 1t seems to us quite 
appnrcnt thai the situation in the em·w of Selllleirtcr Y. 
S('lmeirler is Pntirely diffen•ut to that now before the 
court. llt>rc tlw question was diredl)· within the pro-
Yi:->iou of tlw statuil' whieh pro\·ides that tlw eourt must 
det<·nniue whether or not the "use" iuteuded is one 
JH'rntitt<·d by law. 'l'lw real question in this case is 
wlwther or not plaintiff under the guise of condemnation 
is attl•Jupt iug to confiscate the mineral values helonf.,l'j_ng 
to thl' defell(lant. 
Plaiutiff cites the case of Publie Serviee Co. v. CHy 
of Lov<'laud, 7~l Colo. 21G, 24G Pac. 498, on p. 127 of its 
ln·ief. The City of Lon~land broug·ht an action to con-
dPmn for puhlie purposes an eledri(' light plant belonging 
to tlw Public Serviee Compmt~·. The C'ourt held in that 
ease that the <pwstiou "eouceruing the clain1 that there 
wns a misappropriation or improper diversion of public 
funds h~, c·ity officers" was not proper, and that the em-
im•nt domain rnocl'edings could not be eonverted "into 
n trial for alleged misfeasan<·e or malfeasance of muni-
C'i pa 1 oftiee n; ''. 'l'hese remarks eoneern an attempt lly 
the Plcctric light plant owner to dcfewl against the eon-
denmation prof'eedingR on the ground that the funds 
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for the purehasc and those for eonsiruction of the electric 
light plant should be kept separate, which it was elaimed 
was not clone. '!'he court holds that such an issue is im-
proper, <'iting, among others, the ease of Shields v. City 
of Lo\'claud, in whieh it was held that "questions of 
municipal bonds and the rights of holders thereof" could 
not lw injected into a condemnation case, among other 
reasons, bee· a use "such parties are not before the court.'~ 
\\' e C'annot sec how these manifestly foreign considera-
tions a l"e in any \\·ay analogous to the issue in the present 
case as to whether or not the plaintiff is not in allegedly 
attempting to condemn a right of way actually appro-
priating, without paying for it, eoppcr solutions of the 
defendant. 
On page 127 of its brief plaintiff cites Truckee River 
General Eleetric Co. v. Durham, :~8 Nev. :311, 149 Pac. 
til. In this case the court holds: "If the llemand is 
so unreasonable as to justify a fair-minded person in 
litigating the question, small C'onsider·ation should he paid 
to his request for judgment for the costs whieh accrued 
after the filing of the answer in the case." And then a 
sentence follows in the opinion which shows that the 
statement of the eourt is purely dieta. This sentence is 
omi tte<l from tho quota i ion by appellant: "Sinee the 
case must be tried anew, we will make no order as to 
C'osts." \\' e know nothing about the statutes in Nevada 
relating to costs in condemnation suits, but in any event, 
we are perfectly willing that the eourt shall consider 
whether or not the defense made in this case is "so un-
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n•n:-;mwhlL''' tlJat it will shoek a fair-milldecl person, an<l 
to dutermine our right to costs from such consideration. 
< h1 page 128 eounsel reiterates its assertion that in 
ihis adion the defenJauts have settled a fictitious daim 
for damages in the sum of $200,000.00 and upwards for 
$500.00, the amount offered prior to the institution of the 
suit. ~We have heretofore discussed this eharge and shall 
content ourselvL•s witlt J'L•ferring tilL• court to page 17 
or this ))riel' where tlw matter is considered. 
Ou }JHg'l' 1:l0 l'()SJHHHlL•Jlt eiteH the ca:-;e of ln re Coul'!-
land, ete. Horse Railway Co., 98 N. Y. 36:~. (The page 
eitation is iu error. It is found at page 336). This castl 
i:-; cited on tlte proposition that costs nmy be awarded 
L•itliL•r the JllaiutiiT or the Llefendaut under the New York 
statutL·s appli<·able to speeial proceedings. The case is 
mw in \Yhi<·ll a railroad coJllpany attempt;, to condemn '1 
no:-;sing o\·er tlJL' track of another company. Respondent 
in Lluoting the Ll<·eisiou of the eourt 011 page 1:n leaves 
OUt tJH' lllOHt llllportant part. rJ'his part distinguishes 
tht• L'HSL' eited from the presunt one. ll1 the pre:,.;eut case 
•n· an• contesting tlw right of the plaintiff to condemn. 
In tilL• <·ase eitL•d Uw right to eoudt•mn is admitted and 
tliL· onl:· <pll'~lion was as to the necessity of taking a 
particular pie(·e of laud, awl tllis question was to be de-
tt>rmiued by commissioners under the 1\ew York practiee 
in ~ueh lllatters. 'l'his ease holds that the matter of one 
rairoad crossing another is g·overned by a special statute 
awl, as is said in several other New York cases, such au 
nction is not strietly a proceeding in eminent domain. 
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On the latter point we cite the following cases: 
In re Limi & H. :F'. Ry. Co., 22 N. Y. S. 967; 
Buffalo B. & L. R. Co. v. New York L. E. & 
vV. R. Go., et al., 25 N. Y. S. 265; 
!Hornellsville Elec. R. R. Co. v. N. Y. L. E. 
& Vv. R. Co., 31 N. Y. S. 745. 
We also wish to refer to the case of New York \Vest 
Shore & Buffalo Ry. Co., In re Walsh, 94 N.Y. 287. We 
quote from pp. 2~)4- and 295, as follows: 
''In the present case tho costs allowed are 
small compared with the amount of the award, 
which was $35,500, but that can make no difference 
in the principle. If the company can recover 
against the land-owner the expenses of proceed-
ings carried on by it for its O\Vn benefit, where the 
avvarrl is large, it may do the same when the 
award is small; and a case may he supposed where 
the costs and expenses of the company would ab-
sorb a large part, or even the \\'hole of the award. 
There is no warrant in the Htatute for awarding 
such eosts, and if there wel'e, it \Yould be a viola-
tion of tho ronstitutional right of the land-
owner.'' 
As further ovidonee that nos sing eases in Now York 
are treated as sni generis, we eall attention to the fact 
that the \\Talsh ease is referred to in tho Courtland case. 
\\" e do not believe that there is any rem;on in the at-
tempted distinction made by eounsel between the two 
eases. It is not the law that the land owner is only en-
titled to his costs in the action for determination of dam-
ages aud is denied his eosts in an action whore he resists 
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the right of the plaintiff to condemn. An eminent domain 
proceeding is logically divided into three parts: (1) The 
determination of the right to condemn. Under this part, 
questions of public use, the authority of the plaintiff 
and conditions precedent to the exercise of the right are 
properly involved. (2) Necessity. Under this part ques-
tions of the need of a particular track or method of 
accomplishing a particular result are to be considered. 
(3) 'rhe question of damages. It should not be the law, 
and it is not the law, that the land owner can recover 
his costs expended under the last heading only. 
Cases holding that the land owner can recover his 
costs expended in denying the right of the plaintiff td 
condemn are the following: 
San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irr. Co. 
Inc. v .• James .T. Stevinson, et al., 1:32 
Pac. 1021; 
Yolo vVater & Power Co. v. Edmunds, 205 
Pac. 445. 
Respomlent further eites two cases holding that the 
condemning party may be allowed his costs on appeal 
when the property mvner appeals. vV e are appealing 
from the deeision of the lower eourt ,:~;hich awarded the 
costs of the trial to the plaintiff, and up to the present 
time we have no quarrel with the rules of law enunciated 
in the eases cited by respondent on page 1:32 of its brief; 
in fad, the prononneements of the California eourt in 
the ease of City of Oakland v. Paeific Coast Lumber & 
~till Co., 172 Cal. :132, 15G Pac. 4G8, as to costs on the 
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trial meet with our entire approval. 'rhe court in that 
<·ase reeognizes aud enunciate-s our position on the mat-
ter of costs ~u; clearly as it may he done. We quote from 
p. 4()!) as follows: 
"1t is seUlt~d law in this state that, in view 
of the provision of Rection 14 of article 1 of our 
Constitution that 'private property shall not be 
taken or damag-e<l for public use \vithont .iust eom-
pensation having- iirst lwen ma<le to, or paid into 
court for, Uw owner,' the owner whose property 
is thus soug-ht to lw takeu <·aunot he required to 
pay any portiou of' his I·easoiwhle costs neeessar-
ily i1H•itlcntal to the h·inl of' the isstws 011 his part, 
OJ' any part of the ('Osts of the plaintiff; for to re-
quin) him to do thiR would redm•e the just com-
pensation awarded by the .inr.'· by a snm equal to 
that paid by him for such eosts. 'l'his was helrl 
to he the ndc as to the cosh; in the SUJH'rior cour·t 
in the ease of San Francisco v. Collins et al., 98 
Cal. 259, :~;~ Pae. 56, vvhere til<• trial eourt, fol-
lowing tlw provisions or :,;ection 125:-i of the Code 
of Civil Procerlurc, had apportioned sneh co:,;b 
between the partie:,; on adverse sides. Said see-
tion 12;)5, speeially applicahlt• to aetions in emin-
ent flomain, provi<l0d, as it still provi(l<'s, that: 
" 'Costs ma~' be allow0(l OJ' not, awl, 
if allowed, may lw apportioned between 
the partie:,; on the sallie OJ' adn'l'."il' sidt':', 
i11 the di:,;crctioll of the court.' 
"lt was heltl that thi:,; secti011 was limited in 
its effed by the provision of :,;cdion 14 of arti(~lt~ 
1 of the Constitution, hereinbefore :,;d forth, and 
the order of the superior eonrt was l'lW<'I'S!'cl. It 
iR not questioned that this ruling was iu aeeonl 
with tlw decit-~ions in other states, an(1 its correct-
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ness has never been doubteu. In San Joaquin 
& Kings River, etc., Co. v. Stevinson, 165 Cal. 
540, 132 Pae. 1021, it •vas held that on a success-
ful appeal by the party seeking to condemn, the 
judgment in favor of the owner being reversed, 
the constitutional provision precluded the recov-
ery by the party seeking to condemn of itf; costs 
of appeal. 'rhis ruling was in aeeord with the 
overwhelming weight of authority in other juris-
dictions, and we see no reason to uoubt its cor-
rectness.'' 
The other case eited by respondent on page 1:32 of 
its brief is i'rom the State of Washington, and sinee 
submitting our brief" on this <tuestiou the ('ase of 
State v. Superior Court of Walla "Walla County wa,s 
decide<l h~· the Supreme Court of \Vashington. The re-
port of t l1is <'ase may he found in 9 Pac. (2d) 70. We 
quote from p. 71 as follows: 
"Onr Constitutio11, art. 1, sec. 16, prescribes 
that no private property shall he taken or dam-
aged for pnblir or private use without just com-
pensation having hee11 first made or paid into 
court for the owner. Under this provision of the 
Constitution it has heen held from an early day 
that the land-owner must not be put to the ex-
peuse of litigation in order to preserve his con-
stitutional right to have the nmount of damages 
<1etermined by a court in a proceeding to which 
he is a party. Adams Oounty v. Dobschlag, 19 
Wash. :156, 53 P. :1:~9; Little v. King County, 159 
\Yash. 326, 293 P. 438.'' 
Se<~ also Kelle1· v. Miller 165 Pae. 774 and ('ases cited 
therein. 
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011 page 129 counsel say.-;: •' Determination of title 
to the eoppcr solutions was not a neecssary ineident of 
thir-; suit~-no more so than all inquiry into the precis·:; 
nature of plaintiff's title in or to its dumps in Dixon 
Gnleh, nor into the many other matters the eourts have 
excluded from consideration in condeumation suits." If 
the only question at issue ill this ease had beeu the title 
of plaintiff to plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Guleh, there 
would ltm·e he ell no Ia w suit. \ \" n aJ·p not ('Oncerned iu 
<HJ.v way with thai title. 'rllis action, however, did eou-
cem c·crtaiu c·opper solutions not in plai-ntiff"s rlump 
but on the pn'mises of the defendant, and the whole ques-
tion is whether or not, beeausp plaintiff owns ('ertain 
dumps west of Tract D it also owns ('Crtain ('Opper r-;olu-
tions appearing in Tract D. Certain!~· il' the copper 
solntions are owned hy tl1c defendants, the plaintiff had 
no right to condemn Tra(·t D and eaptu1·e thesp copper 
solutions. 'l'he purpose of this adiou was to (·apture 
eoppcr solutions on Tra(·t D, and all the ist>ues raiHed 
lnwe hee11 di rpeted to the IJUestion of wht>tber or not 
this was a "use" of Tract D sue h as is '• aut hori ~eel by 
law". Thai issue is cxprt-ssly made mw of the pl'Plim-
inary ones before the cmut in f·ondt-mnation proc·eedings. 
N ont- of tho caHes cited on page ] 2D by plaintiff in whicl1 
the conrts han; exclnded extraneous issuer-; from pro-
eoediugs in eminent domain haYP thp n•motest re-
semblance to the issues in this ease. 
'l'he ('aRe of lure City of Cedar Rapids, 83 lo\Ya, 39, 
01 N. \\~. 1142, is a ease where the owner of property 
attempted to set up the fact that the eity had 110 funds 
with \\·hieh to pay for the land taken. It was held that 
tllis questio11 did not affect the Cit~· 's r·ight to bring 
the action because payment in full would have to be 
made before the City could take the property. 
Tlw caSl' of M ereer Count_,. , .. \Y oHf, :n/ lll. 7 4-, KG 
X. K 70K, is a similar casC' in whi(•h it is ht>lcl that 
whether or not a cou11ty has sufficient money to build a 
jail is not a proper math)r to be <'Ollsiderecl in condem-
llation proeeeclings. 
Tlw 1wxt <·ase <·ited h.Y respondent is the cast~ of City 
of Chi<·ago , .. The Hmritar.'· Dist riet of ( 'bieago, 272 lll. 
:)7, 111 :\. !<:. 4!Jl. 'rhis was an aetimr b.v thP City to 
<·mrdenm nrr outlet for a se,,·er. 'fhe def,ense was that 
the liiOIH).'. for tlw eondPmllation action "·as furniRhecl 
not h.'· the Cit_,. hut b.'· tl!e Union Htation Company. It 
was lwld that this c·otdd not affect the City's rig·ht to 
eon<lenm since tlwn' was a contra<·t bdwee11 the Cit~· and 
the Fnion Rtation Compan.'· wht'rt>hy tlw Cit.'· had agreed 
to ac<'omplish the changes whirh were sought in the ac-
tion if the.'· were fonud to lle He<•essary. 
In the Cit~· of Dallas , .. Halloek, 44 Ore. 246, l:i Pac. 
20+, the objection Taise(l was that tht> Cit~· after pur-
eha:sing the l)]'OJWJ't)r intendt>cl to pay the bnildeT by 
making it a lPsRee of the \\·aten\'Ol'ks to he eonstnwted on 
the land comlcmmecl and allowing the builder as such 
lessee to eollect tolls fol' a term of years. It was held 
that this was no objection to the action heeause the de-
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fendant was neither a resident nor a taxpayer of the 
Uity and certainly did not affect the City's right to 
condemn. 
Similarly, m the ease of State ex reJ. Thomas, v. 
Superior Court of Whatcom County, 42 Wash. 521, 85 
Pac. :236, the owner of the property sought to defeat 
the <'OIHlenmation action by pleading that the City had 
exeeeded it~ right to incur debts. This was held to be 
110 defense to a condemnation action. 
ln the case of Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. 
v. Birmingham So. R. Co., 128 Ala. 526, 29 So. 
4il5, the ow11cr of the land sought to defeat the right to 
<'OIHlenmation on the ground that the railroad company 
whieh was attempting to obtain ground for a branch road 
had not filed a resolution of its board of directors with 
the se<~retary of state authori%ing· it to do so. It was 
held that this was only a matter of importance to the 
stockholders of the t•orporation and of no legitimate eon-
cern to strang·ers. 
City of Santa Ana v. Brunner, 1:32 Cal. 2:34, 64 Pac. 
:287. rrhe objediou raised in this case was that one of 
the trustees of the City had filed the petition which was 
presented to the board requesting eondemnation of the 
laud for eoustruction of an alley. It was held that this 
objedion could not defeat the plaintiff's right of action 
so long as there was a quorum without that trustee. 
Hichland S('hool rrp. of Fulton County v. Overmyer, 
164 Ind. ~~82, 7i3 N. E. 811, is a case where the objection 
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to the right to condemn was that land was going to be 
applied to a different use than that for \\'hich the action 
\\·as <·ommenccd, and also that a loss quantity of land 
·woul<l he sunieicnt or that another location would be more 
<·onvt~uient. It was held that these objection:,; could not 
defeat the rig·ht to ('OIHlenm. 
The eourt sa:vs: 
"It was not conqwtt~nt in this p1·ocet>ding to 
iutroduce evidence tending to show that the prop-
erty was to be applied to a <liffen~nt use than !lwt 
for which it was appropriated. The propcrt~· 
thus acquired could only be used for the public 
purpose for whi(•h it was obtained under this 
statute." 
Kan::-;ns & 'l'Pxa::-; Coal Ry. Co. \'. Northwe::-;tern Coal 
& M i niug Co., 1 Gl l\l o. 288, 61 R. \\'. 684, 84 Am. Rt. Rep. 
717,51 L. R. A. ~)i~(i, was a <"ase where the chief objection 
;nts that a railroad was seeking· to lmild a branch Jine 
for th<:> sole purpose of developing coal lauds owued by 
the railroad. The court held the use was public beeanse 
tht• railroad <"ould be required to cany passengers or 
freigl1t for nnyolle desiring to nse it. 
Caretta R~·. Co. v. Ya.-Po<"ahontas Coal Co., 6:2 \\T. 
Va. 185, 57 S. E. 402, is a ease where the owner sought 
to deft>at the right of a railroad eomp;m~· to <·omlerrm 
land on tlw grouud that the p1·oposed route was through 
a mountajnous and sparsely settled cou11tr.'' and that 
only a few people would he able to use the road for the 
purpose of transporting freight or for passenger ser-
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vwe. This was held to be immaterial on the question of 
the right to eondemn. 
It will be seen that while all the cases cited by the 
respondent held that the questions attempted to be raised 
were not competent and were not determinative of the 
right to condemn, that none of the questions attempted 
to he raised are analogous to the question in this case. 
At any ra tl~, plaintiff allowed the question of title to be 
raised in this action and without obj.ection, and admitted 
that if the waters on Tract D had been found to belong 
to the defemlant that this action wonld have been dis-
missed (Respondent's brief, p. 8) (Ab. ______ ), and also 
plaintiff has stated that it could not in this action con-
demn any of defendant's waters, and further that it was 
not attempting to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case plaintiff is attempting to lift itself by 
its boot straps. The only argument made by plaintiff 
as to its right to collect water in catchment C is that it 
i•s given such right hy the order of occupaney on June 
13, 1928. Nothing antecet1ent, nothing other than this 
order, is suggested as the basis of plaintiff's right; in 
other words, the order which is part of these proceed-
ings, the issuance of which and all right•s under the same, 
the order that is brought hefore this court on this ap-
peal; the determination of the effeet of which is the very 
purpose of the appeal, is the only consideration on whieh 
plaintiff staHds in au effort to uphold that order and the 
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proceedings based thereon. This order was made "with-
out prejudice" and only "pending the action", and has 
no legal effieaey in (•onferring any affirmative rights on 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserts that the order of oc-
cupancy gives it its right to capture copper solutions in 
eatchment C. rrhis could only be true if the order could 
not be appealed from. If it were final and once having 
been entered could not be reviewed, plaintiff's position 
might be eol'Tect, but the order i-s reviewable aml plain-
tiff is accountable for its oeeupaney, and whether or not 
plaintiff obtains any right by the order is the very sub-
ject of this appeal. 'rhe order entered was "without 
prejudice" to existing rights, conveyed nothing, granted 
nothing·, wm; temporal')', was to be iu foree ouly until the 
righb-; existing prior to the order itself could be deter-
mined. The whole purpo•se of an order of occupancy 
pending the action is to preserve the status quo of the 
partil's until fimd determination of their rights and, in 
the 1neantime, at the peril of the condemnor, to permit 
eondemnor to proeeed aeeonling to his claim of rig·ht. 
The order, however, confers no rights and extends no 
immunity. rrhe occupant cannot he charged with being 
a trespasser, hut he must re•spoll(l for every element of 
damage done hy him while in possession. The con-
demuee <~an lose nothing by the order. 
Plaintiff lays great store upon the fact that the late 
Honorable M'Orris L. Ritchi·e commeneed the trial of this 
aetion and passe<l upon a motion for a nonsuit. We have 
no desire to rob plaintiff of any weight to be attached to 
130 
this fad; but considering- tlw sorwusnt>ss of the issues 
involved here, both as to questions of law and as to tlw 
amount of damage, it may be that the overruling of a 
motion for a 11onsuit in t:he midst of a trial is not entitled 
to very great weight. The case war-; nevm· completed bP-
fore .Jndge Ritchie and he never had an opportunity of 
passing finally upon its merits. As to the adion by his 
Honor, .Judg·c McDonough, we de,sire only to say that 
it took .J uclge l\lcDonough a long time to reach a decision 
in this matter, and does not indicate any case in arriv-
ing at the conclusion finally reached. 
UNLESS PEltMITTED TO CONDEMN DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY 
PLAINTIFF WILL HAVE "ABANDONFm" 
THE COPPER SOLUTIONS. 
On page 1:3;: plaintiff admits that "PlaiiJtiff's coll-
demnation sought by this ac·tion'' is for the purpose ''to 
avoid ~· :; .,. au abandonment". In other worcls, before 
the condemnation proC'eedings plaintiff realized it had 
lost 1sueh copper solutions as ('.arne from its dump and 
title to such copper solutions passed up011 reaching tlll' 
we::-;tern boundary of t.ht> appellant's land to tlw ap-
pellant, othPnvise wh~· those proceedings. The purpose 
of this action is to prevent •such an abandomne11t by ac-
quirillg defendants' property. 'rhP won! "abandon-
ment", as we han• heretofort> arg-ued regarding- thP 
words "eonve~'", "c·arry", "transport", is a dangerous 
word. Jt implies volition where no volition t•xists. It 
is one of the charncteristies of water that tit!<> is lost 
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without volition on the part of one having such title as 
may he bad to water. In this case the plaintiff can ac-
quire title only by collecting its copper solutions on its 
property; it has no title at any other place. It does not 
"abandon" title except in the sense that it loses title 
when the waters pass from plaintiff's property, and de-
fendant does not ''acquire'' title as far as any volitio11 
on the part of appellant is concerned wheu the waters 
pass across the western boundary line of appellant's 
premises. The only change as far as the water is con-
cerned is that while on the plaintiff's property the plain-
tiff has the right to capture and control the waters and 
when the waters reach the defendant ',s property the de-
fendant has an equal right. The right to capture foreign 
waters whi(·h will come onto the defendant's laud is a 
present right to future enjoyment. This right is tlll ex-
isting, t'Olltinuing right. It may not be acquired by plain-
tiff without the eonsent of the defendant. vV e know of 
no provision of the statutes of condemnatiou which would 
permit the plaintiff in this ca,se to acquire now without 
compensation the copper waters which have come upon 
the land of the defendant nor the present right of the de-
fendant to such waters as may in the future come into 
the land of defendant from whatever source they ma~· 
come. 
Plaintiff also says, on p. 133 of its brief: "If plain-
tiff be permitted to condemn, plaintiff's solutions will be 
saved to plaintiff, not abandoned by it. In their effort 
to defeat the eondemnation and thereby accomplish the 
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a;bamlonment defendants require, defendants assume the 
ahandonrnent the maintenance of this snit will avoid, 
a false assumption upon wliich defendant's attempt to 
Prect a defense." If plaintiff will liste11 with plaintiff's 
n•asoninp; faculties after reading- again the foregoing, 
plaintiff may hear with unmistakable viviclneRs tlw fa.ll 
of the unRubstantial leg-nl •Rtructurc attempted to be 
erected by the plaintiff. In otlwr wonls, plaintiff admit"' 
that if it were uot for thest~ pro<·cPdings, all waters eom-
ing from till• plaintitT'R dnmp would now lw ahmHloncd 
as aTI waterR prior to the order of oecupancy "pendinp; 
the adion" and "without prejudicl•'' had hcl•n almn01wd, 
and admits that it was the paHHing of the watt>rs onto 
the premiRes sought to lw eondemued that <·oustitutcd 
their abandonment by plaintiff and the acqnin~ment of 
title h:· thl' defPndant. Plaintiff has also Hdmittt>d n•-
pcatedly in itR brief that plaintiff C'<lll acquire no watN 
hy thiR aetiou, title to whi<·h iR in the defl'udmd. 'fht> 
waters ~still cross the western houmlar.\· of thl• land o"·npd 
hy the defendant and will f•outinue so to do iu all likl•li-
hood for many yt>arR to coml'. Tlw decrel' of no ('Ourt 
<·an Atop their comiug, and as ineYitahly as the:· conw 
the la\\· pronounees upon them the ownership of the de-
fendant. This ownership the plaintiff emlllot all<l dt>-
elarcs it doeR not seek to acquirl'. All plaintiff on its ow11 
admiRsiou attempts to do by this adion is to prevcut au 
"abandonment". ThiR plaiutiif eanuot do. No law of 
condemnatim1 t•an repeal thP law of gravitation, or that 
fundamental prineiplt> of the law of property all<l water, 
that water, hceanRe of it1s migratory charaet<•r, must he 
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captured in the laud belonging to the plaintiff befor·e it 
belongs to plaintiff in any final sense; that when it leaves 
the land of the plaintiff, plaintiff camwt fo1low it for tlte 
simple reason that it would, in attempting to follow it, 
be seeking not its own but that which belongs to another. 
BY THE ORDER OF OCCUPANCY "PLAINTII:<'F'S BOUNDARY 
LINE WAS, PENDING THE ACTION, EXTENDED 
ACROSS TRACT D TO AND INCLUDING 
PLAINTIFF'S INTAKE". 
Plaintiff says: "Pending the action the copper solu-
tioll's have been saved from abandonmen1t by order of 
<'Ourt putting plaintiff iu possession for the purpose of 
conveying plaiHtiff's eopper solutions across rrraet D to 
aiHl into plaintiff's intake, by which order plaintiff';-; 
boundary line was, pending the action, extended across 
rrract D to and ineluding plainltiff's intake.'' vVe recall 
someone saying, we think it was a United Rtates senator, 
that it was the iHte11tiou of our country to pick up the 
boundary line behY<:>en the Republic of Mexico and the 
United States aud carry th.at boundar~· far into the heart 
of' Mexico. It was a rather boastful declaration; but 
nations are powerful and bouudar~· liues are subject to 
strange movements wlw11 appeal is made to a jurisdie-
tion in which there are few laws amino <'our·ts and ·where 
the final arbiter is the sword and the only law is that 
written by force. We '"·owler if the plaintiff feels that 
it is aho•ve law and by its uucontrolled will eapahle of 
twisting both law and justiee to the acc-omplishment of 
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the movmg of the houndary that on .June 12, 1928, se-
parated the appellant from those who owned the land 
immediately to appellant's west. "\Ve are quite sure, 
nnless that was aocomplished in law and fact which 
plaintiff says was a.cC'omplisbed, to-w~t, "plaintiff's 
boundary line \nt::>, pending the action, Pxtended across 
Tract D to awl including phintiff's intake", plaintiff 
bas no hope of success in this action. Did the order of 
.June 13, 1928, entered "without prejudice" and only 
"pending the action", pick up the westt boundary line 
of the defendant's property and twist it into the con-
tortions of Traet<s A, B, C, and D? No. The law, out 
of its desire to promote certain general interests of the 
community, has authorized the taking of property he-
longing to a private individual for certain public uses 
and until all issues raised as to whether or not an al-
leged effort to apply ·such law is one which in fact comes 
witthin the statute, permits the party claiming the bene-
fit of the operation of the law to go into possession; but 
just as certainly as the party claiming to be within the 
provision of the law ha:,; the right, before all issuers in-
volved in an attempt to apply the law have been deter-
mined, to enter into possession, such temporary occupant 
must render an account of his acts while in possession, 
if it is finally found that it was mistaken in claiming it 
\\ias right in the institution of the proceeding. If, pend-
ing the action, the plaintiff could by the institution of 
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proceedings to condemn the land of the appellant ac-
qmre those lands for collecting copper water, and the 
court in deciding later that the appellant wa~s wrong 
could not compel the appellant to account for its actions 
during its oecupane,v, all plaintiff would have to do would 
he on the day of the decision in the present case that tlw 
plaintiff was wrong in the im;!tituiiou of its suit in .June, 
E)2~, to refile another action, put up a bond "without 
prejudice'', ''pending the adion '', and reoccupy the 
premises of the defendant, and when defeated in a see-
ond ~suit, commenee a thir·d suit, and continue on through-
out all time colleding the eopper solutions belonging to 
the defell(lant. Or it may lw that the real imp01't of 
plaintiff's words is even stronger than the foregoing. If 
plaintiff is right, all plaintiff would have to do on the 
trial of an aetiou .in <·ondemnation would be to prove 
that au order had lwen entered" peudiug the action" and 
''without prejudicP '' awl the trial would be stopped, 
judgment pronounced for tlte plaintiff, and everybody 
\\·ould take their hats :mel go home. There would be no 
danger in putting up a bond, according to plaintiff's 
theory, because t,here would be no duty to account. The 
bond \Vould be one of those amusing .incident's of the 
proeeedings which enlivens the eouduct of a trial as 
portrayed in Jig-hi opera. \;v'e are quite certain that all 
the twisting of <the boundary by the order of oecupaney 
"pending the action" an<1 "without prejudiee", entered 
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on .J nne 13, 1928, occurred in that part of the anatomy 
of counsel for plaintiff which is usually thought to be 
devoted to the pr·ocesses of reasoning, and ha•s no other 
existence. 
Respectfully sUibmitted, 
BADGER, RICH & RIOH, and 
OARIJ)S J. BADGER and 
H. D. LOWRY, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
